Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the restitution portion of Defendant's judgment of conviction and remanded this case to the district court for further restitution proceedings, holding that restitution for a victim's medical costs is limited to the amount that the medical provider accepts as payment in full rather than the amount initially billed by the medical provider.Defendant pleaded guilty to reckless driving resulting in substantial bodily harm and agreed to pay restitution. After the sentencing hearing the district court ordered Defendant to pay $463,826 in restitution and sentenced him to thirty days in jail and five years' probation. The Supreme Court vacated the restitution portion of the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings on restitution, holding (1) a district court must offset the defendant's restitution obligation by the amount the defendant's insurer paid to the victim for losses subject to the restitution order; (2) the amount to be offset is limited to the portion the payments intended to compensate the victim for costs recoverable as restitution; and (3) the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing hearing in this case did not support the restitution award. View "Nied v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for multiple charges and sentence of death for the murder of two people, holding that cumulative error deprived Defendant of a fair penalty hearing and that no relief was warranted on Defendant's claims regarding the guilt phase.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by prohibiting him from arguing during the penalty phase that if a single juror determines that there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury must consider imposing a sentence other than death. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by prohibiting Defendant's argument, and this error, in conjunction with other errors that occurred in the penalty phase, cumulatively deprived Defendant of a fair penalty hearing; but (2) no relief was warranted on Defendant's claims regarding the guilt phase. View "Barlow v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction of multiple child sexual assault and abuse counts, holding that the district court's decision denying Appellant's motion to substitute counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.In this twenty-two-count criminal matter Appellant retained Mitchell Posin as defense counsel. On the eve of trial, Appellant filed a motion to substitute counsel, alleging that Posin failed adequately to prepare the defense. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Appellant of most of the counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court applied the wrong test in deciding Appellant's motion to substitute counsel because Posin was retained, not appointed; and (2) under the appropriate test, the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to substitute counsel. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly applied Nev. Rev. Stat. 231.1517 and ordered the Parole Board to credit Respondent for the time he spent incarcerated pending adjudication on his new criminal charges.The Division of Parole and Probation issued parole violation reports against Respondent based on new criminal charges. Respondent was remanded into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and physically incarcerated in the prison. However, Respondent's parole revocation hearing was continued for more than one year until the day after he entered an Alford plea to the new charge of attempted burglary. Respondent received a consecutive sentence on the new charge and did not begin serving it until after he was parole on the previous charges. Respondent filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he lost over a year of credit for time served due to him. The district court agreed and granted relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board exceeded its authority by deferring the revocation hearing beyond sixty days after Respondent's return to the custody of NDOC. View "In re Application of Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that counsel's overt interjection of racial stereotypes into Appellant's criminal trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. In his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for introducing racial issues into the trial. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) counsel's statements impermissibly tainted the jury pool by introducing racial invective into the proceedings; and (2) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defense. View "Dean v. Narvaiza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the petition.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly robbery and other crimes. After a penalty phase retrial, the jury returned a death sentence. Appellant later filed a third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petition at issue on appeal. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant could not rely on the alleged ineffective assistance of first postconviction counsel as good cause and prejudice to raise grounds for relief from the guilt phase of his trial; (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance claims of second postconviction counsel lacked merit; and (3) Defendant failed to show that the failure to consider his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to the petition. View "Chappell v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sex trafficking of a child under eighteen years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment, holding that the trial court's Faretta canvass was in appropriate in this case.Defendant, who represented himself at trial, was found guilty of sex trafficking of a child under eighteen years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction on the basis that the waiver of his right to counsel was invalid, holding (1) the trial court's determination that Defendant validly waived his right to counsel was unreasonable in light of the inadequate inquiry into Defendant's understanding of the sentences he faced if convicted; and (2) the trial court should refrain from disparaging Defendant's choice to waive counsel. View "Miles v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for the sexual assault of a woman who was killed twelve years before Defendant was charged, holding that there was no statutory time limit in which the State was required to file the sexual assault charge, and the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.In 1998, two elderly victims were murdered in a retirement facility. In 2010, the State charged Defendant with murdering both victims and sexually assaulting the female victim. Defendant moved to dismiss the sexual assault charge, arguing that the State's prosecution was time-barred. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was no limitations period for the offense under Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.083. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the murder of both victims and the sexual assault of the female victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the requirements of section 171.083 were satisfied, and therefore, there was no statutory time limit in which the State was required to file the sexual assault charge; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Ramos v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual assault, battery with the intent to commit sexual assault upon a victim age sixteen or older, and open or gross lewdness, holding that Defendant was not denied a fair and just sentencing hearing.At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's right to be present was violated when the sentencing hearing was conducted by simultaneous audiovisual transmission over the Zoom videoconferencing platform because of the district court's administrative orders forbidding in-person hearings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's sentencing hearing was fair and just considering the surrounding circumstances; (2) the district court properly admitted evidence of Defendant's previous conviction for battery with intent to commit sexual assault; and (3) the district court did not err in limiting inquiry into Defendant's prior conviction that the court had determined would be admitted as evidence. View "Chaparro v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of two counts of driving under the influence resulting in death and one count of felony reckless driving but vacated his sentence, holding that the district court wrongly considered certain statements during sentencing.Under Nev. Const. art. I, 8A, also known as Marsy's Law, and Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.015 victims are afforded the right to be heard at sentencing. At issue was how to reconcile the provisions' different definitions of "victim." The Supreme Court held (1) neither definition includes anyone and everyone impacted by a crime, as the district court found in this case; (2) when presented with an objection to impact statements during sentences, a district court must first determine if an individual falls under either the constitutional definition or the statutory definition of "victim," and if the statement is from a nonvictim, the district court may consider it only upon a determination that the statement is relevant and reliable; and (3) the district court erroneously considered statements, over objection, from persons who do not fall under either definition of victim without making the required relevance and reliability findings. View "Aparicio v. State" on Justia Law