Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal because the district court had not issued a final ruling on the change of venue motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court order deferring a final ruling on a change of venue motion based on adverse pretrial publicity until after jury selection begins does not finally decide the motion; and (2) because the court did not finally rule on the motion in this case, the matter was not ripe for appeal. View "Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. After the jury was empaneled, Appellants renewed their motion for a change of venue, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court must apply a multifactor test to determine whether there is a reason to believe that the party seeking a change of venue will not receive a fair trial in the community where the case originated; and (2) because Appellants did not demonstrate that the circumstances in this case presented a reasonable belief that a fair trial could not be had in Clark County, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' motion for a change of venue. View "Sicor, Inc. v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

Employee suffered a work-related injury to his back in 2004. Employee had also suffered previous accidents resulting in injuries to his lower back. A rating physician determined that Employee's permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for the 2004 injury should be calculated using a net twenty-six percent impairment rating. Employer's Insurer offered an award to Employee based on a net seventeen percent impairment rating. An appeals officer ordered Insurer to offer Employee a PPD award based on the original impairment rating. The district court affirmed, concluding that Employee's prior impairment rating, which was calculated using an older version of the AMA Guides, should be deducted from his current impairment rating, which was calculated using the current edition of the AMA Guides. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the governing statute required the rating physician to reconcile the different editions of the AMA Guides by first recalculating the percentage of the previous impairment rating using the current edition and then subtracting that recalculated percentage from the current level of impairment; and (2) the district court and appeals officer erred in determining the amount due, and therefore, the PPD award based on the seventeen percent impairment rating for the current injury was proper. View "Pub. Agency Comp. Trust v. Blake" on Justia Law

The children of Helen Klasch brought a wrongful-death action against Walgreens Pharmacy after Klasch had a fatal reaction to medication dispensed by Walgreens. The pharmacy had information before releasing the medication to Klasch that she was allergic to the medication. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Walgreens on the basis that, under the learned-intermediary doctrine followed in a majority of jurisdictions, the pharmacist's limited duty was to properly fill the prescription, as written by the physician, unless there was plain error or the prescription was obviously fatal. The Supreme Court (1) adopted the learned-intermediary doctrine in the context of pharmacist/customer tort litigation because the public-policy considerations behind doctrine were sound; but (2) in circumstances in which a pharmacist has knowledge of a customer-specific risk with respect to a prescribed medication, the learned-intermediary doctrine does not insulate a pharmacist from liability, and the pharmacist has a duty to exercise reasonable care in warning the customer or notifying the prescribing doctor of this risk. Remanded to resolve factual issues as to breach of duty and causation of injury. View "Klasch v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Allen Smith was fatally shot by Daniel Ott after an altercation in the lounge of the Silver Nugget. Smith's Estate filed suit against the Silver Nugget asserting negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for the Silver Nugget on the ground that it did not owe Smith a duty of care under Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.015. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the duty element of a negligence cause of action must be determined as a matter of law by considering whether the wrongful act that precipitated the plaintiff's injury was foreseeable; (2) section 651.015's definition of "foreseeable" provides the appropriate framework for conducting this inquiry in the context of innkeeper liability by codifying the common-law approach that was set forth in Doud v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp.; and (3) because the district court properly applied section 651.015 in determining that the act leading to the victim's death was not foreseeable, Silver Nugget did not owe the victim a duty as a matter of law, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Silver Nugget. View "Estate of Smith v. Mahoney's Silver Nugget" on Justia Law

From 2007 to 2008, Dorothy Rogers received Medicare benefits through Pacificare's federally-approved Medicare Advantage Plan, Secure Horizons. Rogers and Pacificare entered into separate contracts each year providing the terms and conditions of coverage. After receiving treatment from the Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada (ECSN), a facility approved by Pacificare for use by its Secure Horizons plan members, Rogers tested positive for hepatitis C. Rogers sued Pacificare, alleging that Pacificare should be held responsible for her injuries because it failed to adopt and implement an appropriate quality assurance program. Pacificare moved to dismiss her claims and compel arbitration based on a provision in the parties' 2007 contract. The district court determined that the 2007 contract governed, but held that the arbitration provision was unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the parties in this case did not expressly rescind the arbitration provision at issue, the provision survived the 2007 contract's expiration and was properly invoked; and (2) as the Medicare Act expressly preempts any state laws or regulations with respect to the Medicare plan at issue in this case, Nevada's unconscionability doctrine was preempted to the extent that it would regulate federally-approved Medicare plans. View "Pacificare of Nevada v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Appellant Margerita Cervantes allegedly contracted hepatitis C as a result of treatment she received at the Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada (ECSN). Appellant obtained treatment at ECSN as part of the health care benefits she received through her culinary union. The union operated a self-funded ERISA health care plan and retained Respondents, Health Plan of Nevada and other health and life insurance entities, as its agents to assist in establishing a network of the plan's chosen medical provider. Appellant filed a lawsuit alleging that Respondents were responsible for her injuries because they failed to ensure the quality of care provided by ECSN and referred her to a blatantly unsafe medical provider. The district court concluded that Cervantes' claims were preempted by ERISA section 514(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state law claims of negligence and negligence per se against a managed care organization contracted by an ERISA plan to facilitate the development of the ERISA plan's network of health care providers were precluded by ERISA section 514. View "Cervantes v. Health Plan of Nevada" on Justia Law

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery. View "Francis v. Wynn Las Vegas, L.L.C." on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a multi-vehicle traffic accident, which led to a dispute over who was at fault for the accident. At trial, Phillip Emerson, the attorney of one of the defendants, made a series of statements to the jury that the Supreme Court later deemed improper and amounted to impermissible jury nullification. On remand, the matter was ultimately dismissed with prejudice. Afterwards, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and imposed sanctions on Emerson, personally. Emerson subsequently filed a petition for writ relief, requesting that the Supreme Court issue a writ directing the district court to vacate its order imposing sanctions. The Court denied writ relief, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to impose sanctions because a district court retains jurisdiction after a case is dismissed to consider sanctions for attorney misconduct that occurred prior to the dismissal; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing as a sanction attorney fees and costs incurred in the original trial. View "Emerson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Mallory Warburton was working for the City of North Las Vegas when she was involved in a car accident and suffered numerous injuries. The City started paying workers' compensation benefits to Warburton at a rate of $10 an hour. At the time of the accident, Warburton was expected to make $12 an hour because of a promotion to manager of one of the City's pools. After an administrative appeal, a hearing officer instructed the City to redetermine Warburton's benefits using the $12-an-hour rate of pay for a pool manager. An appeals officer reversed, concluding Warburton's benefits should be based on the $10-an-hour rate of pay she was actually receiving at the time of the accident. The district court reversed the appeals officer's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence and that substantial evidence supported the district court's determination that (1) Warburton's primary job at the time of the accident was that of pool manager, and (2) Warburton's workers' compensation benefits must be determined using an average monthly wage calculation at the $12-an-hour rate of pay. View "City of North Las Vegas v. Warburton" on Justia Law