Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case concerned State Engineer Ruling 5823, which allocated groundwater rights in the Dayton Valley Hydrographic Basin, which lay wholly within Lyon County. Appellants Churchill County and the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe protested the applications, maintaining that the Basin was severely over-appropriated. The State Engineer rejected both Appellant's protests and granted all pending applications. Appellants filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.540(1), which affords judicial review in the nature of an appeal to any person feeling aggrieved by an order or decision of the State Water Engineer affecting the person's interests. The appeal "must be initiated in the proper court of the county in which the matters affected or a portion thereof are situated." The district court dismissed the petition because the Petitioners filed their appeals in Churchill County, where their rights or interests allegedly would be affected, as opposed to Lyon County, where the applicants' groundwater appropriations lay. By then, section 533.450(1)'s thirty-day limit on seeking judicial review had passed. The Supreme Court vacated the jurisdictional dismissal, holding that the district court read the statute too restrictively. Remanded. View "In re State Engineer Ruling No. 5823" on Justia Law

Petitioners Club Vista Financial Services and others (Club Vista) entered into a real estate development project with real parties in interest Scott Financial Corporation and others (Scott Financial). When a loan guaranteed by some of the Petitioners went into default, Club Vista filed an action against Scott Financial. During discovery, Scott Financial obtained a deposition subpoena for Club Vista's attorney, K. Layne Morrill. An Arizona court granted Morrill's motion to quash the subpoena. The Nevada district court, however, denied Morrill's motion for a protective order and permitted Scott Financial to depose Morrill as to the factual matters supporting the allegations in the complaint. The Supreme Court granted Morrill's petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition in part after adopting the framework espoused by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shelton v. American Motors Corp., which states that the party seeking to depose opposing counsel must demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by other means, is relevant and nonprivileged, and is crucial to the preparation of the case. Because the district court did not analyze the Shelton factors, the Court directed the district court to evaluate whether, applying the Shelton factors, Scott Financial may depose Morrill. View "Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered whether the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), an act that governs the disposition of failed financial institutions' assets, divests a court of jurisdiction to consider any defense or affirmative defense not first adjudicated through FIRREA's claims process. The Supreme Court concluded that while FIRREA's jurisdictional bar divests a district court of jurisdiction to consider claims and counterclaims asserted against a successor in interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) not first adjudicated through FIRREA's claims process, it does not apply to defenses or affirmative defenses raised by a debtor in response to the successor in interest's complaint for collection. In this case, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Successor in Interest on its breach of contract and breach of personal guaranty claims against Debtor, as Debtor's affirmative defenses were not barred by FIRREA. Remanded. View "Schettler v. RalRon Capital Corp." on Justia Law

Charles Huebler was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. Huebler subsequently filed an untimely post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had good cause for his delay in filing the petition because the State improperly withheld surveillance videotapes that were exculpatory, which rendered his guilty plea involuntary. The district court granted relief to Huebler. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State is required under Brady v. Maryland to disclose material exculpatory evidence within its possession to the defense before the entry of a guilty plea; (2) a defendant may challenge the validity of the guilty on the basis of the State's failure to make the required disclosure, but to succeed, the defendant must demonstrate the three components of a Brady violation in the context of a guilty plea; (3) as to the materiality component, the test is whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the State's failure to disclose the evidence the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and would have gone to trial; and (4) Huebler failed to demonstrate that the evidence was material under the materiality component. View "State v. Huebler" on Justia Law

Appellants Michael and Analisa Jones purchased a home with a loan from a mortgage company, which assigned the note and deed of trust to SunTrust Mortgage. After the Joneses defaulted on their mortgage, the Joneses elected to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086. SunTrust and the Joneses resolved the pending foreclosure by agreeing to a short sale of the Joneses' home. The Joneses, however, never returned the short-sale documents and instead filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, requesting that the court impose sanctions against SunTrust because SunTrust violated section 107.086 and foreclosure mediation rules (FMRs) by failing to provide required documents and mediating in bad faith. The district court (1) denied the petition, finding that the Joneses entered into an enforceable short-sale agreement and therefore waived any claims under section 107.086 and the FMRs; and (2) allowed SunTrust to seek a certificate from the FMP to proceed with the foreclosure based on the terms of the short-sale agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the short-sale agreement was an enforceable settlement agreement, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to impose sanctions against SunTrust. View "Jones v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

After a seven-day jury trial, Kevin Rodriguez was found guilty of multiple criminal counts. Rodriquez appealed, arguing that the district court erred (1) in overruling his objection to the admission of twelve text messages because the State failed to authenticate the messages and the messages constituted inadmissible hearsay, and (2) in overruling his objection to the admission of DNA nonexclusion evidence because the evidence was irrelevant without supporting statistical data. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in admitting ten of the twelve text messages because the State failed to present sufficient evidence corroborating Appellant's identity as the person who sent the ten messages, but the error was harmless; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by admitting the relevant DNA nonexclusion evidence because, so long as it is relevant, DNA nonexclusion evidence is admissible because any danger of unfair prejudice or of misleading the jury is substantially outweighed by the defendant's ability to cross-examine or offer expert witness evidence as to probative value. View "Rodriguez v. State" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest Laura and Edward Rehfeldt filed a complaint for medical malpractice against Defendants, a hospital and health care practitioners. Accompanying the Rehfeldts' complaint was an opinion letter from a medical expert supporting their claim and a notary acknowledgment form attached to the letter. Neither the opinion letter nor the acknowledgment contained a declaration that the statements contained in the opinion letter were made under penalty of perjury, and the opinion letter did not contain a jurat. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Rehfeldts failed to comply with the affidavit requirement of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. Defendants then filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus for the purpose of instructing the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing for the limited purpose of determining whether the Rehfeldts could sufficiently prove that the medical expert appeared before the notary public and swore under oath that the statements contained in his opinion letter were true and correct in accordance with section 41A.071's affidavit requirement. View "MountainView Hosp. v. Nev. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

After a trial, the district court entered a summary order terminating Father's parental rights to his minor child. The district court's written order, drafted by the State, closely followed the termination petition submitted by the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). Father appealed, contending that the district court's order failed to set forth specific factual findings, and therefore, the decision to terminate his parental rights was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) express findings of fact are required in parental rights termination proceedings; and (2) neither the district court's order nor the record in this case contained findings of fact to support the district court's conclusions. Remanded to the district court to enter its findings. View "In re C.C.A." on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. An MRI revealed evidence of previous back surgeries, which was the first record provided to Employer of Employee's previous permanent physical impairment. Employer eventually awarded Employee permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. Employer's Insurance carrier sought reimbursement from the subsequent injury account for private carriers (Account) under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.587(4). The Nevada Division of Industrial Relations (DIR) denied the request for reimbursement, noting that section 616.587(4) had not been satisfied because Employer did not have knowledge of Employee's prior permanent physical impairment until after her industrial injury. An appeals officer affirmed. The district court denied Employer's petition for judicial review based on its determination that the appeals officer interpreted section 616.587 correctly. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in its judgment because an employer is required to acquire knowledge of an employee's permanent physical impairment before a subsequent injury occurs to qualify for reimbursement from the subsequent injury account for private carriers under section 616B.587(4). View "Holiday Ret. Corp. v. State Div. of Indus. Relations " on Justia Law

Warren West's wife gave birth to a girl born with severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation. West's wife died during the procedure. West relinquished the infant for adoption and subsequently retained attorney Christopher Gellner to bring a wrongful death and personal injury claim on the infant's behalf. While litigation was ongoing, Dale Haley was appointed as the infant's guardian ad litem. The parties reached a settlement before going to trial. The district court approved the overall settlement but unilaterally altered the distribution. Gellner and Haley filed a petition for extraordinary writ, asserting that the district court lacked the statutory authority to unilaterally alter the distribution, and even if it had such authority, the court abused its discretion in making the alteration it did. The Supreme Court denied in part and granted in part the writ petition, holding (1) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.200 authorized the district court to modify the proposed compromise in the minor's best interest, the redistribution of settlement proceeds was proper; but (2) the district court should have provided explanation for the allocation of fees between Gellner and Haley. View "Haley v. Nev. Dist. Court" on Justia Law