Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants were injured in automobile accidents, but Geico, which insured both Appellants, denied coverage of their medical expenses. Appellants subsequently instituted a class action of behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alleging that Geico violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.145(3), which provides that a motor vehicle insurer must offer its insured the option of purchasing medical payment coverage, because, while Geico may have offered its insureds medical payment coverage, it did not obtain written rejections from them of the offered coverage. The district court granted Geico’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 687B.145(3) does not require a written rejection of medpay coverage, and therefore, Appellants’ claims failed. View "Wingco v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After Appellants purchased condominiums and engaged in related transactions at the Las Vegas Cay Club resort, Appellants filed suit against dozens of defendants, including Cay Clubs, Jeffrey Aeder, and JDI Loans, LLC and JDI Realty, LLC (together, the JDI entities), alleging that Defendants engaged in wrongdoings while abandoning a plan to improve Las Vegas Cay Club and leaving Appellants with “worthless property.” Appellants claimed that they bought the condominiums on the belief that a partnership between Cay Clubs and the JDI entities existed that would provide the expertise and resources to execute the resort’s transformation. Aeder and the JDI entities successfully moved for summary judgment with respect to their liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1), which codifies the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying the meaning and application of section 87.160(1), holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the JDI entities with regard to their liability under the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. View "In re Cay Clubs" on Justia Law

Appellant-homeowners filed a complaint against Respondent-contractor for negligence and breach of warranty arising from construction defects in their homes. After a trial, the jury awarded verdicts for each homeowner. Appellants and Respondent subsequently filed motions for costs and attorney fees, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s order denying Appellants’ motion for a new trial for attorney misconduct, and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of costs or attorney fees to Appellants, but reversed the court’s order as it related to Respondent’s motion for costs and attorney fees because the court failed to apply the full, applicable legal analysis in this instance. Remanded. View "Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners were involved in an altercation with an Assailant at a Casino. The Petitioners filed a complaint against the Casino, alleging negligence. The Casino's answer asserted the Petitioners' comparative negligence as an affirmative defense. Based on Cafe Moda, LLC v. Palma, the Casino moved to compel the Petitioners to join the Assailant as a necessary party under Nev. R. Civ. P. 19, which provides that a person must be joined as a party if the court cannot afford complete relief in that person's absence. The district court granted the motion and compelled Petitioners to join the Assailant. Petitioners petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the order compelling joinder. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the Assailant was not a necessary party under Rule 19 because the district court could afford complete relief to the parties, the Casino was able to implead the Assailant as a third party under Nev. R. Civ. P. 14, and creating a per se joinder requirement would unfairly burden the Petitioners. View "Humphries v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant received treatment at Hospital for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Appellant granted two statutory liens to Hospital on settlement proceeds she obtained from the tortfeasor for hospital services rendered. Appellant subsequently settled her case against the tortfeasor, and the tortfeasor's insurer (Insurer) agreed to pay Appellant $1.3 million in exchange for Appellant's agreement to indemnify Insurer from all healthcare provider liens. Hospital subsequently sued Insurer, and Appellant tendered to Hospital all money it asserted was due. Appellant then filed a complaint against Hospital, alleging that Hospital overcharged her pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 439B.260(1), which provides that hospitals must reduce charges by thirty percent to inpatients who lack insurance "or other contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a third party." The district court entered judgment in favor of Hospital, finding that Appellant's settlement agreement with the tortfeasor rendered Appellant ineligible for the thirty percent statutory discount. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that a patient's eligibility is determined at the commencement of hospital services, and therefore, a later settlement agreement with a third party for the payment of such services does not disqualify the patient for the statutory discount. View " Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

After a fire destroyed a recreation center in Nye County, Appellant, which owned and operated the center, filed a complaint in Nye County against numerous defendants. Some defendants filed a motion for change of venue to Clark County. The district court granted the motion based on the convenience of the witnesses and the promotion of the ends of justice, finding that the existing courtroom facilities in Nye County were inadequate for a trial of this size. The district court then concluded that, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the trial should be transferred to Clark County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to the extent the district court relied on the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a basis for its decision, there was insufficient evidence to support such a finding; (2) the district court abused its discretion in failing to analyze and provide specific findings regarding whether existing courtroom facilities in Nye County could be made adequate and whether there were alternative facilities in the county that could be utilized to accommodate the trial; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Clark County's court schedule and docket congestion before ordering a change of venue. Remanded. View "Mountain View Recreation v. Imperial Commercial Cooking Equip. Co. " on Justia Law

After a general contractor (Perini) was sued in connection with alleged reinforcing steel defects on commercial construction project, Perini filed a counterclaim against the steel installer (Century) and the company to whom the steel installer assigned its assets (PCS). Century and PCS in turn filed third- and fourth-party complaints against several entities, including the company that provided structural engineering services for the project (Halcrow), alleging negligence, indemnity, contribution, an declaratory relief. Halcrow moved to dismiss the third- and fourth-party complaints, arguing that unintentional tort claims against design professionals in commercial construction projects are barred when the claimant incurs purely economic losses. The district court granted Halcrow's motion. The district court subsequently granted Century's and PCS's motions to amend their complaints to allege a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Halcrow then filed this petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court issued the writ and directed the district court to vacate its order granting PCS and Century leave to amend their third- and fourth-party complaints, holding that, in commercial construction defect litigation, the economic loss doctrine applies to bar claims against design professionals for negligent misrepresentation where the damages alleged are purely economic. View "Halcrow, Inc. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Deloitte and Touche (Deloitte), a public accounting firm, performed a financial audit for Global Cash Access Holdings (GCA). While performing a financial audit for another client Larry Krause, a CPA employed by Deloitte, obtained an FBI intelligence bulletin containing information about alleged illegal acts committed by GCA and members of its board of directors (Appellants). Deloitte disclosed the allegations to GCA's audit committee. A subsequent investigation revealed no evidence of misconduct on the part of GCA or Appellants. The investigation, however, resulted in a significant drop in GCA's stock price. Appellants filed a complaint for defamation and tortious interference against Deloitte and Krause (collectively, Deloitte). The district court granted Deloitte's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Deloitte's communications to the audit committee were protected by a conditional privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) one who is required by law to publish defamatory matter is absolutely privileged to publish it when the communication is made pursuant to a lawful process and to a qualified person; and (2) Deloitte's statement to GCA's audit committee was therefore absolutely privileged as a matter of law because Deloitte communicated information about alleged illegal acts in accordance with federal securities law. View "Cucinotta v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint for professional negligence against a doctor of podiatric medicine and his employer. Appellant filed the complaint without a supporting Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 affidavit of merit because podiatrists are not considered "physicians" under chapter 41A for medical malpractice claims purposes. While Appellant's case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Fierle v. Perez concluding that an affidavit of merit is required under section 41A.071 for both medical malpractice and professional negligence complaints. Relying on Fierle, the district court dismissed Appellant's complaint without prejudice. Appellant was subsequently unable to file a new complaint because the statute of limitations for her claims had expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in Fierle, the Court expanded the reach of section 41A.071 beyond its precise words, and therefore, Fierle was overruled; (2) professional negligence actions are not subject to the affidavit-of-merit requirement based on the unambiguous language of section 41A.071; and (3) therefore, the district court erred when it dismissed Appellant's professional negligence complaint for lack of a supporting affidavit of merit. View " Egan v. Chambers" on Justia Law

Respondents were involved in the development and construction of Holcomb Condominiums (Condos). Appellant was the homeowners' association for Condos. Appellant filed, on behalf of itself and all condominium homeowners, a constructional defect complaint against Respondents, alleging a variety of defects and claims for negligence and breach of warranty. The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint as time-barred by the two-year contractual limitations period found in nearly identical arbitration agreements attached to each of the homeowners' purchase contracts. The court also denied as futile Appellant's request to amend its complaint to add causes of action for willful misconduct and fraudulent concealment based on missing roof underlayment, finding that the claim would also be time-barred by the contractual limitations period. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) arbitration agreements containing a reduced limitations period that are attached to and incorporated into purchase contracts are unlawful; (2) the district court erred in finding Appellants' negligence-based claims and breach of warranty claims were time-barred; and (3) because the contractual limitations provision was unenforceable, the district court's denial of the motion to amend on this basis was improper. View "Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Stewart Venture, LLC" on Justia Law