Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An attorney and his law firm (collectively, Attorney) filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief challenging a district court order adjudicating attorney liens and distributing settlement funds in a personal injury action. Attorney’s former client (Client) was the real party in interest. Attorney had also filed a separate contract action against Client and others seeking to enforce an alleged fee-sharing agreement. After Attorney received Client’s answer, it decided to pursue the contract action rather than writ relief and filed a motion to dismiss the writ petition. Client opposed the motion, asking that if the Supreme Court did not resolve the petition on the merits, it require Attorney to pay her costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted Attorney’s motion to dismiss without requiring, as a condition of the dismissal, payment of Client’s attorney fees, holding that Nev. R. App. P. 42(b) does not authorize the routine imposition of attorney fees on a party who seeks to voluntarily dismiss a nonfrivolous writ petition after an answer has been filed. View "Breeden v. District Court" on Justia Law

Patients of certain healthcare facilities were advised to testify for blood-borne diseases after it was discovered that those healthcare facilities used unsafe injection practices during certain procedures. Plaintiffs, patients of those facilities who had undergone such procedures, filed a complaint on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated individuals against PacifiCare of Nevada, Inc., a health maintenance organization, asserting negligence on the ground that PacifiCare failed to establish and implement a quality assurance program to oversee the medical providers within its network. The district court granted PacifiCare’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a negligence claim because they had not alleged an “actual injury,” such as testing positive for a blood-borne illness. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs’ complaint adequately alleged an injury in the form of exposure to unsafe injection practices that caused a need for ongoing medical monitoring to detect latent diseases that may result from those unsafe practices. View "Sadler v. PacifiCare of Nev., Inc." on Justia Law

A stock transfer agent gave a stockholder an allegedly incomplete and misleading answer to a question about its requirements for removing a restrictive legend on the stockholder’s stock. The stockholder sued the transfer agent, asserting claims for violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.8401 and 104.8407, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. Under sections 104.8401 and 104.8407, a transfer agent must, on proper request, register a transfer of securities without unreasonable delay. The district court granted the transfer agent’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sections 104.8401 and 104.8407 did not support liability in this case because the stockholder did not ask the transfer agent to remove the legend and reissue him clean shares, and because the stockholder never submitted a transfer request, the agent’s statutory duty to register a requested transfer did not arise; and (2) the stockholder’s common law claims failed on the grounds that they were not supported by competent evidence. View "Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer" on Justia Law

Gilbert Hyatt, an inventor, sued the Franchise Tax Board of the State of California (FTB) in 1998 seeking damages for intentional torts and bad faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of the inventor’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns. Eventually, Hyatt’s case went to a jury, which found in favor of Hyatt on all intentional tort causes of action. The jury awarded $139 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Court’s exception for government immunity for intentional and bad faith conduct survives the adoption of the federal discretionary function immunity test; (2) all of Hyatt’s causes of action, except for his fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims, failed as a matter of law; (3) in regard to Hyatt’s fraud and IIED claims, substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings as to liability, but errors committed by the court required reversal of the damages awarded for IIED; (4) FTB was not entitled to a statutory cap on the amount of damages Hyatt may recover on the fraud and IIED claims under comity; and (5) under comity principles, FTB is immune from punitive damages. View "Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Medicare beneficiary who received his Medicare benefits through a plan offered by Respondents, health insurance businesses that specialize in health maintenance and/or managed care and are engaged in the joint venture of providing insurance. As a result of his treatment at a clinic, which was a contracted provider for Respondents, Plaintiff became infected with hepatitis C. Plaintiff subsequently sued Respondents alleging negligence in selecting their health care providers. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the federal Medicare Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state common law negligence claims regarding the retention and investigation of contracted Medicare providers are expressly preempted by the Medicare Act. View "Morrison v. Health Plan of Nev., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent Lasik corrective surgery on her eyes and subsequently developed ocular complications. Plaintiff sued Dr. John L. Siems, who performed the surgery, and Siems Advanced Lasik, asserting claims for medical malpractice and professional negligence. During trial, the defense argued that Plaintiff’s condition was consistent with eye drop abuse. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain expert testimony because the testimony met the standard for expert testimony set forth in Williams v. Eighth Judicial District Court, which clarified existing law on medical expert testimony; and (2) the defense counsel’s direct, unauthorized communications with Plaintiff’s treating physician were improper, but because Plaintiff did not demonstrate prejudice, a new trial was not warranted. View "Leavitt v. Siems" on Justia Law

Palms Casino Resort allowed promotional actors to toss souvenirs into a crowd of patrons watching televised sporting events at the casino’s sports bar. Respondent was injured when another patron dove for a souvenir during a broadcast of Monday Night Football at the casino. Respondent sued Palms on a theory of negligence. After a trial, the district court determined that Palms was liable as a matter of law and awarded Respondent $6,051,589 in damages. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding testimony of an expert on security and crowd control, and the error was not harmless. View "FCH1, LLC v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Steve Jacobs filed a wrongful termination complaint against Las Vegas Sands Corp. (LVSC) and Sands China Ltd. after he was fired as chief executive officer of the Sands China unit. Jacobs made several allegations in the complaint against Sheldon Adelson, the chief executive officer and majority shareholder of LVSC, personally. The case received widespread media attention, and after the Wall Street Journal published Adelson’s response to the allegations, Jacobs amended his complaint to add a claim for defamation per se against Adelson. The district court dismissed the defamation claim, determining that Adelson’s statements to the media were absolutely privileged communications relating to litigation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that communications made to the media in an extrajudicial setting are not absolutely privileged when the media holds no more significant interest in the litigation than the general public. View "Jacobs v. Adelson" on Justia Law

Appellant, on behalf of her daughter, Sarah, filed a wrongful death action under Nev. REv. Stat. 41.085(4) against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. after Sarah’s father was fatally assaulted in a Wal-Mart parking lot. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s action against Wal-Mart, concluding that claim preclusion barred the case because the decedent’s estate, along with three of the decedent’s heirs, had already filed a wrongful death lawsuit under 41.085(5) against Wal-Mart and lost. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal but on issue preclusion grounds, holding that Appellant was barred from relitigating the issue of Wal-Mart’s negligence because it had already been established, in the case brought by the estate on her behalf, that Wal-Mart was not negligent and thus, not liable. View "Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a civil complaint against The Power Company, Inc. (“TPCI”) and TPCI’s president, Rick Rizzolo. Less than five years after Plaintiffs filed their action, they entered into a settlement agreement with TPCI and Rizzolo providing that Plaintiffs would receive $9 million upon the sale of Crazy Horse Too, which TPCI owned. More than five years after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, TPCI and Rizzolo filed two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) for want of prosecution. The district court denied the motions. After the Crazy Horse Too sold at a foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs filed a third motion to reduce the settlement agreement to judgment. The district court granted the motion. TPCI and Rizzolo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 41(e)’s provision requiring dismissal for want of prosecution does not apply to an action in which the parties enter into a binding settlement agreement before Rule 41(e)’s five-year deadline has expires, and therefore, the district court properly denied TPCI and Rizzolo’s motions to dismiss for want of prosecution; and (2) the district court did not err in reducing the parties’ settlement agreement to judgment. View "The Power Co., Inc. v. Henry" on Justia Law