Articles Posted in Juvenile Law

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When a minor is arrested solely for solicitation or prostitution but is charged in juvenile court with offenses other than prostitution or solicitation, Nev. Rev. Stat. 62C.240 applies, precluding formal adjudication of delinquency and ensuring counseling and medical treatment services as part of a consent decree. Petitioner, a juvenile, was arrested for soliciting prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution and was charged with obstructing an officer. Petitioner was adjudicated as a delinquent. The State subsequently filed several petitions alleging violations of Petitioner’s probation. The juvenile court committed Petitioner to placement at the Claliente Youth Center. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the juvenile court to vacate its orders adjudicating her as a delinquent and apply the provisions of section 62C.240. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition, holding that A.J. was entitled to protections afforded under 62C.240 and that the juvenile court arbitrarily and capriciously abused its discretion by adjudicating her as a delinquent. View "A.J. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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On May 12, 2009, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Appellant with burglary and grand larceny. On August 16, 2010, the State filed a petition to certify Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. The juvenile court granted the State’s petition and certified Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. After a trial, Appellant was found guilty. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction over a juvenile even if it does not make its final disposition of the case within the one-year period provided by statute; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of burglary and grand larceny. View "Barber v. State" on Justia Law

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The district court denied Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo after reviewing the recommendations of a master of the juvenile court after Appellant timely requested such a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 62B.030(4) does not require the juvenile court to direct a hearing de novo if, after a master of the juvenile court provides notice of the master’s recommendations, a person who is entitled to such notice files a timely request for a hearing de novo; and (2) therefore, the district court did not violate section 62B.030(4) by denying Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo because section 62B.030(4) grants the district court discretion to decide whether to grant such a hearing. View "In re P.S." on Justia Law

Posted in: Juvenile Law

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Appellant was employed by Employer at a store located on property owned by Casino (Employer and Casino henceforth referred to as “Casino”). Appellant was engaged to Fiancé when Fiancé filed a complaint with the Nevada Gaming Control Board (NGCB) regarding some of Casino’s slot machines. Casino subsequently terminated Appellant’s employment. Appellant filed suit against Casino alleging that Casino terminated her employment in retaliation for Fiancé’s complaint to the NGCB. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because Nevada has not recognized a cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining to recognize a common law cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge, holding that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Brown v. Eddie World, Inc." on Justia Law

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The State charged Petitioner with two counts of first-degree murder and associated offenses. The State filed a motion in the juvenile court seeking to unseal and release Petitioner's juvenile records to assist in the prosecution. The juvenile court issued an order broadly unsealing and releasing the records for "use in the prosecution." The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief, holding (1) a district attorney is not statutorily authorized to inspect a defendant's sealed juvenile records to obtain information that will be used against him or her in a subsequent proceeding; and (2) therefore, the juvenile court manifestly abused its discretion by granting the State's motion to inspect Petitioner's sealed juvenile records.View "Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

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Among the issues in this appeal was whether a juvenile court has authority under Nev. Rev. Stat. 62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision without the written approval of the district attorney. In this case, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that Respondent, a juvenile, committed unlawful acts that would be felony and gross misdemeanor charges if committed by an adult. The juvenile court dismissed the State's petition without the district attorney's written approval and referred Respondent to the probation office for informal supervision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 62C.230(1)(a) grants the juvenile court the authority to dismiss a petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision only if the district attorney gives written approval for placement of the juvenile under informal supervision where the acts alleged in the petition would be a felony or gross misdemeanor if committed by an adult; and (2) the juvenile court is limited by the provisions of Nevada Revised Statutes Title 5 when exercising its authority to carry out its duties in overseeing juvenile justice matters. Remanded. View "In re Steven P." on Justia Law

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Because Petitioner tested positive for drugs prior to a hearing in the juvenile drug court, the judge held Petitioner in contempt of court. Petitioner moved to stay the contempt order, contending that she could not be held in direct contempt because she did not not cause any disturbance in the presence of the court or violate any court order. The juvenile court refused to change its contempt ruling. One month after Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, the juvenile court vacated its order finding Petitioner in direct contempt. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition as moot, holding that because the district court vacated its contempt order, the proceeding was moot, and no exception to the mootness doctrine applied. View "Paley v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

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Logan D. was adjudicated delinquent for lewdness with a minor for an offense that occurred when Logan was seventeen years old. The law at the time of Logan's adjudication provided the juvenile court with discretion to require Logan to submit to adult registration and community notification if it determined that Logan was not rehabilitated. The Legislature subsequently passed a bill mandating that all juveniles ages fourteen an older adjudicated for certain sex offenses register as adult sex offenders and be subject to community notification. Logan and twenty other juveniles filed motions asking the juvenile court to find the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile sex offenders. The juvenile court declared the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile sex offenders. The State filed a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the retroactive application of mandatory sex offender registration and community notification requirements on juveniles adjudicated for certain sex offenses did not violate the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

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Respondent was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state facility. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor. The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(f), a felony. Citing relevant statutes and Robinson v. State, which broadly holds that "prisoner" as used in section 200.481(2)(f) was meant to only apply in the criminal setting, the district court dismissed the charge, holding that because Respondent's detention was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom section 200.481(2)(f) could apply. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detained for delinquency in a state facility is not a "prisoner" for purposes of section 200.481(2)(f). View "State v. Javier C." on Justia Law