Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marie Liapis filed a complaint for divorce against petitioner Theodore Liapis, in which she also sought disposition of the couple's property, permanent spousal support, and her attorney fees and costs. Theodore answered Marie's complaint and later retained Mark Liapis, the couple's son, as his attorney. A settlement conference was scheduled, and each party filed a statement in preparation for that conference. In her statement, Marie objected to Mark's representation of Theodore. Because of the issues raised concerning Mark's representation of Theodore, the district court vacated the scheduled settlement conference and gave Mark time to determine whether he would continue as Theodore's counsel. Mark informed Marie's counsel that he did not intend to withdraw as counsel for Theodore. Marie subsequently filed a motion to disqualify Mark, asserting three bases for his disqualification: (1) Mark's representation of Theodore and his pecuniary interest in their estate created an appearance of impropriety; (2) even though Mark had never represented her, there was an "inherent conflict of interest" because it was unclear "how [Mark] would be able to zealously represent [Theodore]" when he "professe[d] to still love both his parents;" and (3) Mark should be disqualified because he was a potential witness in the case. Because appearance of impropriety is no longer recognized by the American Bar Association, and the Supreme Court has not recognized the appearance of impropriety as a basis for disqualifying counsel except in the limited circumstance of a public lawyer, the Court rejected that conclusion when the alleged impropriety is based solely on a familial relationship with the attorney. The Court also concluded that absent an ethical breach by the attorney that affects the fairness of the entire litigation or a proven confidential relationship between the nonclient parent and the attorney, the nonclient parent lacked standing to seek disqualification under RPC 1.7. View "Liapis v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

After a trial, the district court entered a summary order terminating Father's parental rights to his minor child. The district court's written order, drafted by the State, closely followed the termination petition submitted by the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). Father appealed, contending that the district court's order failed to set forth specific factual findings, and therefore, the decision to terminate his parental rights was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) express findings of fact are required in parental rights termination proceedings; and (2) neither the district court's order nor the record in this case contained findings of fact to support the district court's conclusions. Remanded to the district court to enter its findings. View "In re C.C.A." on Justia Law

Warren West's wife gave birth to a girl born with severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation. West's wife died during the procedure. West relinquished the infant for adoption and subsequently retained attorney Christopher Gellner to bring a wrongful death and personal injury claim on the infant's behalf. While litigation was ongoing, Dale Haley was appointed as the infant's guardian ad litem. The parties reached a settlement before going to trial. The district court approved the overall settlement but unilaterally altered the distribution. Gellner and Haley filed a petition for extraordinary writ, asserting that the district court lacked the statutory authority to unilaterally alter the distribution, and even if it had such authority, the court abused its discretion in making the alteration it did. The Supreme Court denied in part and granted in part the writ petition, holding (1) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.200 authorized the district court to modify the proposed compromise in the minor's best interest, the redistribution of settlement proceeds was proper; but (2) the district court should have provided explanation for the allocation of fees between Gellner and Haley. View "Haley v. Nev. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Under a 1998 divorce decree granted to Husband and Wife, Husband was obligated to pay wife $1,300 a month in child support. Husband voluntarily ceased paying child support in 2000. In 2007, Wife filed a motion to establish a fixed monthly child support obligation for Husband without regard to the formula adopted in the decree, to calculate arrears, and to reduce those arrears to judgment. The district court granted Wife's motion, set Husband's monthly child support obligation at $1,300, calculated arrearages, and reduced them to judgment. When Wife filed her motion, neither the parties nor the children resided in Nevada. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction by modifying its child support order when the parties and their children did not reside in Nevada. Remanded. View "Vaile v. Porsboll" on Justia Law

Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her two children in the district court. The district court ordered that the tribal social services have custody over the children. The tribal court then ordered the adoption of the children. Mother subsequently asked the state district court to set aside her relinquishment under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The district court denied Mother's petition. At issue on appeal was whether, under section 1919 of the ICWA, a tribal-state agreement respecting child custody proceedings may vest a Nevada district court with subject matter jurisdiction to take a relinquishment of parental rights under circumstances where section 1911(a) of the ICWA would otherwise lay exclusive jurisdiction with the tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ICWA, in keeping with the fundamental principles of tribal autonomy, allows for tribal-state agreements for concurrent jurisdiction even when the tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction absent an agreement. View "In re S.M.M.D." on Justia Law

Father and Mother's stipulated Nevada divorce decree incorporated the parents' agreement that Nevada would have exclusive jurisdiction over future custody disputes. The parents had joint legal custody, but when Husband and Wife were not able to work out a schedule for joint physical custody, Wife applied to Nevada's district court for an order awarding her primary physical custody. At this point, both parents and their children had moved to California. Husband initiated competing custody proceedings in California, maintaining that Nevada lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The Nevada district court, meanwhile, provisionally granted Wife primary physical custody. Husband petitioned for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus, directing the Nevada district court to stand down from its assertion of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which Nevada and California had both adopted, California had jurisdiction as the children's home state, and Nevada could not proceed unless California determined that Nevada was the more convenient forum. View "Friedman v. Nev. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After Father received sole custody of Child, Father and Child lived with Grandmother. Father and Child then moved. Later, Father stopped allowing Child to see Grandmother. Grandmother then sought court-ordered nonparental visitation. Father filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which the district court denied. The parties then reached a settlement of the visitation issues, and the district court issued a visitation order effecting the provisions of the parties' stipulation. Later, Grandmother filed a motion to compel Father to comply with the stipulated visitation order, which the district court denied, finding, inter alia, that continued visitation was not in Daughter's best interest. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) modification or termination of a nonparent's judicially approved visitation rights is only warranted upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances that affects a child's welfare such that it is in the child's best interest to modify the existing visitation arrangement; and (2) the district court failed to articulate any substantial change in circumstances before it terminated Grandmother's nonparent visitation rights, and therefore, it was not in the best interests of Child to terminate visitation. Remanded. View "Rennels v. Rennels" on Justia Law

Appellant Dlynn Landreth and Respondent Amit Malik lived together between 2001 and 2004 and moved multiple times through multiple states. The couple never married and had no children. Ms. Landreth ended the relationship prior to moving to Nevada and purchased a home shortly after moving to Las Vegas. The couple briefly reunited, but by September, 2005, the relationship was over. Mr. Malik contended that the decision to move to Las Vegas was a joint decision and that Ms. Landreth used joint money for the down payment on the house. In 2006, Mr. Malik sued Ms. Landreth in family court seeking half of the equity in the house. Ms. Landreth had difficulty obtaining counsel and raising a defense to Mr. Malikâs complaint. She asked for multiple extensions of time, each of which Mr. Malik granted. In February, 2007, Mr. Malik grew weary of the delays and asked the court to enter a default judgment and grant him equity in the Las Vegas house. The court entered a default against Ms. Landreth, and she appealed, arguing that the family court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case since family law was not implicated by the underlying facts. Ms. Landreth also argued that she did not receive proper notice of the default judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that the family court maintained all the constitutional powers of a district court judge and had jurisdiction over Mr. Malikâs claim. Furthermore, the Court found that Mr. Malik did not serve Ms. Landreth with proper notice of his intent to seek a default judgment against her. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings.