Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

These two consolidated appeals arose from the same underlying district court action in which the district court issued a final judgment against Appellants in consolidated civil cases alleging various tort, contract, and declaratory relief claims. Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment and paid the requisite filing fee. That appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court as docket number 55200. Docket number 55981 was an appeal from a subsequent award of attorney fees entered in the same district court case. Because the notice of appeal was not accompanied by the requisite filing fee, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Docket number 56473 was an appeal from a subsequent order denying a motion to set aside the judgment entered in the same district court case underlying the previous two appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal for failure to pay the filing fee. Appellants submitted the instant motions for reconsideration in docket numbers 55981 and 56473, asking the Court to permit them to pay the fees necessary to reinstate the appeals. The Supreme Court denied the motions, stating that due to limited judicial resources, failure to pay the requisite fee in a timely matter will result in dismissal. View "Weddell v. Stewart" on Justia Law

At issue in this extraordinary writ proceeding was whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.259(1) compels dismissal where the initial pleading in an action alleging nonresidential construction malpractice was served without filing the attorney affidavit and expert report required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258(1) and (3). The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that a defective pleading served in violation of section 11.258 is void ab initio and of no legal effect and, thus, cannot be cured by amendment. The Court held that because the initial pleadings served by certain real parties in interest in this case did not include the attorney affidavit and expert report as required by section 11.258, those pleadings were void ab initio, and the district court did not have discretionary authority to allow the parties to amend their pleadings to cure their failure to comply with section 11.258. View "Otak Nevada, L.L.C. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Kelly Encoe alleged that he was struck by a taxicab owned by petitioner Yellow Cab of Reno and driven by Timothy Willis. In his amended complaint, Encoe asserted that Yellow Cab was liable for Encoe's injuries under a respondeat superior theory. Yellow Cab moved for summary judgment, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat. 706.473 authorized it to lease the taxicab to Willis as an independent contractor, and because Willis was an independent contractor, Yellow Cab could not be held liable for the incident. The district court denied Yellow Cab's motion, determining that the nature of the relationship between Yellow Cab and Willis was a question of fact for the jury, without addressing Section 706.473's potentially dispositive application. The Supreme Court denied Yellow Cab's petition for a writ of mandamus but granted Yellow Cab's petition for a rehearing because it overlooked a material question of law regarding the application of Section 706.473. The Court ultimately denied the writ due to policy but noted that the district court may wish to reconsider its reasoning for denying summary judgment because it did not render a thorough resolution of the issues before it on summary judgment. View "Yellow Cab of Reno v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

Respondent Andrea McNulty filed a complaint in a district court located in Washoe County, alleging tort claims against appellant Ben Roethlisberger and eight other defendants. The events on which the allegations were based occurred in Douglas County. Roethlisberger was a resident of Pennsylvania. Roethlisberger filed a motion to change venue to Douglas County, arguing that venue was improper in Washoe County because no defendant resided there. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Roethlisberger asserted that (1) because a codefendant actually resided in Douglas County, and because no other defendant resided in Washoe County, venue was improper there, and (2) the district court abused its discretion in concluding that convenience and the ends of justice did not require removal to Douglas County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as venue was not improper as to appellant, he lacked standing to challenge venue based on his codefendant's place of residence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to change the place of trial. View "Roethlisberger v. McNulty" on Justia Law

Pedro Gallegos was injured by David Gonzalez in a car accident. At the time of the accident, Gonzalez was driving a car rented from respondent Malco Enterprises, for which he purchased a liability insurance policy issued by respondent First American and managed by respondent Knight Management. Gallegos obtained a default judgment against Gonzalez. After Gallegos was unable to collect on the judgment, he sought a judicial assignment of Gonzalez's unasserted claims against respondents, which was granted. Gallegos brought the assigned claims, which related to Gonzalez's insurance policy with respondents, in a separate district court action. Respondents moved for summary judgment on the basis that the previous district court could not assign the right of action in a proceeding supplementary to the execution of the judgment, and thus, Gallegos lacked standing to bring Gonzalez's claims. The district court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, vacating the earlier assignment order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) rights of action held by a judgment debtor are subject to execution toward satisfaction of a judgment and may be judicially assigned; and (2) Gallegos properly asserted a right of action assigned to him by another district court. Remanded. View "Gallegos v. Malco Enterprises of Nev., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Joonsong Jitnan and his wife instituted a personal injury action against Ryan Oliver for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. During the voir dire, appellants exercised a challenge for cause to a prospective juror. The district court denied the challenge for cause, and appellants subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge on the prospective juror. After the trial, Jitnan appealed, arguing (1) the district court abused its discretion denying the challenge for cause to the prospective juror, and (2) the court's erroneous denial of the challenge for cause required reversal because in using a peremptory challenge to cure the district court's error, appellants lost one of their peremptory challenges, which was prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a prospective juror expresses a potentially disqualifying bias or prejudice and is inconsistent in his or her responses regarding that preconception upon further inquiry, the district court must set forth the reasons for its grant or denial of the challenge for cause; and (2) although the district court in this case failed to set forth its reasons for denying the challenge for cause, there was no prejudicial error requiring reversal because the jury that decided appellants' case was fair and impartial. View "Jitnan v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Debbie Costello and Philip Casler were involved in an automobile accident, after which Casler died from unrelated causes. Costello submitted a claim with Casler's insurance provider, American Family, for injuries relating to the accident. After the statute of limitations expired, Costello submitted a motion in the district court pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 25, seeking to substitute the special administratrix of Casler's estate for Casler. American Family submitted a countermotion for summary judgment, arguing that any amendment adding a party was now time-barred because the statute of limitations had expired. The district court granted Casler's countermotion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under Nev. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an amendment to a complaint adding a decedent's estate as a party to an action will relate back to the date of the original pleading filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations; and (2) a decedent insurer's notice and knowledge of the institution of an action may be imputed to the decedent's estate for purposes of satisfying the relation back requirements of Rule 15(c). Remanded. View "Costello v. Casler" on Justia Law

Policyholder Robert Sparks was sued by victims and families of an automobile accident in which Sparks was involved. Sparks's insurance company, Benchmark, filed an interpleader action, seeking permission to deposit the $30,000 policy limits with the district court for dispersal to the plaintiffs. Benchmark then filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a determination that once the court accepted the deposited funds, Benchmark would have no further obligation to defend Sparks in the underlying tort lawsuit. The district court granted Benchmark permission to deposit the policy liability limits but denied it's motion for summary judgment, determining that Benchmark's duty to defend Sparks extended beyond its tender of the policy limits. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the policy did not unambiguously alert Sparks that Bench could terminate its duty to defend him by depositing the policy's limits with the district court; and (2) that a policyholder in Sparks' position would reasonably expect his insurer to procure a settlement on his behalf or defend him until the policy limits have been used to satisfy a judgment entered against him. View "Benchmark Ins. Co. v. Sparks" on Justia Law

In 2010, Brian M. Walsh filed a complaint against, among others, petitioner Benjamin A. Lund. Petitioner added counterclaims of his own against Walsh and several additional counterclaim defendants. The district court dismissed the counterclaims against the new parties. Lund then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court. At issue was whether a defendant could, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 13(h), bring a counterclaim that adds new parties to the action. Under that rule, if there is at least one original party included in the counterclaim, a defendant may add new parties to the action through a counterclaim if the nonparty meets the joinder requirements under Nev. R. Civ. P. 19 or 20. The Court held the district court failed to apply the proper Rule 13(h) analysis and directed the district court to vacate its order dismissing the counterclaims and to reconsider the decision in light of its opinion. Because the petitioner failed to fully develop his petition for extraordinary relief by necessarily addressing Nev. R. Civ. P. 19 or 20, the Court rejected petitioner’s request that it order the dismissed counterclaims reinstated. View "Lund v. District Court" on Justia Law

Appellant Roy Sparks and Jeffrey Clack got into a fistfight during a college football tailgate event. Appellant was injured, and he filed suit against Clack and several entities that sponsored the event. Appellant also named fictitious "Roe" and "Doe" defendants for other parties they couldn't identify but that they felt were liable. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed Appellant's case, finding that Appellant did not try hard enough to find all the persons he felt were liable for his injuries. Furthermore, the court held that Respondent Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc. was not responsible for the conduct of persons like Mr. Clack at the tailgate. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Appellant's case.