Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.140, which allows for assessment of attorney fees in a private cause of action for recovery of unpaid wages, explicitly recognizes a private cause of action for unpaid wages, and accordingly, Nev. Rev. Stat. chapter 608 provides a private right of action for unpaid wages.Petitioner filed a class-action complaint against real party in interest Terrible Herbst Inc. alleging, among other causes of action, failure to compensate for all hours worked, failure to pay overtime, and failure to timely pay all wages due and owing, all in violation of various provisions of Chapter 608. All of Petitioner’s Chapter 608 claims also referred to Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.140. The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Chapter 608 claims on the basis that no private right of action exists. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for extraordinary relief and instructed the district court to vacate its order dismissing Petitioner’s claims, holding that Petitioner has and properly stated a private cause of action for unpaid wages. View "Neville v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Exposure to a hazard can be demonstrated by facts establishing that exposure to the hazard is reasonably predictable.Appellant in this case argued that the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NOSHA) improperly cited it for violating 29 C.F.R. 1910.132(f), which requires employers to provide training regarding the use of personal protective equipment to employees exposed to hazards requiring the use of such equipment. Specifically, Appellant argued that it was improperly cited for a violation because no facts established that its employees were actually exposed to such a hazard in the course of their work or were required to have fall protection training. The Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Review Board upheld NOSHA’s citation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a statute or regulation requires NOSHA to establish employee exposure to a hazard, the Board’s decision regarding a NOSHA citation may be upheld if NOSHA presents substantial evidence demonstrating that exposure to the hazard was or would be reasonably predictable; and (2) the Board in this case relied on an incorrect standard in evaluating the citation. View "Sierra Packaging & Converting, LLC v. Chief Administrative Officer of Occupational Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law

Judicial marshals are “peace officers” within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 289.040, 289.057 and 298.060, which provisions are intended to provide job-related protections to peace officers employed by law enforcement agencies, but the Eighth Judicial District Court (EJDC) is not a “law enforcement agency” as statutorily defined.Appellant, who was employed by the EJDC first as a bailiff and then as an administrative marshal, was terminated for misconduct. According to the terms of a written memorandum of understanding between the Clark County Marshal’s Union and the EJDC, Appellant’s appeal resulted in arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the EJDC’s decision to terminate Appellant. Appellant petitioned the district court to set aside the arbitrator’s decision, arguing that the EJDC violated his statutory rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 289 by disclosing and relying upon his prior disciplinary history as justification for his termination. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provisions of Chapter 289 in this case did not apply to Appellant; and (2) Appellant failed to demonstrate that the arbitrator either exceeded his authority or manifestly disregarded the law. View "Knickmeyer v. State" on Justia Law

The district court erred in granting a motion to vacate an arbitration award affirming a school district’s termination of a principal. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting Respondents’ motion to vacate the award, holding (1) the arbitrator did not exceed his authority as an arbitrator because his decision did not contradict the express language of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement; (2) the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law because he acknowledged Nev. Rev. Stat. 391.3116 and applied the statute in reaching his decision; and (3) the arbitration award was not arbitrary or capricious because substantial evidence supported the arbitrator’s findings. View "Washoe County School District v. White" on Justia Law

Based on the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.530(1), the requirement that all relevant parties be named as defendants must be completed as timely as the rest of the petition.The Board of Review and the Administrator of the Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation, Employment Security Division (ESD) awarded unemployment compensation benefits to Jessica Gerry, a former employee of McDonald’s of Keystone. McDonald’s filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The ESD moved to dismiss the petition for judicial review on the ground that the caption failed to identify Gerry as a defendant, rendering the petition defective under Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.530(1). The district court denied the ESD’s motion to dismiss and granted McDonald’s motion to amend, concluding that the naming of all relevant parties as defendants was not a jurisdictional requirement. The Supreme Court granted the ESD’s petition for extraordinary relief, holding that McDonald’s failure to follow the statutory requirements of section 612.530(1) deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear its petition for judicial review. View "Board of Review v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a class action lawsuit against Respondent, a taxi company, seeking back pay and equitable relief under the Minimum Wage Amendment of the Nevada Constitution (MWA). The district court denied class certification based on an agreement that resolved an earlier-filed grievance for wage adjustments under the MWA brought by the union that represented Respondent’s cab drivers. The district court subsequently granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in holding that the settlement of the union’s grievance against Henderson Taxi made class certification inappropriate; and (2) properly granted summary judgment to Respondent. View "Sargeant v. Henderson Taxi" on Justia Law

At issue in this consolidated matter was whether Nevada’s general slayer statutes apply to the Public Employees’ Retirement Act (PERS Act) for the purposes of determining payment of survivor benefits. The Supreme Court held (1) Nevada’s general slayer statutes are applicable to the PERS Act, and therefore, any person who kills their PERS-member spouse must be treated as if they predeceased the PERS-member spouse for the purposes of determining payment of survivor benefits (2) the Public Employees’ Retirement System of Nevada (PERS) is not exempt from paying prejudgment or post-judgment interest; (3) it is within the district court’s discretion to award up to $1,500 in reasonable costs for a non testifying expert consultant under Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.005(5); and (4) attorney fees should not have been awarded in this case under Nev. Rev. Stat. 7.085 and 18.010. View "Pub. Employees' Retirement System of Nevada v. Gitter" on Justia Law

William Poremba (Appellant) was injured in an accident during the course of his employment with Southern Nevada Paving. Southern Nevada Paving, through S&C Claims (collectively, Respondents), accepted Appellant’s workers’ compensation claim and eventually closed the claim. Approximately four years later, Appellant sought to reopen his claim. Respondents denied the request. Appellant administratively appealed. The appeals officer denied Appellant’s attempt to reopen his claim. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The appeals officer and the district court apparently resolved the petition to reopen based on whether Appellant exhausted his funds from a settlement with third-parties involved in the accident on medical expenses. Appellant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the appeals officer erred in granting summary judgment because he was not required to prove that he spent his excess recovery on medical expenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390 does not require exhaustion or reimbursement as a condition precedent to reopening a workers’ compensation claim; and (2) insurers are only entitled to reimbursement from the portions of third-party recovery allocated to expenses within the scope of workers’ compensation. View "Poremba v. Southern Nevada Paving" on Justia Law

The Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) to the Nevada Constitution guarantees that employees be paid a specific minimum wage and gives an employee the right to bring an action against his employer to remedy any violation of the MWA. The MWA, however, does not specify a statute of limitations for the right of action it establishes. At issue in this case was whether the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.260 or the four-year statute of limitations in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.220 applies to claims asserted under the MWA. Here, Appellant filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Respondent failed to pay her and other similarly situated employees the minimum wage required by the MWA. Citing the two-year statute of limitations in Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.260, Respondent sought judgment in its favor on claims for damages that were more than two years old when Appellant filed suit. The district court applied section 608.260 to Appellant’s claims and dismissed the claims after concluding that MWA claims are closely analogous to those provided for in Chapter 608. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the MWA is most closely analogous to section 608.260 and that applying section 608.260’s limitations period is consistent with Nevada minimum wage law. View "Perry v. Terrible Herbst, Inc." on Justia Law

Under the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) to the Nevada Constitution, if an employer provides health benefits, it may pay its employees a lower minimum wage than if no such health benefits are provided. The MWA also requires that health benefit premiums be capped at ten percent of the employee’s gross taxable income from the employer. The employees in these consolidated cases argued that employers must actually enroll employees in health benefit plans to be eligible to pay the lower-tier minimum wage and that the ten-percent cap does not include tips in its calculation of taxable income. The Supreme Court held (1) an employer need only offer a qualifying health plan to pay the lower wage; and (2) tips are not included in the calculation of taxable income. View "MDC Restaurants, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law