Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's murder convictions and affirmed her remaining convictions, holding that the district court's instruction on murder was inaccurate and caused prejudice and that Defendant's challenges to her remaining convictions failed.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, grand larceny, and leaving the scene. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court's murder instruction was plainly inaccurate and caused prejudice. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the instructions on murder allowed the jury to convict without finding that Defendant acted with malice was erroneous, and the error in instruction caused actual prejudice; and (2) Defendant's arguments challenging her remaining convictions were unavailing. View "Guidry v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's civil rights complaint without prejudice on the grounds that Appellant failed personally to serve any of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) parties with a copy of the summons and complaint within the service period, holding that the court was required to allow Appellant additional time to cure defects in service.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Appellant alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Respondent based on an alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs; and (2) Nev. R. Civ. P. 4.2(d)(6) gave Appellant additional time to complete service on the remaining respondents. Appellant, an inmate, filed this lawsuit against various officials and employees of NDOC, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on Respondents' alleged indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant properly pleaded a section 1983 claim against Respondent; and (2) Appellant was entitled to additional time under Rule 4.2(d)(6) to serve the state officials or employees. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendant's conviction of, among other things, sixteen counts of lewdness with a child under age fourteen and nineteen counts of sexual assault of a minor under sixteen years of age, holding that the unit of prosecution for the crime of incest is per victim, not per instance.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) vacated six of Defendant's nine incest convictions because Defendant was improperly charged with nine counts when he only should have been charged with three counts; (2) vacated two counts of possession of visual presentation depicting the sexual conduct of a child based on a unit-of-prosecution analysis, holding that the State impermissibly pled multiple possession charges as having occurred at the same time; (3) vacated one count of child abuse or neglect via sexual abuse, holding that the count was redundant to another count; and (4) otherwise affirmed, holding that none of Defendant's other challenges on appeal warranted reversal. View "Sena v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the order of the district court denying Defendant's third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus without conducting an evidentiary hearing, holding that two of Defendant's claims warranted an evidentiary hearing.Defendant was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death for each murder. After a penalty phase retrial, the jury again imposed death sentences. In this postconviction relief proceeding, Defendant alleged ineffective assistance of second postconviction counsel and other claims. The district court summarily denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) two of Defendant's ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claims warranted an evidentiary hearing; and (2) none of Defendant's remaining arguments warranted relief. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the restitution portion of Defendant's judgment of conviction and remanded this case to the district court for further restitution proceedings, holding that restitution for a victim's medical costs is limited to the amount that the medical provider accepts as payment in full rather than the amount initially billed by the medical provider.Defendant pleaded guilty to reckless driving resulting in substantial bodily harm and agreed to pay restitution. After the sentencing hearing the district court ordered Defendant to pay $463,826 in restitution and sentenced him to thirty days in jail and five years' probation. The Supreme Court vacated the restitution portion of the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings on restitution, holding (1) a district court must offset the defendant's restitution obligation by the amount the defendant's insurer paid to the victim for losses subject to the restitution order; (2) the amount to be offset is limited to the portion the payments intended to compensate the victim for costs recoverable as restitution; and (3) the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing hearing in this case did not support the restitution award. View "Nied v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for multiple charges and sentence of death for the murder of two people, holding that cumulative error deprived Defendant of a fair penalty hearing and that no relief was warranted on Defendant's claims regarding the guilt phase.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by prohibiting him from arguing during the penalty phase that if a single juror determines that there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury must consider imposing a sentence other than death. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by prohibiting Defendant's argument, and this error, in conjunction with other errors that occurred in the penalty phase, cumulatively deprived Defendant of a fair penalty hearing; but (2) no relief was warranted on Defendant's claims regarding the guilt phase. View "Barlow v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction of multiple child sexual assault and abuse counts, holding that the district court's decision denying Appellant's motion to substitute counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.In this twenty-two-count criminal matter Appellant retained Mitchell Posin as defense counsel. On the eve of trial, Appellant filed a motion to substitute counsel, alleging that Posin failed adequately to prepare the defense. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Appellant of most of the counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court applied the wrong test in deciding Appellant's motion to substitute counsel because Posin was retained, not appointed; and (2) under the appropriate test, the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to substitute counsel. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly applied Nev. Rev. Stat. 231.1517 and ordered the Parole Board to credit Respondent for the time he spent incarcerated pending adjudication on his new criminal charges.The Division of Parole and Probation issued parole violation reports against Respondent based on new criminal charges. Respondent was remanded into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and physically incarcerated in the prison. However, Respondent's parole revocation hearing was continued for more than one year until the day after he entered an Alford plea to the new charge of attempted burglary. Respondent received a consecutive sentence on the new charge and did not begin serving it until after he was parole on the previous charges. Respondent filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he lost over a year of credit for time served due to him. The district court agreed and granted relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board exceeded its authority by deferring the revocation hearing beyond sixty days after Respondent's return to the custody of NDOC. View "In re Application of Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that counsel's overt interjection of racial stereotypes into Appellant's criminal trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. In his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for introducing racial issues into the trial. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) counsel's statements impermissibly tainted the jury pool by introducing racial invective into the proceedings; and (2) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defense. View "Dean v. Narvaiza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the petition.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly robbery and other crimes. After a penalty phase retrial, the jury returned a death sentence. Appellant later filed a third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petition at issue on appeal. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant could not rely on the alleged ineffective assistance of first postconviction counsel as good cause and prejudice to raise grounds for relief from the guilt phase of his trial; (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance claims of second postconviction counsel lacked merit; and (3) Defendant failed to show that the failure to consider his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to the petition. View "Chappell v. State" on Justia Law