Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial based on new DNA test results, holding that, consistent with Sunburn v. State, 812 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1991), new DNA test results are "favorable" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.09187(1) where they would make a different result reasonably probable upon retrial.Under section 176.09187(1), a party may move for a new trial at any time where DNA test results are "favorable" to the moving party. In 2001, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of robbery. Although substantial circumstantial and physical evidence linked Defendant with the killings, no physical evidence connected Defendant to the locations where the bodies were found. In 2018 and 2019, DNA testing excluded Defendant from several pieces of evidence and discovered other DNA profiles on some of that evidence. Based on these DNA results, Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the new results exculpated him and implicated an unknown person in the crimes. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the standard articulated today, the new DNA evidence did not make a different outcome reasonably probable and was not "favorable" to the defense as necessary to warrant a new trial. View "State v. Seka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for fourth-degree arson, holding that although the district court clearly erred in rejecting Defendant's Batson objection to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective alternate juror based on gender, the error was harmless.Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree arson. At issue on appeal was whether a discriminatory peremptory challenge used to remove a prospective alternate juror constituted structural error requiring reversal if no alternate deliberated with the jury. The Supreme Court held (1) there were compelling reasons to apply harmless-error review under these circumstances; and (2) the district court's error in rejecting Defendant's Batson objection to the prospective alternative juror based on gender, but the error was harmless because no alternate deliberated with the jury. View "Dixon v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition to seal criminal records, holding that the district court misapplied the relevant statutes.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to a felony sexual offense that falls under a category for which criminal records are not subject to sealing. After successfully completing probation, Appellant withdrew his guilty plea and instead entered a guilty plea to unlawful contact with a child, a gross misdemeanor. Appellant subsequently filed this petition to seal his criminal records. The district court denied the petition, concluding that both the crime Appellant initially pleaded guilty to and the later pleaded crime were not subject to sealing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a withdrawn guilty plea cannot justify the denial of a petition to seal criminal records after a subsequent guilty plea; (2) gross misdemeanor unlawful contact with a child is not a crime for which record sealing is precluded under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.245(6); and (3) Appellant was entitled to the presumption in favor of sealing criminal records under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.2445(1). View "Tiffee v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, finding Defendant guilty but mentally ill on charges of first-degree murder and first-degree arson, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving an instruction on voluntary intoxication.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court misinstructed the jury on voluntary invocation and erred by denying his motion to vacate the jury's verdict and find him not guilty by reason of insanity. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for acquittal; and (2) Defendant could not demonstrate prejudice from the district court's inclusion of the challenged jury instruction. View "Kassa v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's judgment of conviction and remanded the case, holding that the district court denied Defendant due process by failing to conduct a competency hearing when reasonable doubt arose about Defendant's competency.Pursuant to a jury verdict, Defendant was convicted of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was denied due process under the United States and Nevada Constitutions when the district court failed to order a competency hearing. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's judgment of conviction, holding that a trial court must order a hearing sua sponte to determine whether a defendant is competent when their is a reasonable doubt about his competency, and to fulfill its duty to order a competency hearing a trial court must follow Nevada's statutory competency procedures. View "Goad v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering that his conviction for misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence charge be vacated and that he receive a jury trial, holding that the new rule in Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 448 P.3d 1120 (Neb. 2019), applied to Petitioner.In Andersen, the Supreme Court announced that persons charged with a misdemeanor domestic battery offense are entitled to a jury trial. Anderson was decided three weeks after the district court affirmed Petitioner conviction of appeal. Petitioner then brought this petition arguing that the municipal court and district court erred by denying him a jury trial. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding (1) Andersen announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure; and (2) because Andersen was decided before the time period to appeal had expired, Petitioner's conviction was not final and the rule in Andersen applied to his conviction. View "Hildt v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus sought by Petitioner arguing that the district court was required to grant his release on bail under Nev. Const. art. I, 7, holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to defeat Petitioner's right to reasonable bail.Petitioner was charged by indictment with first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner filed motion to suppress his confession to the murder, which the district court granted. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to set reasonable bail on the basis that the State's proof was not evident, nor was the presumption great, that he committed the crime. The district court denied bail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State failed to rebut the presumption in favor of bail under Article 1, Section 7 and, therefore, the district court's denial of Petitioner's request for release on reasonable bail was contrary to law. View "Sewall v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the State properly charges a defendant with only a single violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360(1)(b) when it alleges, without more, that the defendant is a felon who possessed "any firearms" - or, one or more firearms - at one time and place.Anthony Martinez shot two individuals. The police recovered five firearms at the scene - four from Martinez's car and the fifth from beside the car. The State charged Martinez with five counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360(1)(b) - possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony offense - one count per firearm. The district court granted Martinez's motion to consolidate the five felon-in-possession counts into a single count, concluding that Martinez committed, at most, a single violation of section 202.360(1)(b). The State filed a pretrial petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the court wrongly interpreted the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State properly charges a defendant with only a single violation of section 202.360(1)(b) when it alleges, without more, that the defendant is a felon who possessed "any firearms" - i.e., one or more firearms - at one time and place. View "State v. Fourth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of conspiring with a hitman to have his sixth wife murdered during a staged burglary and then murdering the hitman, holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain prior bad act evidence.At issue was the admission of events surrounding the death of Defendant's second wife. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was inadmissible under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value of the disputed evidence, and the district court abused its discretion by allowing its admission; and (2) the error in admitting the prior bad act evidence was not harmless. The Court remanded the matter for a new trial. View "Randolph v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of driving and/or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or alcohol resulting in substantial bodily harm entered upon an Alford plea, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.When he entered his Alford plea, Defendant was informed that he faced a mandatory fine of up to $5,000 but was not informed that the fine would be at least $2,000. Defendant filed a presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he did not understand the consequences of his plea because he did not know the mandatory minimum fine for the offense was $2,000. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because a fine is a form of punishment, a defendant must be informed of any mandatory minimum fine in order to be fully informed of the direct consequences of a plea; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "Banka v. State" on Justia Law