Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Paul Martinez and Jennifer Martinez divorced in California in 2015, with Jennifer receiving primary physical custody of their child, L.M., due to Paul's health issues. Paul and Jennifer shared joint legal custody. After Jennifer moved to Nevada with L.M., Paul requested a custody evaluation, which resulted in maintaining the existing custody arrangement but with Paul entitled to visitation one weekend per month. The parties were to split transportation costs equally. In 2020, the custody matter was transferred to Nevada.The Nevada district court denied Paul's motion for primary physical custody and Jennifer's countermotion for supervised visitation, instead increasing Paul's visitation. The court ordered Jennifer to bear all transportation costs for L.M.'s visits to Paul, citing her relocation. Jennifer's motion to alter this determination was denied, leading her to appeal. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order, and Jennifer petitioned for review by the Nevada Supreme Court.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that transportation costs must be considered as part of the overall child support determination under NAC 425.150. The court found that the district court erred by imposing all transportation costs on Jennifer without considering the parties' financial situations or the established child support obligations. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order imposing transportation costs on Jennifer and remanded the matter for further proceedings to apply the NAC 425.150 framework. The court affirmed the district court's decision to modify visitation, finding no abuse of discretion and no violation of Jennifer's due process rights. View "Martinez v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Ryan S. and Marie S. married in 2011 and have three minor children. They separated in 2019, and Marie was awarded temporary primary physical and legal custody. Ryan participated in supervised visits, which were terminated due to policy violations. In early 2020, the district court found Ryan unfit for custody, partly due to self-diagnosed PTSD, and allowed Marie to relocate with the children to California. Ryan's virtual visits were also terminated due to financial constraints. Despite his efforts to comply with custody evaluations and provide support, Ryan had not interacted with his children since June 2020.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County, terminated Ryan's parental rights, finding him unfit and concluding that he had abandoned and neglected his children, making only token efforts to support or communicate with them. The court applied NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109, which outline factors for terminating parental rights and create a presumption that termination is in the child's best interest when the child has been placed outside the home.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109 were inapplicable because the children were in the custody of a parent, not placed outside the home under NRS Chapter 432B. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying these statutes and that the findings of abandonment, neglect, and token efforts were not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order terminating Ryan's parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to order the destruction of any amended birth certificates and restore the children's names. View "In re Parental Rights to L.R.S., J.M.S. and J.L.S." on Justia Law

A six-year-old child, Z.K., was removed from the custody of Yumila Cardenas-Garcia due to unlivable conditions in her home. Cardenas-Garcia was charged with felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. She pleaded no contest at the custody hearing, and Z.K. remained in protective custody. In a separate criminal case, she pleaded guilty to the felony as part of a plea agreement, which allowed her to withdraw the felony plea after completing probation and instead plead guilty to a misdemeanor.The Eighth Judicial District Court held an evidentiary hearing to determine if Cardenas-Garcia had rebutted the statutory presumption against reunification under NRS 432B.555, which applies to parents convicted of felony child abuse. The court found she had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Z.K. would not be harmed by reunification. After completing probation and withdrawing her felony plea, Cardenas-Garcia again sought a determination on the presumption's applicability. The district court maintained that the presumption still applied because she had not rebutted it at the prior hearing.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that NRS 432B.555 applies to anyone who has ever been convicted of felony child abuse, regardless of the legal status of that conviction. The court emphasized that the statute's use of the word "ever" means it applies even if the conviction was later voided. The court concluded that the presumption against reunification remains unless the parent can prove by clear and convincing evidence that no harm will come to the child. The petition was denied, affirming the district court's application of the statutory presumption. View "CARDENAS-GARCIA VS. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA" on Justia Law

A child, J.B., was born while both of his parents were incarcerated for the homicide of J.B.'s older sibling. The Department of Family Services (DFS) placed J.B. with Becky and Jay Whipple, friends of J.B.'s grandmother, who were not licensed foster parents at the time. The district court affirmed this placement, designating the Whipples as J.B.'s "fictive kin," a term referring to individuals who are not blood relatives but have a significant emotional and positive relationship with the child.Months later, after J.B.'s father's paternity was established, he requested that J.B. be placed with his own father, Miles Sr., in Illinois. The district court ordered J.B.'s placement with Miles Sr., asserting that blood relatives have a legal placement preference over fictive kin. The court made no factual findings related to J.B.'s best interest.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada granted a petition challenging the district court's decision. The Supreme Court clarified that the term "fictive kin" requires an evaluation of the relationship from the perspective of both the child and the adult. The court emphasized that placement decisions must be based on a child’s best interest. The court found that the district court had erred in asserting that blood relatives have a legal placement preference over fictive kin. The court also noted that the district court had abused its discretion by proceeding with a change in J.B.'s placement when J.B.'s counsel was absent. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order placing J.B. with Miles Sr. and ordered the case to be reassigned to a different judge for further proceedings. View "In re Matter of J.B." on Justia Law

The case revolves around an adoption dispute involving a minor child, G.P. The child's step-great-grandparents, Katherine and Michael, had agreed to temporary guardianship of G.P. after being contacted by the child's birth mother during her pregnancy. After G.P.'s birth, Katherine and Michael filed for temporary guardianship in the Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County. Concurrently, G.P.'s grandparents, Angela and Randall, filed a competing petition for guardianship. The birth parents of G.P. later consented to terminate their parental rights and agreed to G.P.'s adoption by Katherine and Michael. With these consents, Katherine and Michael filed a petition for adoption in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County.The Second Judicial District Court had scheduled a hearing for the competing guardianship petitions. However, it was unaware of the pending adoption petition in the Eighth Judicial District Court. The court denied Angela and Randall's petition for temporary guardianship but set a trial date for the competing guardianship requests. A few days later, the Eighth Judicial District Court granted Katherine and Michael's adoption petition. Upon learning of the adoption, Angela and Randall moved to set aside the adoption in the Eighth Judicial District Court, alleging misrepresentation and misconduct. The court granted their motion, setting aside the adoption.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the lower court's decision. The court clarified that a motion to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b) could be brought by a party to the proceeding, an entity in privity with one of the parties, or a nonparty with interests directly affected by the judgment. However, Angela and Randall, as nonparties, lacked standing to move to set aside the adoption. They were not parties in the adoption proceedings, did not have rights directly affected by the proceedings, and lacked any other statutory or constitutional basis for standing. The court concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in setting aside G.P.'s adoption. View "In re Petition of Perry" on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was asked to consider whether a law firm, established by one spouse before the marriage and incorporated under a different name during the marriage, constitutes that spouse’s separate property. Robert Draskovich, a practicing criminal lawyer since 1997, married Laurinda Draskovich in 2012, at which point he had a 65% ownership stake in a firm. In 2018, that firm dissolved, and Robert incorporated the Draskovich Law Group (DLG) as his wholly owned corporation.During their divorce proceedings in 2022, DLG was the primary asset in dispute. The district court concluded that DLG was community property, based on the fact that DLG was incorporated during the marriage. The district court also rejected Laurinda’s request for alimony, in part because it determined that the share of community assets distributed to Laurinda would provide sufficient support through passive income.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in determining that the law firm was entirely community property. The court found that the law firm was a continuation of the spouse’s original, separate property law practice, and thus, the presumption of community property does not properly apply. Therefore, the Court reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the DLG interests and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also vacated the district court’s alimony determination to be reconsidered in light of the changed circumstances surrounding DLG. View "Draskovich v. Draskovich" on Justia Law

This case arose from a contentious guardianship dispute over Kathleen June Jones. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division in Clark County, Nevada appointed an attorney to act as a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for Jones to help determine her best interests. The GAL sought fees at her standard hourly rate for legal services, which the district court granted over Jones' objections. Jones argued against the fee award, asserting that the GAL had no right to fees when the appointment order did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the GAL should be compensated at the rate of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that Jones had waived her right to argue about the form of the GAL's appointment order by failing to raise the issue earlier. The Supreme Court found that the district court did err in interpreting the law as requiring the appointment of an attorney as a GAL where there is no court-approved volunteer program. However, this error was deemed harmless because the district court had expressly appointed an experienced attorney due to the complexity of the guardianship case.The court concluded that GALs in Nevada act as fiduciaries, not as attorneys for the protected person, but if they perform services also performed by attorneys and have commensurate experience as an attorney, GALs may be compensated at an attorney rate for their work. The court determined that the GAL's requested fees were appropriate for her work as a fiduciary in this case, given her legal experience and the complexity of the guardianship dispute. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

In the State of Nevada, Alexander M. Falconi, operating as the press organization Our Nevada Judges, petitioned against the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, and parties in interest, Troy A. Minter and Jennifer R. Easler. Falconi challenged local rules and a statute that required certain court proceedings to be closed to the public.Falconi filed a media request for camera access in a child custody proceeding between Minter and Easler. Minter opposed the request, arguing it was not in the child's best interest to have his personal information publicly available. The district court denied Falconi's request, citing that the case was sealed and thus required to be private according to local rules.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the public has a constitutional right to access court proceedings. The local rules and the statute, NRS 125.080, requiring the district court to close proceedings, bypassed the exercise of judicial discretion and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Thus, the court held that these local rules and NRS 125.080 were unconstitutional to the extent they permitted closed family court proceedings without exercising judicial discretion.The court instructed the district court to reverse its order denying media access in the underlying child custody case. The court emphasized the importance of public access to court proceedings, including family court proceedings, which historically have been open to the public. The court rejected the automatic closure of such proceedings and emphasized the necessity of case-by-case judicial discretion in deciding whether to close proceedings. View "Falconi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

In a contentious guardianship case involving Kathleen June Jones, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Elizabeth Brickfield, to aid in determining Jones's best interests. The GAL filed a notice of intent to seek fees and costs at her standard hourly rate. The court awarded her those fees over Jones's objection. Jones appealed, arguing that the GAL had no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that Jones waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court’s order by failing to raise the issue below. The court also held that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program, but this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the complexity of this matter. Lastly, the court held that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL’s fee request and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her requested fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order awarding the GAL fees. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property. View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law