Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was terminated from her employment with Employer for failing to maintain an intern certification or obtain a counselor certification as required by Employer’s employment policy. Appellant applied to the Department of Employment, Training & Rehabilitation, Employment Security Division (ESD) for unemployment benefits. ESD denied Appellant’s claim, finding that she was terminated for misconduct connected with her work. ESD’s Board of Review denied Appellant’s appeal. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review, concluding that Appellant’s failure to receive her bachelor’s degree within ten years constituted misconduct connected with her employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she made a reasonable, good-faith attempt to maintain her certification or to timely graduate, Appellant’s conduct amounted to disqualifying misconduct. View "Goodwin v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2014, Respondent applied to the Division of Parole and Probation for a change in his probation discharge status under a set of regulations adopted pursuant to a statute (referred to as Section 16) that sunsetted in 2008. The Division denied Respondent’s request due to Respondent’s failure to satisfy his parole obligation of community service. Respondent urged the Division to comply with Section 16, but the Division maintained that Section 16 expired in 2008. Respondent filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Division to comply with Section 16 and grant his application, arguing that the Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously and denying his application because the Division granted two other applications after 2008. The district court agreed with Respondent and granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously, such that mandamus relief was necessary, because Respondent did not show that, post-2008, the Division was granting applications for individuals who, like Respondent, failed to satisfy probation obligations. View "Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Coley" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.3705(1) allows the State Engineer to subject newly approved water applications to an incremental use process. The statute was enacted in 2007. In 1989, Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) filed various water permit applications with the State Engineer. Many entities, including the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (CPB), opposed SNWA’s applications. Ultimately, in 2012, the State Engineer denied some of SNWA’s applications and granted others. The State Engineer subjected SNWA’s approved applications to three stages of incremental development and monitoring. CPB and others petitioned the district court for review. The district court rejected CPB’s argument that the State Engineer gave section 533.3705(1) an improper retroactive effect but reversed and remanded the State Engineer’s ruling on other grounds. CPB subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ barring the State Engineer from applying section 533.3705(1) to SNWA’s applications. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the State Engineer applied section 533.3705(1) prospectively to applications approved in 2012, and therefore, the State Engineer did not apply section 533.3705(1) retroactively in this case. View "Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested for driving under the influence and submitted to a blood test. Christine Maloney, a forensic scientist, conducted a blood analysis, which revealed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.159. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) notified Appellant that his driver’s license was being revoked, and Appellant requested an administrative hearing to contest the revocation. The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the DMV established the necessary elements of proof and revoked Appellant’s driver’s license, concluding that Maloney’s affidavit declaring that she was chemist was admissible. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because Maloney’s affidavit failed to state whether she had been court-qualified as an expert. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Maloney’s affidavit, which failed to state whether she had been qualified in a Nevada court of record, was inadmissible at Appellant’s revocation hearing; and (2) in the affidavit’s absence, the evidence was not sufficiently substantial to revoke Appellant’s driver’s license. View "Valenti v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The State Engineer cancelled a water permit for failure to comply with its terms. Plaintiff filed a petition for judicial review in the district court under Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.395(2) seeking an order vacating the state Engineer’s decision to cancel the permit. The district court granted the State Engineer’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s petition because Plaintiff sought judicial review before exhausting her available administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 533.395(2) requires a party aggrieved by the cancellation of a water permit to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a petition for judicial review with the district court, even when the remedy that the State Engineer is authorized to provide is not the remedy that the party seeks; and (2) Plaintiff, therefore, should have filed a written request for the State Engineer to review its decision to cancel the water permit at a public hearing before she sought judicial remedies. View "Benson v. State Eng’r" on Justia Law

Through the adoption of Nev. Rev. Stat. 630.356(2), the Legislature gave physicians the right to contest and the district courts the power to review final decisions of the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners. In this case, the Board suspended the license of Appellant, a surgeon licensed in Nevada, for rendering services to a patient while under the influence of alcohol and in an impaired condition. The Board also issued a public reprimand and imposed additional sanctions. Appellant petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision and requested a preliminary injunction to stay the sanctions and prevent the Board, while judicial review was pending, from filing a report with the National Practitioner Data Bank. The district court denied Appellant’s injunction request, concluding that section 630.356(2), which prohibits district courts from entering a stay of the Board’s decision pending judicial review, precluded such an action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 630.356(2) impermissibly acts as a legislative encroachment on the district court’s power to do what is reasonably necessary to administer justice, and this is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. View "Tate v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

Appellant, a self-employed delivery driver who contracted with FedEx Home Delivery for one of its delivery routes, fell and injured his shoulder while delivering packages. Under his FedEx service contract, Appellant was required to maintain workers’ compensation insurance, which he did through CorVel Corporation. Appellant received medical treatment, but with his physical restrictions, he could not complete his delivery route. Appellant hired a replacement driver until he canceled the service contract. Appellant sought temporary disability benefits, which CorVel denied. Appellant administratively appealed. The appeals officer denied both temporary total disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits on the basis that Appellant could not establish a loss of any income without evidence of a salary. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for self-employed individuals, the lack of a salary associated with typical employment does not preclude an average monthly wage calculation for the purpose of determining lost income and rendering a workers’ compensation benefit decision; and (2) the appeals officer in this case should have determined the best method for calculating any loss to Appellant’s wages resulting from his industrial injury, taking into account both his business’s income and expenses. Remanded. View "Mensah v. CorVel Corp." on Justia Law

Jonathan Piper, who was convicted and imprisoned for burglary, was transferred to Casa Grande Traditional Housing, which was operated by Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) for offenders participating in NDOC’s work release program, to serve out the remainder of his sentence. Washworks Rainbow, LLC hired Piper to work at its car wash. Piper was severely injured during the course of his employment. York Claims Services, Inc., Washworks’ workers’ compensation insurance provider, denied coverage, asserting that NDOC was financially responsible for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage under its own insurance program. An appeals officer found York liable for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage. The district court set aside the decision of the appeals officer, concluding that NDOC was responsible for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.028(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 616B.082(1) does not apply to offenders like Piper, who are participating in the work release program. View "Nev. Dep't of Corr. v. York Claims Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, then a teacher for the Washoe County School District (WCSD), pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana in his residence. Before Appellant completed his probation, the WCSD terminated his employment for immorality and conviction of a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude. Appellant sought unemployment benefits. The Employment Security Division (ESD) denied benefits, finding that Appellant’s guilty plea established that the WCSD had terminated him for “workplace misconduct.” Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.3363, certain first-time drug offenders may avoid a criminal conviction if the offender pleads guilty and then successfully completes a probationary period, after which time the charges are dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that unemployment benefits for workplace misconduct were erroneously denied where the WCSD relied on a felony conviction that didn’t exist to establish that Appellant committed disqualifying misconduct for which he was terminated. View "Hohenstein v. State, Employment Sec. Div." on Justia Law

The Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC) convicted Appellant, an NNCC correctional officer, of providing legal services for a fee (an “MJ29” violation). Appellant challenged the MJ29 discipline through an informal grievance followed by a first-level formal grievance. After Appellant was informed by NNCC’s associate warden that he had exhausted the grievance process on this issue, Appellant filed a complaint in district court arguing that NNCC, among other things, improperly filed the MJ29 disciplinary charge and violated his due process rights by refusing to hear his grievance appeals. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust the grievance process and that Appellant had no liberty interest in a disciplinary appeals process. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; but (2) correctly determined that Appellant failed to state a due process claim. View "Abarra v. State" on Justia Law