Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father shared joint legal and physical custody of their minor child. Based on evidence of domestic violence, Mother obtained a fictitious address from the Secretary of State, who could not disclose Mother's true address without a court order. Father subsequently filed in the Supreme Court an original petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order directing the Secretary to remove Mother from the fictitious address program. At issue before the Court was whether Father may seek the disclosure of Mother's home address. The Supreme Court denied the petition, concluding that the Court was not the proper court to consider Father's petition for extraordinary relief. The court then held (1) as a co-parent, Father may seek the disclosure of Mother's address in the district court by extraordinary writ; and (2) in determining whether to grant the writ, the district court must consider whether Mother can establish that Father was a perpetrator of domestic violence, and if established, the burden shifts to Father to show that despite the domestic violence, disclosure is in the child's best interest. View "Falconi v. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

More than a year after Wife's and Husband's divorce, Wife filed a motion to reopen discovery. Wife also filed a motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery, asserting that Judge Gonzalez hearing the motion would create an appearance of impropriety because Husband and others connected to the parties' divorce contributed to the judge's reelection complain. Judge Togliatti denied Wife's motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez, and the Judge Gonzalez went on to preside over Wife's motion to reopen discovery. Wife subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition vacating Judge Togliatti's order and disqualifying Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery. The Supreme Court denied Wife's petition, holding that the failure to disqualify Judge Gonzalez did not violate Wife's due process rights or Nevada law, as all of the campaign contributions at issue were within statutory limits and made after the divorce decree. View "Ivey v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Child was placed into the protective custody of the County Department of Social Services after Child was found with her extremely intoxicated mother. Child's father (Father) was not involved in the events leading to Child's removal. Social Services filed a petition for neglect against both parents, but the petition was dismissed as to Father. The juvenile court denied Child's placement with Father and placed Child in the legal custody of Social Services while Father was ordered to comply with a case plan for reunification with Child. Social Services then filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father was not required to comply with a case plan and accept services for purposes of reunification when Father was not found to have neglected the child; (2) keeping Child from the custody of Father when there were no substantiated findings he had neglected Child violated Father's fundamental constitutional rights to parent his child; and (3) the presumptions favoring termination of parental rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. 128.109, which arose from Child being placed outside the home in the dependence proceeding, did not apply to Father. View "Washoe County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Kory L.G." on Justia Law

Kourtney Morrow filed a complaint for divorce from Craig Morrow and a motion for child custody. A hearing on the motion was set to be heard by Judge Robert Teuton. On April 20, 2012, Kourtney served Craig with the summons, complaint, and motion. On May 4, 2012, Craig made his first appearance and filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Teuton. The matter was reassigned to Judge Cynthia Steel, who rejected the peremptory challenge and transferred the matter back to Judge Teuton, ruling that the time to file a peremptory challenge had expired on April 30, 2012, ten calendar days after Kourtney served Craig with the complaint and motion. Craig filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the time to file a peremptory challenge cannot expire until a party has made a first appearance. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the requested writ, holding (1) the time to file a peremptory challenge begins to run upon proper notice of a hearing and may expire regardless of whether a party has appeared in the action; but (2) the ten-day window in which to file a challenge excludes intermediate nonjudicial days, and thus, the instant peremptory challenge was timely filed. View "Morrow v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After allegations arose of sexual abuse and sexual risk involving A.B., A.B.'s Mother and Father were reported to child protective services. Following an investigation, the Department of Family Services (DFS) filed an abuse and neglect petition in the juvenile division of the district court, seeking to have A.B. declared a child in need of protection. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on the petition before a dependency master, after which the dependency master filed her findings of fact, recommendations, and order of approval. The master found A.B. was a child in need of protection and that Mother had neglected A.B. Upon Mother and Father's objection, the juvenile court held a hearing and dismissed the abuse and neglect petition, finding that the juvenile court improperly admitted hearsay testimony at the previous hearing. The Supreme Court denied the subsequent petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the juvenile court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in sustaining the objection to the dependency master's findings and dismissing the abuse and neglect petition. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

During divorce proceedings between Husband and Wife, Husband sought an interest in Wife's separate property and requested spousal support. After three evidentiary hearings, the district court entered a divorce decree in which it found that Husband was not entitled to any interest in Wife's separate property. The court also declined to award spousal support to either party. Husband appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the decree regarding the property division, holding that the district court's separate property decisions were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) reversed and remanded as to the district court's rejection of the spousal support request, holding that the court failed properly to consider that issue, as (i) Husband was not afforded an opportunity to present any evidence relating to spousal support, and (ii) the court's order failed to explain its reasons for awarding no spousal support. View "DeVries v. Gallio" on Justia Law

In this divorce action, Appellant Michael Grisham and Respondent Susie Grisham negotiated based on a draft property settlement agreement (PSA). At the end of an uncontested divorce prove-up hearing, the district court orally accepted the settlement. Michael, however, refused to sign the PSA. After several months, Susie moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the PSA. The district court entered a final written decree incorporating the PSA and denied Michael's motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's procedure complied with applicable district court rules, which obviated any issue as to the statute of frauds, and the PSA otherwise met the requirements for an enforceable contract. View "Grisham v. Grisham" on Justia Law

Several issues came before the Supreme Court in this case concerning a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding: (1) whether an objection to the admission of the entire juvenile file as hearsay preserved the issue for appeal; (2) what the applicable burden of proof imposed upon a parent in order to rebut the parental-fault and child's-best-interest presumptions in NRS 128.109 was; (3) whether substantial evidence supported the family division of the district court's order terminating Appellants Quiana M.B.'s and Arthur L.T.'s parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) Arthur waived his hearsay arguments by failing to object to specific portions of the file at trial; (2) after it was determined that a presumption under 128.109 applied, a parent could rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence; and (3) substantial evidence supported the district court's order terminating Quiana's and Arthur's parental rights. View "In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N." on Justia Law

Marie Liapis filed a complaint for divorce against petitioner Theodore Liapis, in which she also sought disposition of the couple's property, permanent spousal support, and her attorney fees and costs. Theodore answered Marie's complaint and later retained Mark Liapis, the couple's son, as his attorney. A settlement conference was scheduled, and each party filed a statement in preparation for that conference. In her statement, Marie objected to Mark's representation of Theodore. Because of the issues raised concerning Mark's representation of Theodore, the district court vacated the scheduled settlement conference and gave Mark time to determine whether he would continue as Theodore's counsel. Mark informed Marie's counsel that he did not intend to withdraw as counsel for Theodore. Marie subsequently filed a motion to disqualify Mark, asserting three bases for his disqualification: (1) Mark's representation of Theodore and his pecuniary interest in their estate created an appearance of impropriety; (2) even though Mark had never represented her, there was an "inherent conflict of interest" because it was unclear "how [Mark] would be able to zealously represent [Theodore]" when he "professe[d] to still love both his parents;" and (3) Mark should be disqualified because he was a potential witness in the case. Because appearance of impropriety is no longer recognized by the American Bar Association, and the Supreme Court has not recognized the appearance of impropriety as a basis for disqualifying counsel except in the limited circumstance of a public lawyer, the Court rejected that conclusion when the alleged impropriety is based solely on a familial relationship with the attorney. The Court also concluded that absent an ethical breach by the attorney that affects the fairness of the entire litigation or a proven confidential relationship between the nonclient parent and the attorney, the nonclient parent lacked standing to seek disqualification under RPC 1.7. View "Liapis v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

After a trial, the district court entered a summary order terminating Father's parental rights to his minor child. The district court's written order, drafted by the State, closely followed the termination petition submitted by the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). Father appealed, contending that the district court's order failed to set forth specific factual findings, and therefore, the decision to terminate his parental rights was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) express findings of fact are required in parental rights termination proceedings; and (2) neither the district court's order nor the record in this case contained findings of fact to support the district court's conclusions. Remanded to the district court to enter its findings. View "In re C.C.A." on Justia Law