Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After respondent received a judgment for child support arrears and penalties against appellant in Nevada, as well as an award of attorney fees, appellant appealed the order. Under NRS 125.040(1)(c), a district court has discretion in a divorce suit to require one party to pay an amount of money necessary to assist the other party in carrying on or defending the suit. The court held that a district court has jurisdiction to award attorney fees pendente lite for the costs of an appeal pursuant to NRS 125.040. In this case, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding such fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Griffith v. Gonzales-Alpizar" on Justia Law

Robert Cooper retained McDonald Carano Wilson LLP (Appellant) to represented him in a personal injury action. Three years into the representation, the district court granted Appellant’s motion to withdraw. Appellant perfected a charging lien for more than $100,000 in attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, Cooper retained another law firm, which obtained a $55,000 settlement for Cooper. The district court concluded that Appellant could not enforce its charging lien because it withdrew before settlement occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its judgment because Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015’s language unambiguously allows any counsel that worked on a claim to enforce a charging lien against any affirmative recovery. Remanded for additional findings to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a disbursement and, if it is, the amount of that disbursement. View "Wilson v. Bourassa Law Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a law firm, was retained as counsel for a gaming company (“the company”) in a lawsuit against the company’s former employees and an entity they created. Petitioner prepared a second amended complaint adding real parties in interest (collectively, “Himelfarb”) as defendants. The jury rejected the company’s claims against Himelfarb and found for Himelfarb on its counterclaims. The district court eventually determined that the company would be liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees and costs and determined that Petitioner was jointly and severally liable with the company for those fees and costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 7.085. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of mandamus vacating the portion of the district court’s order making Petitioner jointly and severally liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 11 does not supersede section 7.085 because each represents a distinct, independent mechanism for sanctioning attorney misconduct, and therefore, the award against Petitioner was not improper; but (2) the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Petitioner under section 7.085 without making adequate findings. View "Watson Rounds v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The State charged real party in interest Jihad Zogheib with several crimes. Steven Wolfson, who was a criminal defense attorney before being appointed to the elective office he currently held, was appointed district attorney. Zogheib moved to disqualify the district attorney’s office based on a conflict of interest because an attorney in Wolfson’s former law firm represented Zogheib in the instant case. The district court disqualified the district attorney’s office, concluding that there was a conflict of interest between Wolfson and Zogheib and that the conflict should be imputed to the office because the appearance of impropriety warranted vicarious disqualification even though Wolfson had been screened from participating in the case. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) the appearance-of-impropriety was the incorrect standard to apply, and the more appropriate standard was whether Wolfson’s conflict of interest would render it unlikely that Defendant would receive a fair trial unless the conflict was imputed to the prosecutor’s office; and (2) regardless of which standard is applied, the district court acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting Zogheib’s motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline issued a verified statement of complaint against the Honorable Steven E. Jones, a family court judge, alleging that he may have violated the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct by his alleged involvement in two particular incidents of domestic battery and a resulting temporary protective order violation. An investigation was subsequently conducted into Judge Jones’s conduct. Judge Jones filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to halt and dismiss the disciplinary proceedings against him, asserting that the investigation upon which the proposed charges were based resulted from a defective complaint, was conducted by a biased party in an untimely manner, and included an improper scope. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that the issues Judge Jones raised were not yet ripe for review. View "Jones v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline" on Justia Law

More than a year after Wife's and Husband's divorce, Wife filed a motion to reopen discovery. Wife also filed a motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery, asserting that Judge Gonzalez hearing the motion would create an appearance of impropriety because Husband and others connected to the parties' divorce contributed to the judge's reelection complain. Judge Togliatti denied Wife's motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez, and the Judge Gonzalez went on to preside over Wife's motion to reopen discovery. Wife subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition vacating Judge Togliatti's order and disqualifying Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery. The Supreme Court denied Wife's petition, holding that the failure to disqualify Judge Gonzalez did not violate Wife's due process rights or Nevada law, as all of the campaign contributions at issue were within statutory limits and made after the divorce decree. View "Ivey v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Marie Liapis filed a complaint for divorce against petitioner Theodore Liapis, in which she also sought disposition of the couple's property, permanent spousal support, and her attorney fees and costs. Theodore answered Marie's complaint and later retained Mark Liapis, the couple's son, as his attorney. A settlement conference was scheduled, and each party filed a statement in preparation for that conference. In her statement, Marie objected to Mark's representation of Theodore. Because of the issues raised concerning Mark's representation of Theodore, the district court vacated the scheduled settlement conference and gave Mark time to determine whether he would continue as Theodore's counsel. Mark informed Marie's counsel that he did not intend to withdraw as counsel for Theodore. Marie subsequently filed a motion to disqualify Mark, asserting three bases for his disqualification: (1) Mark's representation of Theodore and his pecuniary interest in their estate created an appearance of impropriety; (2) even though Mark had never represented her, there was an "inherent conflict of interest" because it was unclear "how [Mark] would be able to zealously represent [Theodore]" when he "professe[d] to still love both his parents;" and (3) Mark should be disqualified because he was a potential witness in the case. Because appearance of impropriety is no longer recognized by the American Bar Association, and the Supreme Court has not recognized the appearance of impropriety as a basis for disqualifying counsel except in the limited circumstance of a public lawyer, the Court rejected that conclusion when the alleged impropriety is based solely on a familial relationship with the attorney. The Court also concluded that absent an ethical breach by the attorney that affects the fairness of the entire litigation or a proven confidential relationship between the nonclient parent and the attorney, the nonclient parent lacked standing to seek disqualification under RPC 1.7. View "Liapis v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

In this case Supreme Court settlement judge Nicholas Frey was disqualified from representing Respondent Amador Stage Lines, In. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct 1.12(c), Frey's disqualification was imputed to the remaining members of his law firm, Woodburn and Wedge, but the parties disagreed on whether screening could be utilized to cure the imputed disqualification. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant Ryan's Express Transportation Services, Inc.'s motion to disqualify Woodburn and Wedge from representing Amador in this appeal. The Court deferred ruling on the motion to disqualify, concluding that more facts were necessary for the Court to consider the sufficiency of Woodburn and Wedge's screening measures and weather screening could be used to cure imputed disqualification in this situation. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing and written findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the adequacy of the screening. View "Ryan's Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Club Vista Financial Services and others (Club Vista) entered into a real estate development project with real parties in interest Scott Financial Corporation and others (Scott Financial). When a loan guaranteed by some of the Petitioners went into default, Club Vista filed an action against Scott Financial. During discovery, Scott Financial obtained a deposition subpoena for Club Vista's attorney, K. Layne Morrill. An Arizona court granted Morrill's motion to quash the subpoena. The Nevada district court, however, denied Morrill's motion for a protective order and permitted Scott Financial to depose Morrill as to the factual matters supporting the allegations in the complaint. The Supreme Court granted Morrill's petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition in part after adopting the framework espoused by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shelton v. American Motors Corp., which states that the party seeking to depose opposing counsel must demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by other means, is relevant and nonprivileged, and is crucial to the preparation of the case. Because the district court did not analyze the Shelton factors, the Court directed the district court to evaluate whether, applying the Shelton factors, Scott Financial may depose Morrill. View "Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

This appeal addressed the factors a district court must consider when determining whether to grant a motion for a preferential trial date to avoid the expiration of Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e)'s five-year period for bringing a case to trial. Appellant brought an action against Respondents. Before the five-year period had elapsed, the parties stipulated to vacate their previous trial date and reset the trial for a date that was beyond the expiration of the five-year period. Appellant then filed a motion for a preferential trial date. The district court denied the motion and instead granted Appellant's motion to confirm that the five-year rule had been tolled or extended. The district court subsequently held that its previous order was ineffective and dismissed the underlying case, finding that because the stipulation was silent on the five-year period, it was insufficient to toll or extend the running of that period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a preferential trial and dismissing the complaint, as (1) Appellant filed his motion with more than three months remaining in the five-year period, and (2) Appellant diligently moved his case forward. Remanded. View "Carstarphen v. Milsner" on Justia Law