Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In May 2014, the City of Reno decided to lay off thirty-two firefighters. The City stated that its decision was based on a lack of funds. A collective bargaining agreement between the City and the International Association of Firefighters, Local 731 (union) provides that the right to lay off employees due to lack of funds is reserved to the City without negotiation. The union and the firefighters who would be laid off (collectively, IAFF) filed a complaint in the district court, claiming that the City had the funds to continue the firefighters’ employment. The IAFF also filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The City filed a motion to dismiss due to the IAFF’s failure to exhaust contractual and administrative remedies. The district court proceeded to enjoin the City from proceeding with the layoffs while the IAFF exhausted its contractual grievance and administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying grievance was not arbitrable under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, and therefore, the district court lacked authority to rule on the request for injunctive relief. View "City of Reno v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 731" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an unpaid wage action against four defendants, including Video Internet Phone Installs, Inc. (VIPI). The claims against VIPI were severed from the rest of the claims and thereafter resolved. Appellant did not appeal from the order resolving the claims against VIPI but, rather, appealed from the order finally resolving the remaining unsevered claims before challenging two interlocutory orders involving VIPI. VIPI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as to it. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding (1) one must take an appeal from an order finally resolving severed claims, even if the unsevered claims remain pending; and (2) because Appellant failed to timely appeal from the order resolving the severed claims against VIPI, he could not now challenge the orders regarding VIPI in an appeal from the order finally resolving the unsevered claims. View "Valdez v. Cox Commc’ns" on Justia Law

Appellants, performers at Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, challenged Sapphire’s practice of paying no wages to the performers, claiming they were “employees” within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.010 and thus entitled to minimum wage. The district court granted summary judgment for Sapphire, concluding that the performers were not “employees” within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed after adopting the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “economic realities” test for employment in the minimum wage context, holding that, based on a review of the totality of the circumstances of the working relationship’s economic reality in this case, Sapphire qualifies as an employer under Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.011 and the performers qualify as employees under section 608.010. Remanded. View "Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club" on Justia Law

Appellants, two taxicab drivers, brought an action against Respondents, taxicab companies, claiming damages for unpaid wages pursuant to the Minimum Wage Amendment, a constitutional amendment that revised Nevada’s then-statutory minimum wage scheme. The district court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the Minimum Wage Amendment did not repeal Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.250, which excepts taxicab drivers from Nevada’s minimum wage provisions, and that the statutory exceptions could be harmonized with the constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Minimum Wage Amendment, by clearly setting out some exceptions to the minimum wage law and not others, supersedes and supplants the taxicab driver exception set out in section 608.250(2). View "Thomas v. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp." on Justia Law

Steve Jacobs filed a wrongful termination complaint against Las Vegas Sands Corp. (LVSC) and Sands China Ltd. after he was fired as chief executive officer of the Sands China unit. Jacobs made several allegations in the complaint against Sheldon Adelson, the chief executive officer and majority shareholder of LVSC, personally. The case received widespread media attention, and after the Wall Street Journal published Adelson’s response to the allegations, Jacobs amended his complaint to add a claim for defamation per se against Adelson. The district court dismissed the defamation claim, determining that Adelson’s statements to the media were absolutely privileged communications relating to litigation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that communications made to the media in an extrajudicial setting are not absolutely privileged when the media holds no more significant interest in the litigation than the general public. View "Jacobs v. Adelson" on Justia Law

In 2004, Appellant sustained a work injury and received temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Appellant returned to work from 2006 until 2008, at which time his back problems recurred. Appellant received TTD benefits until 2010. Appellant was later medically released to return to work, but because he could not find a job, he filed for unemployment compensation. Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.344 allows an individual who cannot find work after a period of temporary disability the option of using his work history for the fifteen months preceding his disability leave to determine his unemployment compensation instead of the fifteen months preceding his application. To qualify for this option, the application must be filed “within 3 years after the initial period of disability begins.” The Employment Security Division denied Appellant’s claim, concluding that because Appellant received disability benefits for his back injury starting in 2004, he could not use section 612.344’s alternative-calculation option because the statute’s three-year window closed in 2007. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the alternative-calculation option in section 612.344 renews when a temporarily disabled worker recovers and returns long enough to reestablish himself in the unemployment compensation system. View "Anderson v. State Employment Sec. Div." on Justia Law

Steven Jacobs filed an action against Las Vegas Sands Corp. and related entities (collectively, “Sands”). During a hearing to consider sanctions as a result of Sands’s conduct in the discovery process, Sands attorney Justin Jones admitted that, prior to testifying, he had reviewed his billing records and e-mails from Jacobs that refreshed his memory as to the timing of events. Jacobs argued that the billing records and e-mails were openly discoverable because Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.125 requires a party to disclose any documents used to refresh a witness’s recollection. Sands objected based on the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. Without deciding the discovery issue, the district court imposed sanctions on Sands. Two months later, Jacobs filed a motion to compel production of the disputed documents, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court granted Sands’s request for a writ of prohibition to halt the production of the purportedly privileged documents, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, where Jacobs failed to demand production, inspection, and admission of the documents at or near the sanctions hearing and waited until well after the district court had entered its order, Jacobs’s demand was untimely under section 50.125(1). View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

Respondent filed a workers’ compensation claim for an injury he received when slipping down a flight of stairs. Liberty Mutual, Respondent’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, denied the claim. A hearing officer with the Department of Administration affirmed, but an appeals officer reversed the claim denial. Liberty Mutual subsequently filed a petition for judicial review in the Second Judicial District Court. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition because Liberty Mutual was not a resident of Washoe County, and therefore the petition did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(b)’s residency requirement. The Second Judicial District Court transferred venue. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order transferring venue and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition for judicial review, holding that section 233.130(2)(b) is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement and because Liberty Mutual was not a resident of Washoe County, the Second Judicial District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Liberty Mutual’s petition. View "Liberty Mut. v. Thomasson" on Justia Law

Appellant was terminated from his position as a group supervisor at a youth center after an incident involving Appellant and one of the youths. Appellant, who was a classified employee with the State Department of Health and Human Services in the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), administratively appealed his dismissal. A State Personnel Commission hearing officer set aside Appellant’s dismissal and remanded to DCFS to determine the appropriate level of discipline for Appellant’s infraction. Appellant subsequently sought judicial review to have a district court decide the issue of whether the hearing officer, as opposed to the employer, should determine the appropriate level of discipline for Appellant’s situation. The district court denied Appellant’s petition, concluding that hearing officers, after finding that dismissal was unreasonable, are not required to determine the appropriate level of discipline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that only appointing authorities, and not hearing officers, have the power to prescribe the actual discipline imposed on permanent classified state employees. View "Taylor v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

While employed by Employer, Appellant sustained an injury. Appellant filed an industrial injury claim. Employer's insurer (Insurer) partly accepted the claim but later closed Appellant's claim. After unsuccessfully filing three requests to reopen his claim, Appellant filed a fourth request, which was again denied by Insurer. A hearing officer affirmed the denial. Appellant administratively appealed. Insurer moved to dismiss, arguing that Appellant was precluded from reopening his claim under the doctrine of res judicata. The appeals officer granted Insurer's motion. The district court denied Appellant's petition for judicial review, concluding that Apellant failed to state a new cause of action that could withstand the application of res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the district court failed to provide any findings of fact or conclusions of law, the court could not properly review the appeals officer's determination that there was no change of circumstances warranting reopening under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390. Remanded. View "Elizondo v. Hood Machine, Inc." on Justia Law