Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a failed land sale contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and recession based on mutual mistake. Defendant counterclaimed for, inter alia, breach of contract, abuse of process, and nuisance. After a trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for Defendant on its nuisance and abuse of process counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its mutual mistake rescission claim, as a mutual mistake will not provide a ground for rescission where one of the parties bears the risk of mistake; (2) an abuse of process claim may not be supported by a complaint to an administrative agency instead of one involving a legal process, and therefore, Defendant failed to establish the elements of abuse of process; and (3) a nuisance claim seeking only emotional distress damages does not require proof of physical harm, and the facts in this case supported the damages award arising under Defendant’s nuisance counterclaim. View "Land Baron Invs., Inc. v. Bonnie Springs Family LP" on Justia Law

Appellants’ vehicle was rear-ended by a semitrailer truck driven and owned by Respondents. Appellants sued, and the jury rendered a verdict in Respondents’ favor. The district court denied Appellants’ motion for a new trial and awarded Respondents attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict and the denial of Appellants’ motion for a new trial, holding that the district court properly instructed the jury on sudden emergencies; but (2) reversed the award of attorney fees based on the rejected offers of judgment, holding that this award was an abuse of discretion, and reversed the award of expert witness fees, as the district court provided only limited justification for its decision to awarded the expert witness fees in excess of Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.005(5)’s per-expert presumptive maximum. View "Frazier v. Drake" on Justia Law

Toni Sanders and her husband sued Risa Sears-Page for negligence after Sears-Page hit Sanders’ car. At issue during trial was whether the accident had caused or contributed to Toni’s injury and, if so, whether Sanders’ claimed medical expenses were reasonable. The jury unanimously found for Sears-Page. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court committed reversible error in (1) failing to strike a certain juror for cause where the juror’s statements suggested bias and he did not unequivocally state he could be impartial; (2) requiring the parties to issue their challenges for cause while the juror at issue was present; (3) admitting a certain exhibit into evidence because it was not properly authenticated; and (4) allowing Sears-Page’s medical expert to testify to an undisclosed opinion regarding the exhibit at issue. Remanded for a new trial. View "Sanders v. Sears-Page" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for various torts after she fell at a hotel owned by Defendant. Defendant filed a demand for security of costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.130. More than six months later, Plaintiff filed the required security with the court clerk. Nine days after Plaintiff filed her bond, Defendant moved the court to dismiss the case pursuant to section 18.130(4). The district court subsequently dismissed the case because Plaintiff filed her bond well outside of thirty days of receiving notice that security was required. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abuses its discretion by dismissing the case if the plaintiff has filed the required security at any time before the court dismisses the case. Remanded. View "Biscay v. MGM Resorts Int'l" on Justia Law

Some independent contractors are immune from liability with regard to a person injured in the course of employment under the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. At issue in this case was when an independent contractor’s actions are within the scope of a major or specialized repair so as to prevent it from claiming immunity from liability as a statutory employer or coemployee. Respondent was injured during the course of his employment by a tire technician for Appellant, a commercial tire retailer. Respondent filed a personal injury claim against Appellant. Appellant moved for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that it was a statutory employee and thus immune from liability. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because there was sufficient evidence that the tire technician was an independent contractor at the time he caused Respondent’s injury, Appellant was not immune from liability for Respondent’s injury; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to give an incomplete “mere happening” jury instruction because to do so would have been duplicative and/or confusing. View "D & D Tire v. Ouellette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured himself while bowling at a center operated by Defendant. After the deadline passed that had been for seeking an amendment of a pleading, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 15(a) seeking to amend his theory of liability. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that the motion was untimely and, furthermore, even if leave were granted, the proposed amendment would be futile “given the results of the discovery already conducted.” The district court subsequently granted summary judgment as to the theory of liability set forth in the original complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) erred by failing to independently analyze whether the proposed amendment was timely under the standards of Nev. R. Civ. P. 16(b), which requires a showing of “good cause” for missing a deadline, before considering whether it was warranted under the standards of Rule 15(a); (2) incorrectly applied the futility exception to Rule 15(a): but (3) nonetheless reached the correct conclusion under the facts of this case. View "Nutton v. Sunset Station, Inc." on Justia Law

The Provincial Government of Marinduque (the Province), was a political subdivision of the Republic of the Philippines. Placer Dome Inc. (PDI), was incorporated under the laws of British Columbia, Canada. A predecessor of PDI formed Marcopper Mining Corp. to undertake mining activities in the Province. The predecessor and PDI controlled all aspects of Marcopper’s operations. During the course of the corporation’s operations, Marcopper caused significant environmental degradation and health hazards to the people living in the Province. The Province filed its complaint in a Nevada district court. Shortly thereafter, PDI and another business entity amalgamated under the laws of Ontario, Canada to form Barrick Gold Corporation. Barrick’s subsidiaries had substantial mining operations in Nevada. Barrick and PDI moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens. The district court found that dismissal for form non conveniens was warranted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal for forum non conveniens was proper because this case lacked any bona fide connection to the state, adequate alternative fora existed, and the burdens of litigating in Nevada outweighed any convenience to the Province. View "Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Robert and Jamie Logan sued Respondents - the owner, operator, and general manager of a hotel - for personal injuries that Robert suffered when he was shot by an employee of the hotel. Before trial, Defendants made an offer of judgment to Appellants offering $55,000 to settle Appellants’ claims. Appellants did not accept this offer. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The district court awarded $71,907 in attorney fees and $24,812 in costs to Defendants, concluding that Defendants were entitled to attorney fees and costs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.115 and Nev. R. Civ. P. 68 because Appellants failed to improve upon Defendants’ offer of judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees or costs to Defendants under section 17.115 and Rule 68. View "Logan v. Abe" on Justia Law

Father John Feeney was employed as a priest by the Catholic Diocese of Green Bay, a religious organization incorporated and headquartered in Wisconsin. Feeney later came to the Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas. John Doe 119 alleged that Feeney sexually assaulted him during Feeney’s time in Las Vegas and sued the Diocese of Green Bay for negligently hiring and retaining Feeney and for failing to warn others that Feeney was a danger to children. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Diocese and returned a verdict in favor of Doe on the negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Feeney was not the agent of the Diocese of Green Bay during his ministry in Las Vegas; and (2) the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Diocese because the Diocese did not have sufficient contacts with Nevada. View "Catholic Diocese of Green Bay v. John Doe 119" on Justia Law

Robert Krause retained Woods & Erickson, LLP for estate planning services. Woods & Erickson created for Krause an asset protection trust, into which Krause transferred his assets. The Cadle Company, which was attempting to collect on a judgment against Krause, filed a second amended complaint against Woods & Erickson, asserting claims for conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and concert of action. Specifically, the Cadle Company alleged that that Krause had fraudulently transferred the assets and that Woods & Erickson had unlawfully facilitated the fraudulent transfers. The district court entered judgment in favor of Woods & Erickson on all claims and awarded Woods & Erickson attorney fees. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s judgment on the merits, holding that Nevada law does not recognize accessory liability for fraudulent transfers; and (2) reversed the portion of the court’s order awarding photocopy costs, runner service costs, and certain deposition transcription costs, holding that the court erred by awarding these costs because no evidence was presented showing that those costs were reasonable, necessary, and actually incurred. View "Cadle Co. v. Woods & Erickson, LLP" on Justia Law