Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Pohlabel pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360. In doing so, he reserved the right to argue on appeal, as he did unsuccessfully in the district court, that his conviction violated the right to keep and bear arms secured by the state and federal constitutions. At issue on appeal was whether Pohlabel, despite his felon status, had a constitutional right to possess a black powder rifle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 202.360(1)(a) does not violate either the state or federal constitutions; (2) while federal law currently permits felons to possess black powder rifles, that does not mandate that Nevada follow suit; and (3) the Legislature used the word "citizen" in Nev. Const. art. I, 11(1) to refer to those persons who are members of the political community, and thus, unpardoned felons are not included among those to whom the Nevada Constitution guarantees the right to keep and bear arms. View "Pohlabel v. State" on Justia Law

Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her two children in the district court. The district court ordered that the tribal social services have custody over the children. The tribal court then ordered the adoption of the children. Mother subsequently asked the state district court to set aside her relinquishment under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The district court denied Mother's petition. At issue on appeal was whether, under section 1919 of the ICWA, a tribal-state agreement respecting child custody proceedings may vest a Nevada district court with subject matter jurisdiction to take a relinquishment of parental rights under circumstances where section 1911(a) of the ICWA would otherwise lay exclusive jurisdiction with the tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ICWA, in keeping with the fundamental principles of tribal autonomy, allows for tribal-state agreements for concurrent jurisdiction even when the tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction absent an agreement. View "In re S.M.M.D." on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Toston pleaded guilty to first-degree kidnapping and robbery. Toston subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him about the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea and failing to file an appeal when Toston expressed dissatisfaction at the sentencing hearing. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) counsel's affirmative misinformation about the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction from a guilty plea may fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and therefore be deficient; (2) trial counsel has a duty to file an appeal when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in challenging his conviction or sentence; and (3) because Toston's allegations in his petition were not belied by the record and would entitle Toston to relief if true, Toston was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his appeal-deprivation claims. Remanded. View "Toston v. State" on Justia Law

After real party in interest Bobby Armstrong's vehicle collided with another vehicle, the State charged Armstrong with driving under the influence causing death and/or substantial bodily harm. A single blood sample was taken from Armstrong more than two hours after the collision. The district court granted Armstrong's motion to exclude the blood alcohol test in part, concluding that the retrograde extrapolation that the State would have to use to determine Armstrong's blood alcohol level at the time was driving would be unfairly prejudicial in this case. The State subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to admit the excluded evidence. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) although retrograde extrapolation evidence is relevant in a prosecution for driving under the influence, under certain circumstances such evidence may be unfairly prejudicial and therefore inadmissible; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in excluding the retrograde extrapolation. View "State v. Dist. Court (Armstrong) " on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and three counts of sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm. Appellant was sentenced to six sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for three of the counts, with each sentence to be served consecutively. Appellant subsequently filed an untimely petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentences and the manner in which they were imposed amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The district court (1) granted the petition in part, determining that the petition was procedurally barred because the petition was untimely filed, but that new caselaw applied retroactively and provided good cause to excuse the procedural default; and (2) imposed three consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole after ten years had been served. The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's partial denial of Appellant' petition, holding that the court abused its discretion in failing to appoint counsel to assist Appellant in the post-conviction proceeding given the severity of the consequences, Appellant's indigency, and the difficulty of the issues presented related to the applicability and scope of the holding in Graham v. Florida. Remanded. View "Rogers v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent, an insurer/managed care organization, contracted with an endoscopy center and gastroenterology center (collectively, the Clinic) to provide health care services to its insureds. After the Nevada Health District found that the Clinic engaged in a number of unsafe medical practices, Respondent terminated its contract with the Clinic. Janice Munda was insured by Respondent through her employer's health plan, which was governed by ERISA. Munda was diagnosed with hepatitis C, which the Health District determined she contracted as a result of being treated at the Clinic. Janise and her husband (collectively, Appellants) sued Respondent for negligence, negligence per se, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and loss of consortium. The district court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that Appellants' claims were preempted by ERISA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the facts, there was no preemption because Respondent's alleged actions were independent of the administration of the ERISA plan. View "Munda v. Summerlin Life & Health Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A casino-hotel filed for bankruptcy. Appellant, the administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders that loaned money to the casino's developers, and Respondents, contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers who asserted statutory liens against the property, entered into a dispute over the priority of their respective liens on the property. The Supreme Court accepted questions certified to it from the bankruptcy court regarding the application of contractual subordination, equitable subordination, and equitable subrogation in the context of a mechanic's lien. Appellant moved to strike Respondents' appendix, contending that the included documents contained information beyond the facts certified to the Court by the bankruptcy court. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the additional information was necessary for the Court's understanding of the certified legal questions. The Supreme Court granted the motion to strike after determining that Respondents' appendix was filed solely to contradict the certification order and the complaint, holding that while an appendix may be filed to assist the Court in understanding the matter, it may not be used to controvert the facts as stated in the certification order. View "In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings" on Justia Law

Appellant, an LLC, purchased an "all-risks" insurance policy for an office building it owned from Insurer. The building was significantly damaged after a general contractor Appellant had hired to renovate the building removed the waterproof membrane on the roof and the building was exposed to substantial rainfall. Insurer denied coverage, concluding that the damage did not result from a covered cause of loss. Appellant sued Insurer, alleging that Insurer breached the insurance policy and denied coverage in bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer, concluding that the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage for the damage sustained to the building. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the damages sustained by the building were excluded from coverage based on the policy's rain limitation and the contractor's faulty workmanship in repairing the roof. In addition, although the doctrine of efficient proximate cause did not provide relief under the facts of this case, the Court adopted the doctrine of efficient proximate cause in Nevada. View "Fourth St. Place v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal because the district court had not issued a final ruling on the change of venue motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court order deferring a final ruling on a change of venue motion based on adverse pretrial publicity until after jury selection begins does not finally decide the motion; and (2) because the court did not finally rule on the motion in this case, the matter was not ripe for appeal. View "Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. After the jury was empaneled, Appellants renewed their motion for a change of venue, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court must apply a multifactor test to determine whether there is a reason to believe that the party seeking a change of venue will not receive a fair trial in the community where the case originated; and (2) because Appellants did not demonstrate that the circumstances in this case presented a reasonable belief that a fair trial could not be had in Clark County, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' motion for a change of venue. View "Sicor, Inc. v. Hutchison" on Justia Law