Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed an amended abuse and neglect petition alleging that Mother’s two minor children needed the State’s protection. Mother’s case plan included a provision that she must randomly submit to drug testing. The district court ordered, instead, that an agent of the Department of Children and Family Services could require Mother to take a drug test if the agent reasonably believed that Mother was under the influence of a controlled substance. Mother filed a motion to amend her case plan, arguing that the drug-testing requirement infringed on her constitutional rights. The district court denied Mother’s motion. Mother subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the portion of the district court’s order establishing the drug-testing requirement in her case plan. The Supreme court granted the petition, holding that because the district court did not make any findings to support the drug-testing requirement in the case plan, there were no explicit factual findings to show why this action step in Mother’s case plan was justified, and a writ of mandamus was warranted. View "Manuela H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

During Vivian Harrison’s divorce proceeding to Kirk Harrison, Kirk hired psychiatrist Norton Roitman to conduct a psychiatric analysis of Vivian. Without meeting with or examining Vivian, Dr. Roitman submitted to the court a written report diagnosing Vivian with a personality disorder. Vivian subsequently filed a complaint against Dr. Roitman, alleging that his statements constituted, inter alia, medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Roitman’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Dr. Roitman was absolutely immune from liability for each of Vivian’s causes of action because he was a witness preparing an expert report in connection with the matter in controversy at the time he made the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if the allegations contained in Vivian’s complaint were true, Dr. Roitman's defense of absolute immunity precluded her claim. View "Harrison v. Roitman" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a petition to be appointed the guardian of N.M., a United States citizen who lived in Nevada with Respondent. Appellant, N.M’s mother, lived in Mexico. The district court appointed Respondent as N.M.’s general guardian. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed the award of custody to Respondent. Appellant then filed this petition for en banc consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a district court exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction may appoint a general guardian to protect a child in Nevada from mistreatment or abuse pursuant to section 125A.335 when (a) no court in another jurisdiction has entered an applicable custody order or commenced custody proceedings, and (b) Nevada has become the child’s home state; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a guardian. View "In re Guardianship of N.M." on Justia Law

An abuse-and-neglect petition was filed alleging that Joanna T.’s daughter was in need of protection. Joanna moved to set aside the domestic master’s oral recommendation to sustain the abuse-and-neglect petition because Joanna had never received a summons notifying her of the adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court granted the motion. A summons was served on Joanna 486 days after the abuse-and-neglect petition was filed. Joanna filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that the summons was untimely under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(i) because it was issued more than 120 days after the abuse-and-neglect petition was filed. The juvenile court denied the petition and later sustained the abuse-and-neglect petition against Joanna. The Supreme Court denied Joanna’s petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, holding that Rule 4(i)’s requirement that a summons be served within 120 days does not apply in chapter 432B proceedings, and therefore, dismissal of the abuse-and-neglect petition was not warranted. View "Joanna T. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the district court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to his two minor children. Father appealed, arguing that the district court should not have terminated his parental rights because he completed his case plan and erred in applying the presumptions in Nev. Rev. Stat. 128.109(1)(a) and 128.109(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court may terminate the parental rights of a parent who has completed his or her case plan for reunification if termination is otherwise warranted under Nev. Rev. Stat. 128.105; (2) the district court is not required to wait the entire twenty months before applying the presumptions found in Nev. Rev. Stat. 128.109(1)(a) and 128.109(2), so long as the child has been removed from his parents’ home pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B for at least fourteen months during any consecutive twenty-month period; and (3) substantial evidence supported the district court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights. View "In re Parental Rights as to A.P.M." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a divorce between Mark Anderson and Sophia Sanchez. At the conclusion of mediation, the parties executed a written Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that awarded certain property in California (“The Wilson property”) to Mark in exchange for the payment of a portion of his retirement funds to Sophia. Mark subsequently sought to set aside the MOU and moved for joinder of his sister, Cheryl Parr, arguing that the MOU was void because it improperly distributed property that did not belong to Mark and Sophia because Cheryl had an ownership interest in the Wilson property. The district court denied Mark’s requests, concluding that the MOU was a valid and binding agreement, that Cheryl lacked standing to intervene, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to allow her to intervene. The court then entered a decree of divorce dissolving Mark and Sophia’s marriage and incorporating the MOU. The Supreme Court vacated the divorce decree only as it affected the disposition of the Wilson property, holding that the district court improperly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to join Cheryl in the divorce proceeding and should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to decide the joinder issues before the court adjudicated the parties’ property pursuant to the settlement agreement. Remanded. View "Anderson v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

As stipulated, a child custody decree gave Mother and Father joint legal custody of their minor son and awarded Mother primary physical custody. The decree granted Father unsupervised visitation but specified that visitation could not occur in Africa where Father lived and worked. The decree also included a provision that forbade either parent from traveling with the child outside the United States absent court order or both parents’ consent. A divided three-judge panel affirmed. The Supreme Court granted en banc reconsideration and affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, without specific findings to connect the child’s best interests to the restrictions imposed, the travel and visitation restrictions could not stand. View "Davis v. Ewalefo" on Justia Law

The State filed an abuse and neglect petition naming R.L. as a minor in need of protection and asking the court to declare R.L. a ward of the court. R.L. was under a Nev. Rev. Stat. 159 guardianship at the time the petition was filed. The petition alleged that the mental health issues of Petitioner, R.L.’s mother, adversely affected her ability to care for R.L. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that she could not be responsible for neglect because she had neither legal nor physical custody of R.L. The hearing master sustained the allegations in the petition, finding that Petitioner’s anxiety and depression affected her ability to provide care for R.L. and that it was in R.L.’s best interest to be adjudicated a child in need of protection. The juvenile division of the district court adopted the hearing master’s recommendation. Petitioner filed this action in mandamus seeking a writ compelling the juvenile division to dismiss the petition entered against her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even when a guardianship is in place, the child’s parents have a statutory duty to continue to care for the child, and parental responsibility for neglect may coincide with the guardianship. View "Jennifer L. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In this child custody case, the parties entered into an agreement for joint custody at the time of their divorce. Seven years later, Mother requested that the district court modify the child custody designation to provide her with primary physical custody, in accordance with Rivero v. Rivero. Specifically, Mother argued that she was entitled to be the child’s primary physical guardian because Father did not have the child at least forty percent of the time under the agreed custodial arrangement. After a hearing, the district court granted the request. The court’s order, however, did not state whether this modification was in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a district court has authority to review and modify the parties’ timeshare arrangement once a modification request is made by either party; (2) the child’s best interest must be the primary consideration for modifying custody, and Rivero’s forty-percent guideline shall serve as a tool in determining what custody arrangement is in the child’s best interest; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider the child’s best interest when modifying custody. View "Bluestein v. Bluestein" on Justia Law

When Respondent was born, her birth certificate identified Decedent as her father. Decedent later married Respondent’s mother but never formally established or challenged his status as Respondent’s father. When Decedent died, Appellants, Decedent’s sister and nephew, filed an ex parte petition for appointment as special administrators of Decedent’s estate. The petition identified Decedent’s siblings and their issue as his heirs, and Respondent was identified as Decedent’s stepdaughter. The district court made Appellants co-administrators of the estate. Respondent then filed a petition for revocation of the letters of special administration and for appointment as the special administrator, arguing that, as Decedent’s child, she had priority in appointment. The probate commissioner suggested that the district court find Respondent was Decedent’s child and entitled to appointment as administrator. The district court ordered that the report and recommendation be fully accepted and adopted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) paternity contests in intestacy proceedings are governed by the Nevada Parentage Act; and (2) Appellants were time-barred by, and lacked standing under, the Nevada Parentage Act to challenge Respondent’s presumptive paternity. View "In re Estate of Murray" on Justia Law