Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, holding that a district court's invocation of general, as opposed to case-specific, concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic does not justify dispensing with a defendant's right to in-person confrontation.Appellant fatally shot his girlfriend in a car in which two children were present. During the jury trial, the district court permitted two witnesses to testify remotely via video. On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated because the witnesses' convenience did not justify permitting remote testimony and that the district court should have made case-specific findings before summarily ordering that the witnesses may appear remotely. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the court did not make the required findings of necessity before allowing the two witnesses to testify remotely Defendant's right to confrontation was violated, but the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court certifying Appellant, a juvenile defendant, to stand trial as an adult, holding that nothing in the 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230 limited the juvenile court's authority to certify Appellant charged with violating section 201.230 to be tried as an adult.The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that B.J. committed five counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The State filed a certification asking the juvenile court to transfer the case to criminal court. After a hearing, the juvenile court certified B.J. for criminal proceedings as an adult. B.J. appealed, arguing that under section 201.230(5), juveniles who commit lewd acts on children under the age of fourteen cannot be certified as adults for criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in the 2015 amendments expressly barred the juvenile court from certifying B.J. charged under section 201.230 as an adult; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying B.J. as an adult. View "In re B.J.W.-A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the district court's judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempted sexual assault, holding that when a child under the age of sixteen commits a delinquent act but is not charged until after turning twenty-one, no court has jurisdiction to hear the case.After he turned the age of twenty-one, Appellant was charged with committing delinquent acts as a fourteen-year-old. Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that while the juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over children under twenty-one years of age who are alleged to have committed a delinquent act when the person was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years of age, the juvenile court loses jurisdiction once a child turns twenty-one, and, absent certain exceptions, the district court lacks jurisdiction over any charges of delinquent acts. View "Zalyaul v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief in part in this case directing the district court to enter an order concerning Petitioner's custodial status consistent with the instructions set forth in this opinion, holding that Petitioner was entitled to mandamus relief in part.Petitioner was arrested, charged with criminal activity, release on bail, then taken into custody for allegedly violating his bail conditions. While he waited for an evidentiary hearing after a remand Petitioner brought this action asking the Court to consider the standards for pretrial release in general and as applied and then to direct his release. In the meantime, the district court re-released Petition to house arrest. The Supreme Court held (1) Petitioner's claims challenging the imposition of house arrest were not moot but the remaining claims were moot; (2) a defendant is constitutionally-entitled to a prompt hearing after being taken into custody from pretrial release, and the State bears the burden of demonstrating probable cause at the hearing; (3) a violation of a condition of house arrest may lead to statutory sanctions; and (4) the district court is required to make findings of fact on the record that each condition of pretrial release was the least restrictive means of ensuring public safety and the defendant's return to court. View "Johnson v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found as a result of and during a protective sweep, holding that a protective sweep does not require a prior arrest.In granting Defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court determined that the officers did not have an appropriate basis for the protective sweep and that the sweep was per se unconstitutional because it was not preceded by an arrest. The district court concluded that the search was not a lawful protective sweep because it was not based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that the premises harbored a dangerous individual. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that because the district court did not indicate the specific evidence that was improperly seized as a result of the protective sweep or as its fruit, remand was required for clarification of the evidence that fell within the scope of the suppression order and which items were properly seized by law enforcement. View "State v. McCall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of a drug offense in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.336(2)(a), holding that the statutes governing Defendant's first-offense drug crime mandated judgment deferral under the circumstances of this case.Defendant pleaded guilty to violating section 453.336(2)(a) pursuant to a guilty-plea agreement with the State that did not address judgment deferral. Before sentencing, Defendant filed an election to enter a substance-use treatment program without addressing whether he qualified for judgment deferral. The district court entered a judgment of conviction with a corresponding prison sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.211(3)(a)(1) requires the district court to defer judgment where the defendant consents to deferral and pleads guilty to violating section 453.336(2)(a); and (2) the district court lacked discretion to decline to defer judgment. View "Locker v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of murder with the use of a deadly weapon, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and related charges, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the footwear impression evidence presented during trial was admissible without expert testimony, and therefore, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence; (2) neither the district court's failure to make express findings under Lipsitz v. State, 442 P.3d 138 (Nev. 2019), nor its decision to allow a witness to testify via two-way video contributed to the verdict and were therefore harmless; and (3) the district court did not improperly limit witness testimony. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court finding Babylyn Tate not negligent in this tort action, holding that none of the challenged conduct or other alleged trial errors warranted reversal.At issue was the procedural question of whether a party must file a motion for a new trial in district court in order to preserve attorney-misconduct claims on appeal. The Supreme Court answered (1) the rule announced in Rives v. Farris, 506 P.3d 1064 (2022), that a party is not necessarily required to move for a new trial to preserve its arguments based on trial error or its ability to seek a new trial as an appellate remedy, applies; (2) the alleged improper ability-to-pay argument and golden-rule argument did not warrant reversal; and (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's challenged rulings. View "Evans-Waiau v. Tate" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's murder convictions and affirmed her remaining convictions, holding that the district court's instruction on murder was inaccurate and caused prejudice and that Defendant's challenges to her remaining convictions failed.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, grand larceny, and leaving the scene. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court's murder instruction was plainly inaccurate and caused prejudice. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the instructions on murder allowed the jury to convict without finding that Defendant acted with malice was erroneous, and the error in instruction caused actual prejudice; and (2) Defendant's arguments challenging her remaining convictions were unavailing. View "Guidry v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's civil rights complaint without prejudice on the grounds that Appellant failed personally to serve any of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) parties with a copy of the summons and complaint within the service period, holding that the court was required to allow Appellant additional time to cure defects in service.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Appellant alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Respondent based on an alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs; and (2) Nev. R. Civ. P. 4.2(d)(6) gave Appellant additional time to complete service on the remaining respondents. Appellant, an inmate, filed this lawsuit against various officials and employees of NDOC, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on Respondents' alleged indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant properly pleaded a section 1983 claim against Respondent; and (2) Appellant was entitled to additional time under Rule 4.2(d)(6) to serve the state officials or employees. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law