Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the relationship between two statutory provisions, enacted in 2009, that govern the extent of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction: NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) and NRS 62B.335. Both provisions address a person who has been charged with committing an offense when the person was between 16 and 18 years of age that would be a category A or B felony if committed by an adult. In those circumstances, NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) provides that the act is not a "delinquent act" and divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction if the person is identified and charged between the ages of 20 years, 3 months and 21 years. Pursuant to NRS 62B.335, if a person charged with a delinquent act that would have been a category A or B felony if committed by an adult is identified before reaching 21 years of age but is not apprehended until after reaching 21 years of age, then the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to conduct a hearing. The matter came before the Court in the case of "George J." who was seventeen years old when he allegedly committed: (1) home invasion, (2) burglary, (3) grand larceny, (4) grand larceny of an automobile, and (5) burglary of an automobile. Reading the statutes together, the Supreme Court concluded that NRS 62B.335 only applied to delinquent acts and therefore does not apply to acts that are "deemed not to be a delinquent act" under NRS 62B.330(3). "Thus, if the case is excluded from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under NRS 62B.330(3), then the juvenile court does not obtain jurisdiction by virtue of NRS 62B.335." Here, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction under NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1). The Court nonetheless affirmed because the juvenile court reached the correct result by transferring the case to the district court for adult criminal proceedings. View "In re George J." on Justia Law

This appeal involved the interpretation of a claims-made professional liability insurance policy that Appellant Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., d.b.a. PIC Wisconsin (PIC), issued to nonparty dentist Hamid Ahmadi, D.D.S. The policy covered dental malpractice claims made against Dr. Ahmadi and reported to PIC during the policy period. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that PIC received constructive notice of Respondent Glenn Williams’s malpractice claim against Dr. Ahmadi while the policy was in force and held that this was enough to trigger coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that a "report" of a potential demand for damages to qualify as a "claim" required sufficient specificity to alert the insurer’s claim department to the existence of a potential demand for damages arising out of an identifiable incident, involving an identified or identifiable claimant or claimants, with actual or anticipated injuries. The Court did not find an ambiguity that would permit the PIC policy to have been triggered by the report of a default judgment against the doctor filed in public records. As such, the Court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of PIC. View "Physicians Insurance Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether proof of California workers’ compensation payments could be admitted into evidence in a personal injury action in Nevada. Because Nevada, the forum state, and California, the state in which the payments were made, both have statutes that permit proof of workers' compensation payments to be allowed into evidence in personal injury actions, the Court concluded that Nevada law governed. Applying Nevada law, the Court held that evidence of the actual amount of workers' compensation benefits paid should have been admitted and that a clarifying jury instruction provided by statute should have been given. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tri-County Equipment & Leasing v. Klinke" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on the applicability of NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2), a statutory provision that divests a juvenile court of jurisdiction over a person who commits a class A or B felony between 16 and 18 years of age but is not identified until after reaching 21 years of age. Defendant Gregory Barren was seventeen years old when he allegedly kidnapped and secually assaulted a woman in 2005. Police identified Defendant from DNA evidence left from bodily fluids at the scene. Defendant was twenty-one when police made the DNA match. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this statutory provision governs jurisdiction over any proceedings initiated after the provision went into effect on October 1, 2009, regardless of when the offense was committed. Because NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) was in effect when the State initiated proceedings against Defendant, the Court concluded that the district court, not the juvenile court, had jurisdiction over his criminal case. View "Nevada v. Barren" on Justia Law

In this case Supreme Court settlement judge Nicholas Frey was disqualified from representing Respondent Amador Stage Lines, In. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct 1.12(c), Frey's disqualification was imputed to the remaining members of his law firm, Woodburn and Wedge, but the parties disagreed on whether screening could be utilized to cure the imputed disqualification. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant Ryan's Express Transportation Services, Inc.'s motion to disqualify Woodburn and Wedge from representing Amador in this appeal. The Court deferred ruling on the motion to disqualify, concluding that more facts were necessary for the Court to consider the sufficiency of Woodburn and Wedge's screening measures and weather screening could be used to cure imputed disqualification in this situation. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing and written findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the adequacy of the screening. View "Ryan's Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the "mode of operation" approach to premises liability, under which the plaintiff does not have to prove the defendant's knowledge of a particular hazardous condition if the plaintiff can prove that the nature of the defendant's business tends to create a substantial risk of the type of harm the plaintiff suffered, extends beyond the self-service context. The Supreme Court held (1) because the mode of operation approach is premised on the idea that business owners should be held responsible for the risks that their choice to have customers serve themselves creates, it does not extend to "sit-down" restaurants; (2) the district court abused its discretion by giving a mode of operation instruction in this case; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence. Remanded. View "FGA, Inc. v. Giglio" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court addressed several issues arising from a dispute over a series of property transactions. Plaintiffs sued Defendants under various theories of liability, including breach of contract and fraud. Defendants countersued for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and fraud by concealment. Defendants also brought a claim against Plaintiffs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.257, which provides a statutory cause of action for the victim of a real estate licensee's breach of the various duties imposed by Nev. Rev. Stat 645.252-.254. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court, holding (1) compromise offers are not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a failure to mitigate damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.105; (2) although Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.251 does not, in all instances, shield real estate licensees from common law forms of liability, it precludes such liability when the type of conduct complained of is covered by sections 645.252-.254; and (3) punitive damages may not be recovered under section 645.257, but compensatory damages are recoverable under the statute in accordance with the measure of damages that appropriately compensates the injured party for the losses sustained as a result of the real estate licensee's violations. Remanded. View "Davis v. Beling" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2006, Robert Winn's daughter, Sedona, suffered an extensive brain injury during a heart surgery. On February 3, 2009, Winn filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital, doctors, and perfusionists who were involved in the surgery. The district court dismissed the action as untimely, concluding that more than one year had elapsed between the time when Winn discovered Sedona's injury and the time when he filed suit. At issue on appeal was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097(2), which provides that medical malpractice actions must be filed within three years of the injury date and within one year of the injury's discovery, and section 41A.097(3), which tolls both deadlines when the health care provider has concealed information upon which the action is based. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court, holding (1) questions of fact remained as to whether subsection 2's one-year discovery period was tolled for concealment against the hospital; and (2) subsection 3's tolling-for-concealment provision did not apply against the doctors and perfusionists. View "Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Jonathon Whitehead pleaded guilty to DUI causing death and DUI causing substantial bodily harm and subsequently filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Whitehead's petition as untimely. Whitehead filed a petition for rehearing, which the panel denied. Whitehead subsequently petitioned for en banc reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that reconsideration was warranted, holding (1) a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does not set an amount of restitution, in violation of Nevada statutes, is not final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Whitehead's post-conviction petition was timely under this analysis. View "Whitehead v. State" on Justia Law

David Zinni was injured when his car was struck by a taxicab driven by Appellant Sun Cab's employee. Zinni filed a personal-injury action against Sun Cab. During discovery, Sun Cab learned that Respondent Dr. Gary LaTourette may have negligently treated Zinni after the accident. Sun Cab subsequently filed a third-party complaint against LaTourette, asserting claims for equitable indemnity and contribution based on LaTourette's alleged medical malpractice. The district court dismissed Sun Cab's complaint as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) because there was no preexisting relationship between the parties in this case, and because the claims against the third-party plaintiffs were based on their active negligence, the equitable indemnity claim was properly dismissed; (2) a party need not pay toward a judgment before bringing a claim for contribution, and as such, the third-party contribution claim was not properly dismissed on that ground; and (3) when a claim for contribution is contingent upon a successful showing of medical malpractice, a claimant must satisfy the expert affidavit requirement of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071, and therefore, the third-party plaintiffs' failure to attach an expert affidavit warranted dismissal of their complaint, but such dismissal should have been without prejudice. View "Pack v. LaTourette" on Justia Law