Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants-medical providers. Before filing suit, Plaintiff consulted with a medical expert from whom he obtained a supporting declaration required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. Plaintiff, however, did not attach the declaration to the complaint but instead filed the complaint by itself and filed the separately captioned declaration the following morning. Plaintiff’s complaint incorporated the medical expert’s declaration by reference and both were served together on Defendants before the statute of limitations ran. The district court dismissed the malpractice action on the grounds that Plaintiff’s action was defective because it was filed without the expert affidavit supporting its allegations required by section 41A.071. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 41A.071 did not require dismissal under the circumstances of this case. View "Baxter v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

A former patient of Dr. Ryan Mitchell, through his guardian ad litem, sued Mitchell for medical malpractice, alleging that Mitchell’s misadministration of anesthesia during a tonsillectomy caused the seven-year-old patient’s heart to fail. Mitchell admitted that at the time he operated on the patient he was addicted to Ketamine and Valium. During discovery, Plaintiff subpoenaed Mitchell’s counseling and substance abuse treatment records. Mitchell objected, citing the doctor-patient and family therapist-client privileges. The district court overruled Mitchell’s claims. Mitchell sought an extraordinary writ directing the district court to protect as privileged the records relating to his substance abuse. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ, holding (1) Mitchell’s family and marital therapy records were privileged; and (2) Mitchell’s doctor-patient records, though subject to the statutory patient-litigant exception, should have been reviewed in camera by the district court and appropriate limitations placed on their use before discovery of them was allowed. View "Mitchell v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The mother of sixteen-month-old Max Zohar (collectively, the Zohars), filed a medical malpractice complaint against multiple defendants, including a physician, a nurse, and several EmCare entities (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims of medical malpractice, professional negligence and vicarious liability after Max’s finger was amputated. The Zohars attached an expert affidavit specifying the allegedly negligent activities of several individuals, but the affidavit did not identify Respondents by name. The district court granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss, concluding that the expert affidavit was deficient because it did not specifically name Respondents as negligent parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court should read a medical malpractice complaint and affidavit of merit together when determining whether the affidavit meets the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071; and (2) in this case, the expert affidavit, while it failed to specifically name allegedly negligent defendants, adequately supported the allegations of medical malpractice against Respondents and provided adequate notice to Respondents of the claims against them, and therefore the district court erred in finding that the expert affidavit was inadequate to support the Zohars’ allegations of medical malpractice against Respondents. View "Zohar v. Zbiegien" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent Lasik corrective surgery on her eyes and subsequently developed ocular complications. Plaintiff sued Dr. John L. Siems, who performed the surgery, and Siems Advanced Lasik, asserting claims for medical malpractice and professional negligence. During trial, the defense argued that Plaintiff’s condition was consistent with eye drop abuse. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain expert testimony because the testimony met the standard for expert testimony set forth in Williams v. Eighth Judicial District Court, which clarified existing law on medical expert testimony; and (2) the defense counsel’s direct, unauthorized communications with Plaintiff’s treating physician were improper, but because Plaintiff did not demonstrate prejudice, a new trial was not warranted. View "Leavitt v. Siems" on Justia Law

In 2005, Dr. Eugene Libby, an orthopedic surgeon, performed surgery on Megan Hamilton’s left knee. In an effort to combat a serious infection that had developed in the knee, Dr. Libby performed another surgery on Hamilton’s knee in 2006. The infection persisted. In 2010, Hamilton brought a claim for injury against Dr. Libby. Dr. Libby filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Hamilton’s claims were barred by the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion. Dr. Libby subsequently filed a petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097(2)’s three-year limitation period begins to run when there is an appreciable manifestation of the plaintiff’s injury, regardless of whether the plaintiff was aware of the injury’s cause; and (2) because Hamilton suffered appreciable harm to her knee more than three years before she filed her complaint, the district court was required to grant summary judgment in Dr. Libby’s favor. View "Libby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Cout" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint for professional negligence against a doctor of podiatric medicine and his employer. Appellant filed the complaint without a supporting Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 affidavit of merit because podiatrists are not considered "physicians" under chapter 41A for medical malpractice claims purposes. While Appellant's case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Fierle v. Perez concluding that an affidavit of merit is required under section 41A.071 for both medical malpractice and professional negligence complaints. Relying on Fierle, the district court dismissed Appellant's complaint without prejudice. Appellant was subsequently unable to file a new complaint because the statute of limitations for her claims had expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in Fierle, the Court expanded the reach of section 41A.071 beyond its precise words, and therefore, Fierle was overruled; (2) professional negligence actions are not subject to the affidavit-of-merit requirement based on the unambiguous language of section 41A.071; and (3) therefore, the district court erred when it dismissed Appellant's professional negligence complaint for lack of a supporting affidavit of merit. View " Egan v. Chambers" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the interpretation of a claims-made professional liability insurance policy that Appellant Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., d.b.a. PIC Wisconsin (PIC), issued to nonparty dentist Hamid Ahmadi, D.D.S. The policy covered dental malpractice claims made against Dr. Ahmadi and reported to PIC during the policy period. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that PIC received constructive notice of Respondent Glenn Williams’s malpractice claim against Dr. Ahmadi while the policy was in force and held that this was enough to trigger coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that a "report" of a potential demand for damages to qualify as a "claim" required sufficient specificity to alert the insurer’s claim department to the existence of a potential demand for damages arising out of an identifiable incident, involving an identified or identifiable claimant or claimants, with actual or anticipated injuries. The Court did not find an ambiguity that would permit the PIC policy to have been triggered by the report of a default judgment against the doctor filed in public records. As such, the Court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of PIC. View "Physicians Insurance Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2006, Robert Winn's daughter, Sedona, suffered an extensive brain injury during a heart surgery. On February 3, 2009, Winn filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital, doctors, and perfusionists who were involved in the surgery. The district court dismissed the action as untimely, concluding that more than one year had elapsed between the time when Winn discovered Sedona's injury and the time when he filed suit. At issue on appeal was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097(2), which provides that medical malpractice actions must be filed within three years of the injury date and within one year of the injury's discovery, and section 41A.097(3), which tolls both deadlines when the health care provider has concealed information upon which the action is based. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court, holding (1) questions of fact remained as to whether subsection 2's one-year discovery period was tolled for concealment against the hospital; and (2) subsection 3's tolling-for-concealment provision did not apply against the doctors and perfusionists. View "Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

David Zinni was injured when his car was struck by a taxicab driven by Appellant Sun Cab's employee. Zinni filed a personal-injury action against Sun Cab. During discovery, Sun Cab learned that Respondent Dr. Gary LaTourette may have negligently treated Zinni after the accident. Sun Cab subsequently filed a third-party complaint against LaTourette, asserting claims for equitable indemnity and contribution based on LaTourette's alleged medical malpractice. The district court dismissed Sun Cab's complaint as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) because there was no preexisting relationship between the parties in this case, and because the claims against the third-party plaintiffs were based on their active negligence, the equitable indemnity claim was properly dismissed; (2) a party need not pay toward a judgment before bringing a claim for contribution, and as such, the third-party contribution claim was not properly dismissed on that ground; and (3) when a claim for contribution is contingent upon a successful showing of medical malpractice, a claimant must satisfy the expert affidavit requirement of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071, and therefore, the third-party plaintiffs' failure to attach an expert affidavit warranted dismissal of their complaint, but such dismissal should have been without prejudice. View "Pack v. LaTourette" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest Laura and Edward Rehfeldt filed a complaint for medical malpractice against Defendants, a hospital and health care practitioners. Accompanying the Rehfeldts' complaint was an opinion letter from a medical expert supporting their claim and a notary acknowledgment form attached to the letter. Neither the opinion letter nor the acknowledgment contained a declaration that the statements contained in the opinion letter were made under penalty of perjury, and the opinion letter did not contain a jurat. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Rehfeldts failed to comply with the affidavit requirement of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. Defendants then filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus for the purpose of instructing the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing for the limited purpose of determining whether the Rehfeldts could sufficiently prove that the medical expert appeared before the notary public and swore under oath that the statements contained in his opinion letter were true and correct in accordance with section 41A.071's affidavit requirement. View "MountainView Hosp. v. Nev. Dist. Court " on Justia Law