Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While employed by Employer, Appellant sustained an injury. Appellant filed an industrial injury claim. Employer's insurer (Insurer) partly accepted the claim but later closed Appellant's claim. After unsuccessfully filing three requests to reopen his claim, Appellant filed a fourth request, which was again denied by Insurer. A hearing officer affirmed the denial. Appellant administratively appealed. Insurer moved to dismiss, arguing that Appellant was precluded from reopening his claim under the doctrine of res judicata. The appeals officer granted Insurer's motion. The district court denied Appellant's petition for judicial review, concluding that Apellant failed to state a new cause of action that could withstand the application of res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the district court failed to provide any findings of fact or conclusions of law, the court could not properly review the appeals officer's determination that there was no change of circumstances warranting reopening under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390. Remanded. View "Elizondo v. Hood Machine, Inc." on Justia Law

After Appellant, the Wynn Las Vegas, restructured its table-games department, it implemented a new tip-pooling policy for its table-games employees. Under the new policy, all tips were gathered and divided among the dealers, boxpersons, and casino service team leads. Respondents, several dealers, filed a class-action complaint with the Labor Commissioner claiming that Appellant's restructured tip-pooling policy violated laws governing compensation and employment practices because it required the dealers to share their tips with employees of different ranks. The Commissioner determined that Appellant's new tip-pooling policy did not violate Nevada law. The district court set aside the Commissioner's decision, determining that the new policy violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.160 because the policy directly benefited Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in overturning the Commissioner's decision because Appellant did not keep any of the tips from the pool but, rather, distributed the money among its employees. View "Wynn Las Vegas, LLC v. Baldonado" on Justia Law

Respondent, a sitting justice of the peace with twenty-three years of creditable Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) service, retired as justice of the peace and took office as a district court judge. As a district court judge, Respondent was employed by a PERS-eligible employer when he applied for retirement benefits. PERS staff determined that, consistent with Nev. Rev. Stat. 286.541(2), Respondent could not retire from PERS while employed in a PERS-eligible position and therefore denied Respondent's application. The PERS Board denied Respondent's appeal. The district court reversed and ordered PERS to pay Respondent retirement payments, concluding that PERS could and should have equitably excused Respondent's noncompliance with section 286.541 and allowed him to reverse his eventual election to transfer from PERS to the Judicial Retirement System. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the PERS Board's determination, holding that the district court erred in its interpretation of the controlling statutes and in reviewing the PERS Board's decision de novo, rather than deferentially. View "Nev. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Employee was injured during the course of his employment with Employer. Employer subsequently issued a notice of claim acceptance to Employee. Two years after his claim's closure, Employee unsuccessfully asked Employer to reopen his claim. An appeals officer affirmed. At issue on appeal was Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390, which bars an employee from applying to reopen his workers' compensation claim after a year from its closure if the employee was "not off work as a result of the injury." The appeals officer interpreted the statute as requiring that an injured employee miss at least five days of work as a result of the injury to be considered "off work." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 616.390 does not bar an employee from applying to reopen his claim after a year from its closure if the employee missed time from work as a result of his injury; (2) the appeals officer erred in reading a minimum-time-off-work requirement into the statute; and (3) because Employee missed the remainder of his shift on the day of his injury, he was "off work" as a result of his injury and was not therefore subject to the one-year limit on the reopening of his claims. View "Williams v. United Parcel Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant filed an employment action against her former employer. Appellant initially authorized her attorney to settle with Respondent, but Appellant refused to sign the settlement agreement. Respondent filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court granted the motion and entered an order setting forth the terms of the parties' settlement. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding the order was not a final judgment because it did not dismiss or formally resolve Appellant's complaint. Respondent subsequently issued a check to Appellant for the settlement amount, which Appellant refused to accept. The district court then granted Respondent's motion to deposit the settlement proceeds with the district court. The order, however, failed to enter judgment in favor of either party or otherwise resolve the case. The district court then entered an order statistically closing the case on the basis that there had been a stipulated judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the district court's order was not substantively appealable because no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an order statistically closing a case, and the order did not constitute a final, appealable judgment, as none was entered. View "Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC" on Justia Law

A police department initiated an internal investigation of Appellant, a veteran of the department, regarding allegations of insurance fraud. During an internal investigation meeting, Appellant was not provided a police protective association (PPA) representative because she had retained a private attorney. Appellant subsequently received a formal written reprimand. Appellant later filed a complaint with the Employee Management Relations Board (EMRB) against the PPA and the department. The EMRB denied Plaintiff's claims, and the district court denied Appellant's petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the EMRB correctly concluded that Nev. Rev. Stat. 289.080 did not impose a duty of fair representation on the PPA, and thus, Appellant was not entitled to have PPA representation present during the internal investigation meeting; and (2) the EMRB properly upheld the department's written reprimand of Appellant. View "Bisch v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't" on Justia Law

Respondent, a firefighter, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits after he was diagnosed with cancer within four years from the commencement of his employment with the City. Respondent asserted that his cancer was a compensable occupational disease that resulted from his work as a firefighter. The City denied the claim for benefits. A hearing officer with the Department of Administration Hearings Division affirmed the denial of the claim because Defendant had not been employed as a firefighter for five years pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.453. An appeals officer reversed, holding that Defendant satisfied Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.440's requirements for proving a compensable occupational disease. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in upholding the appeals officer's determination that a firefighter such as Evans, who fails to qualify for section 617.453's rebuttable presumption can still seek workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 617.440 by proving that his cancer is an occupational disease that arose out of his employment; and (2) the appeals officer correctly found Respondent's cancer was a compensable occupational disease. View "City of Las Vegas v. Evans" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether NRS 616B.227 allows an average monthly wage calculation for workers' compensation benefits to include untaxed tip income that an employee reports to his/her employer. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that NRS 616B.227 required an average monthly wage calculation to include the untaxed tips. The Court affirmed the district court's order in this case which denied appellant Sierra Nevada Administrators' petition for judicial review. View "Sierra Nevada Administrators v. Negriev" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether proof of California workers’ compensation payments could be admitted into evidence in a personal injury action in Nevada. Because Nevada, the forum state, and California, the state in which the payments were made, both have statutes that permit proof of workers' compensation payments to be allowed into evidence in personal injury actions, the Court concluded that Nevada law governed. Applying Nevada law, the Court held that evidence of the actual amount of workers' compensation benefits paid should have been admitted and that a clarifying jury instruction provided by statute should have been given. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tri-County Equipment & Leasing v. Klinke" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. An MRI revealed evidence of previous back surgeries, which was the first record provided to Employer of Employee's previous permanent physical impairment. Employer eventually awarded Employee permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. Employer's Insurance carrier sought reimbursement from the subsequent injury account for private carriers (Account) under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.587(4). The Nevada Division of Industrial Relations (DIR) denied the request for reimbursement, noting that section 616.587(4) had not been satisfied because Employer did not have knowledge of Employee's prior permanent physical impairment until after her industrial injury. An appeals officer affirmed. The district court denied Employer's petition for judicial review based on its determination that the appeals officer interpreted section 616.587 correctly. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in its judgment because an employer is required to acquire knowledge of an employee's permanent physical impairment before a subsequent injury occurs to qualify for reimbursement from the subsequent injury account for private carriers under section 616B.587(4). View "Holiday Ret. Corp. v. State Div. of Indus. Relations " on Justia Law