Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law

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In this workers’ compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Employer, holding that an injury arising from Employer’s failure to provide medical assistance to Employee suffering a stroke arose out of and in the course of the employment, and therefore, Employee’s sole remedy for the injury was workers’ compensation. Employee sued Employer for failure to aid him during the “golden window” of diagnostic and treatment opportunity when he was suffering a stroke. The district court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that Employee’s exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee’s exclusive remedy against Employer was workers’ compensation because his injuries occurred in the course of his employment and arose out of his employment. View "Baiguen v. Harrah’s Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this dispute over a noncompete agreement (NCA) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holdings that an NCA must be limited to the geographical areas in which an employer has particular business interests and emphasized that this precedent remains applicable in instances where the NCA imposes a nationwide restriction on the former employee. The Court further clarified that an employer seeking a preliminary injunction enforcing an NCA bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the NCA’s reasonableness. In this dispute over an NCA, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of the motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Respondent, an employer, seeking to enforce the terms of a noncompete agreement (NCA) against Appellant, a former employee, holding that Respondent failed to make a prima facie showing that the NCA was reasonable by showing its restrictions did not extend beyond date geographical areas in which Respondent conducted business. View "Shores v. Global Experience Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) to the Nevada Constitution requires an employer who provides health benefits and pays one dollar per hour less in wages than an employer who does not provide health benefits to provide a benefit in the form of health insurance at least equivalent to the one dollar per hour in wages that the employee would otherwise receive. Employees alleged that their Employer paid them the lower-tier minimum wage without providing sufficient health benefits under the MWA. Employees moved for summary judgment, arguing that the health insurance offered by Employer did not comply with Nevada statutes placing substantive requirements on health insurance. The district court granted summary judgment for Employees, concluding that an employer provides health benefits sufficient to pay the MWA’s lower-tier minimum wage only if the employer offers health insurance that complies with Nev. Rev. Stat. chapter 608, 689A and 689B. The Supreme Court granted Employer’s request for extraordinary relief, holding that an employer is qualified to pay the lower-tier minimum wage if the employer offers a benefit to the employee in the form of health insurance of a value greater than or equal to the wage of an additional dollar per hour. View "MDC Restaurants, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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The failure to name a party of record in the caption of a petition for judicial review is not jurisdictionally fatal under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(a) where the party is named in the body of the petition and is properly served with the petition. Appellant, a former corrections officer employed by the State of Nevada, Department of Corrections (NDOC), filed a workers’ compensation claim. Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. (CCMSI), as NDOC’s third-party administrator, denied Appellant’s claim. An appeals officer affirmed. Appellant then filed a petition for judicial review. The caption of the petition listed as respondents NDOC and the Department of Administration but did not individually identify CCMSI. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant’s failure to name CCMSI in the caption of the petition did not render the petition jurisdictionally defective because the body of the petition named CCMSI through incorporation by reference of the attached administrative decision and CCMSI was timely served with the petition. View "Prevost v. State, Department of Administration" on Justia Law

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Where the record showed that, when faced with a resign-or-be-fired option, Appellant’s decision to resign was freely given and stemming from his own choice, such a resignation was voluntary pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.380. Appellant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the Employment Security Division (ESD). An ESD claims adjudicator denied the claim based on section 612.380, stating that Appellant voluntarily resigned because he resigned from his employment in anticipation of being discharged or laid off. An administrative referee and Board of Review upheld the decision. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant voluntarily resigned pursuant to section 612.380; and (2) substantial evidence supported the appeals referee’s determination that Appellant lacked good cause to resign, which rendered him ineligible for unemployment benefits. View "Dolores v. State, Department of Employment Security Division" on Justia Law

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Zenor was employed by the Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) when he injured his wrist on the job. Eleven months later, Zenor underwent an examination and received an evaluation by his treating physician, Dr. Huene, who determined Zenor was not yet capable of performing his pre-injury job duties. Two months later, Dr. Huene again examined Zenor and determined he could fully use his wrist with a brace as needed. Less than one month later, Dr. Huene released Zenor "without limitations." Zenor delivered the full release to NDOT that same day. NDOT nonetheless commenced proceedings and separated him from employment for medical reasons. An administrative hearing officer reversed. The district court affirmed. Zenor sought attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) on the ground that NDOT unreasonably brought its petition to harass him. The court held that NRS 233B.130 prohibited attorney fees in a judicial action of a final agency decision. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. NRS 233B.130(6), which states that the provisions of NRS Chapter 233B provide the exclusive means of judicial action in a petition for judicial review, prohibits an award of attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) in petitions for judicial review. View "Zenor v. State of Nevada Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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Felton, then employed by Hewlett-Packard, sustained a minor injury to his knee while volunteering on a Douglas County search and rescue team. Felton sought insurance benefits from Douglas County and its workers' compensation insurance carrier. The third-party claims adjustor, ASC, notified Felton that it had calculated his average monthly wage (AMW) for the purpose of determining the amount of benefits based upon the statutorily deemed wage of a search and rescue volunteer as set forth in NRS 616A.157, which is $2,000 per month. ASC awarded Felton a one-percent permanent partial disability (PPD) or whole person impairment (WPI). A hearing officer affirmed the award. Felton appealed only the determination that his AMW should be set at the statutorily deemed wage of a search and rescue volunteer. The appeals officer affirmed, holding that Felton was not entitled to an AMW that aggregated his statutorily deemed wage and his earned wage from his private employment. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The plain language of the statutes and regulations requires the aggregation of concurrently earned wages. View "Felton v. Douglas County" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether untimely service of a petition for judicial review on the Attorney General mandates dismissal of the petition. The Supreme Court held (1) while service of a petition for judicial review on the Attorney General under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(c)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional and must be effected within the statutorily prescribed forty-five-day period, that time period can be extended when good cause is shown under section 233B.130(5); (2) the district court may exercise its authority to extend the forty-five-day period either before or after the service period has run; and (3) because the district court in this case did not determine whether good cause to extend the time to serve the Attorney General existed before declining to consider Appellant’s motion to extend the time for service, this matter must be remanded for such a determination. View "Heat & Frost Insulators and Allied Workers Local 16 v. Labor Commissioner" on Justia Law

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Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.140, which allows for assessment of attorney fees in a private cause of action for recovery of unpaid wages, explicitly recognizes a private cause of action for unpaid wages, and accordingly, Nev. Rev. Stat. chapter 608 provides a private right of action for unpaid wages. Petitioner filed a class-action complaint against real party in interest Terrible Herbst Inc. alleging, among other causes of action, failure to compensate for all hours worked, failure to pay overtime, and failure to timely pay all wages due and owing, all in violation of various provisions of Chapter 608. All of Petitioner’s Chapter 608 claims also referred to Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.140. The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Chapter 608 claims on the basis that no private right of action exists. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for extraordinary relief and instructed the district court to vacate its order dismissing Petitioner’s claims, holding that Petitioner has and properly stated a private cause of action for unpaid wages. View "Neville v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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Exposure to a hazard can be demonstrated by facts establishing that exposure to the hazard is reasonably predictable. Appellant in this case argued that the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NOSHA) improperly cited it for violating 29 C.F.R. 1910.132(f), which requires employers to provide training regarding the use of personal protective equipment to employees exposed to hazards requiring the use of such equipment. Specifically, Appellant argued that it was improperly cited for a violation because no facts established that its employees were actually exposed to such a hazard in the course of their work or were required to have fall protection training. The Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Review Board upheld NOSHA’s citation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a statute or regulation requires NOSHA to establish employee exposure to a hazard, the Board’s decision regarding a NOSHA citation may be upheld if NOSHA presents substantial evidence demonstrating that exposure to the hazard was or would be reasonably predictable; and (2) the Board in this case relied on an incorrect standard in evaluating the citation. View "Sierra Packaging & Converting, LLC v. Chief Administrative Officer of Occupational Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law