Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Beau Maestas pleaded guilty to several charges, and a jury sentenced him to death for first-degree murder. Appellant subsequently sought a new penalty trial based on allegations of juror misconduct and bias, but the district court denied the motion. In these consolidated appeals, Appellant challenged the judgment of conviction and the order denying the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding principally that (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.556 does not violate the Eighth Amendment because the relevant jurisprudence focuses on whether a capital sentencing scheme sufficiently channels the sentencer's discretion to impose a death sentence and does not afford the district court the discretion to impose a death sentence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a new trial because no misconduct or bias was proved. View "Maestas v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants, health care practitioners and health care facilities, alleging claims for medical negligence, wrongful death, and statutory abuse and neglect arising from the care of Patient. The district court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for writ of mandamus, finding that the court abused its discretion in not granting summary judgment in Defendants' favor because the claims failed to comply with the affidavit requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a new complaint, reasserting the dismissed medical malpractice claims, but the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' claims had passed. The district court applied Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.500, Nevada's savings statute, to save the time-barred medical malpractice claims. The Supreme Court subsequently granted Defendants' writ for mandamus relief, holding that section 11.500 does not save medical malpractice claims dismissed for failure to comply with section 41A.071 because these claims are void, and section 11.500 applies only to actions that have been "commenced." View "Wheble v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Respondent Michael Stewart and appellant Rolland Weddell entered into a business relationship concerning a number of different projects. After their business relationship collapsed, Weddell filed a complaint asserting numerous claims against Sewart. Stewart asserted numerous counterclaims. The district court found in Stewart's favor on all counts. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.401, a judgment creditor may obtain the rights of an assignee of the member's interest, receiving only a share of the economic interests in a limited-liability company, and thus, the judgment creditor and holder of a charging order against Weddell's membership interests was entitled to Weddell's economic interest in appellant Granite Investment Group, LLC but not Weddell's managerial rights. The Court affirmed in all other aspects, holding (1) parties should only file a notice of pendency when the action directly involves real property, and therefore, the notice of pendency filed by Weddell, which involved an option to purchase a membership interest in Respondent Empire Geothermal Power, LLC, was unenforceable; and (2) substantial evidence existed to support the district court's finding that Weddell had no ownership interest in respondent H2O, Inc. View "Weddell v. H20, Inc." on Justia Law

This was an appeal and cross-appeal from a district court judgment awarding appellant homebuyer treble damages against respondent seller, a limited liability company, but refusing to find that the individual respondent, a former manager of the limited liability company, was liable for the judgment as the company's alter ego. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's award of treble damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 113.150(4), which awards treble damages for a seller's delayed disclosure or nondisclosure of property defects, despite the court's failure to make a finding that the seller acted willfully, as the legislature did not intend to imply a heightened level of mental culpability to the statute; and (2) vacated the portion of the court's judgment concerning the alter ego issue, as the court failed to explain its reasoning for denying alter ego status. Remanded. View "Webb v. Shull" on Justia Law

When Employee left his employment, Employee and Employer entered into a consulting agreement containing restrictive covenants prohibiting Employee from disclosing Employer's confidential information. After Employee purchased another competing company, Employer filed a motion alleging breach of the agreement and seeking a preliminary injunction to enforce the Agreement's covenants. The district court granted Employer's request, concluding that Employee had likely violated several provisions of the agreement and had misappropriated trade secrets in violation of Nevada's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Employee then filed a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction upon termination of the agreement, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief; and (2) reversed the court's order denying Employee's motion to dissolve the injunctive provisions, finding that the court improperly relied on the terminated agreement in declining to dissolve the injunction and failed to make findings as to the continued existence of a trade secret and for what constitutes a "reasonable period of time" for maintaining an injunction under the Act. View "Finkel v. Cashman Prof'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal addressed the factors a district court must consider when determining whether to grant a motion for a preferential trial date to avoid the expiration of Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e)'s five-year period for bringing a case to trial. Appellant brought an action against Respondents. Before the five-year period had elapsed, the parties stipulated to vacate their previous trial date and reset the trial for a date that was beyond the expiration of the five-year period. Appellant then filed a motion for a preferential trial date. The district court denied the motion and instead granted Appellant's motion to confirm that the five-year rule had been tolled or extended. The district court subsequently held that its previous order was ineffective and dismissed the underlying case, finding that because the stipulation was silent on the five-year period, it was insufficient to toll or extend the running of that period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a preferential trial and dismissing the complaint, as (1) Appellant filed his motion with more than three months remaining in the five-year period, and (2) Appellant diligently moved his case forward. Remanded. View "Carstarphen v. Milsner" on Justia Law

Matt Richards and Donny Palma were patrons on Cafe Moda's premises. During an altercation between the two, Richards stabbed Palma repeatedly. Palma brought suit against Richards and Cafe Moda, pursuing an intentional-tort theory of liability against Richards and a negligence theory of liability against Cafe Moda. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Palma, apportioning eighty percent of the fault to Richards and the remaining twenty percent to Cafe Moda. Based upon its reading of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.141, Nevada's comparative-negligence statute, the district court held both Richards and Cafe Moda jointly and severally liable for 100 percent of Palma's damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 41.141 was ambiguous as to whether liability could be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor, the legislature intended that it permit such an apportionment; and (2) Cafe Moda was severally liable for twenty percent of Respondent's damages, and Richards was jointly and severally liable for 100 percent of Palma's damages. View "Cafe Moda, LLC v. Palma" on Justia Law

Appellant Donald Bigpond was charged with battery constituting domestic violence. Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence involving Bigpond and the victim. The district court reserved judgment on the State's motion until trial. During direct examination, the victim recanted her previous statements. The district court decided to admit the victim's prior allegations of domestic violence against Bigpond, determining that they were relevant to explain the relationship between the victim and Bigpond and provide a possible explanation for her recantation. Bigpond was convicted as charged. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" may be admitted for a nonpropensity purpose other than those listed in Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed evidence, as the victim's pretrial accusations against Bigpond placed their relationship in context and provided a possible explanation for the recantation, which assisted the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility. View "Bigpond v. State" on Justia Law

The State and Testator's heirs disputed Testator's $3 million estate. Testator, by way of a handwritten will, attempted to disinherit all of his heirs but was unsuccessful in otherwise affirmatively devising his estate. The district court (1) determined that Testator's handwritten will was a valid testamentary instrument that revoked his earlier will, and (2) applied the common law, deeming Testator's disinheritance clause unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) deeming the disinheritance clause unenforceable, as Nev. Rev. Stat. 132.370 abolishes the common law rules that would otherwise render a testator's disinheritance clause unenforceable in these circumstances; (2) determining that Nev. Rev. Stat. 132.130 precludes the doctrine of dependent relative revocation but did not err in determining that it was inapplicable under the facts of this case; and (3) determining that Testator's estate did not escheat, as escheat was triggered under the facts of this case. View "In re Estate of Melton" on Justia Law

Under a 1998 divorce decree granted to Husband and Wife, Husband was obligated to pay wife $1,300 a month in child support. Husband voluntarily ceased paying child support in 2000. In 2007, Wife filed a motion to establish a fixed monthly child support obligation for Husband without regard to the formula adopted in the decree, to calculate arrears, and to reduce those arrears to judgment. The district court granted Wife's motion, set Husband's monthly child support obligation at $1,300, calculated arrearages, and reduced them to judgment. When Wife filed her motion, neither the parties nor the children resided in Nevada. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction by modifying its child support order when the parties and their children did not reside in Nevada. Remanded. View "Vaile v. Porsboll" on Justia Law