Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant made a records request pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) for email communications between the former governor and ten individuals. The State informed Appellant that the requested emails were confidential because they were either privileged or not considered public records. Appellant then filed a writ of mandamus in the district court seeking access to the emails or, in the alternative, to receive a detailed log or index containing a general factual description of each of the records withheld and a specific explanation for nondisclosure. After an in-camera review of the emails, the district court (1) denied Appellant's request for a detailed log or index, and (2) determined that six of the 104 requested emails were not confidential, thereby granting the petition as to the six emails. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant's request for a log because (1) after the commencement of an NPRA lawsuit, the state entity withholding requested records is generally required to provide the requesting party with a log; and (2) in the instant case, the State failed to meet its prelitigation responsibilities under the NPRA. View "Reno Newspapers v. Gibbons" on Justia Law

Appellants signed a note secured by a deed of trust on their home. Respondents, Regional Trustee Services Corporation (RTSC) and One West Bank, were the trustee and beneficiary of the deed of trust. After Appellants stopped making payments, RTSC initiated judicial foreclosure. Appellants elected mediation under the foreclosure mediation program (FMP), which provides proof of compliance with the state's law requiring mediation upon homeowner request before a nonjudicial foreclosure sale can proceed on an owner-occupied residence. When RTSC failed to attend the mediation, the district court declared RTSC in bad faith and directed that RTSC be denied the FMP certificate needed to conduct a valid foreclosure sale. RTSC later reinitiated nonjudicial foreclosure. Appellants sought to enjoin Respondents from pursuing foreclosure, arguing that the order denying the FMP certificate permanently prevented foreclosure. The district court denied Appellants' request and directed the parties to return to FMP mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, a lender who has been denied an FMP certificate for failing to mediate in good faith can reinitiate foreclosure by means of a new notice of default and election to sell and rescission of the original, thereby restarting the FMP process. View "Holt v. Reg'l Tr. Servs. Corp." on Justia Law

Paul Choy filed a complaint in district court alleging various tort claims against respondent Ameristar Casinos. According to the complaint, Choy was gambling at the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City when he was handcuffed by casino security guards and his belongings were searched. Ameristar subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was not properly named as a party because Ameristar did not own or operate the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. In his opposition to Ameristar's motion, Appellant sought a continuance under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to allow discovery before granting Ameristar's motion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameristar and denied Choy's request for a continuance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Choy did not comply with rule 56(f) because he did not attach an affidavit explaining why he sought a continuance of the summary judgment motion to conduct further discovery, and therefore, the district court properly denied Choy's request for a continuance; and (2) the district court properly granted Ameristar's motion for summary judgment because Choy failed to present any evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue regarding Ameristar's ownership or operation or Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. View "Choy v. Ameristar Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

Father and Mother's stipulated Nevada divorce decree incorporated the parents' agreement that Nevada would have exclusive jurisdiction over future custody disputes. The parents had joint legal custody, but when Husband and Wife were not able to work out a schedule for joint physical custody, Wife applied to Nevada's district court for an order awarding her primary physical custody. At this point, both parents and their children had moved to California. Husband initiated competing custody proceedings in California, maintaining that Nevada lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The Nevada district court, meanwhile, provisionally granted Wife primary physical custody. Husband petitioned for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus, directing the Nevada district court to stand down from its assertion of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which Nevada and California had both adopted, California had jurisdiction as the children's home state, and Nevada could not proceed unless California determined that Nevada was the more convenient forum. View "Friedman v. Nev. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Employee suffered a work-related injury to his back in 2004. Employee had also suffered previous accidents resulting in injuries to his lower back. A rating physician determined that Employee's permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for the 2004 injury should be calculated using a net twenty-six percent impairment rating. Employer's Insurer offered an award to Employee based on a net seventeen percent impairment rating. An appeals officer ordered Insurer to offer Employee a PPD award based on the original impairment rating. The district court affirmed, concluding that Employee's prior impairment rating, which was calculated using an older version of the AMA Guides, should be deducted from his current impairment rating, which was calculated using the current edition of the AMA Guides. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the governing statute required the rating physician to reconcile the different editions of the AMA Guides by first recalculating the percentage of the previous impairment rating using the current edition and then subtracting that recalculated percentage from the current level of impairment; and (2) the district court and appeals officer erred in determining the amount due, and therefore, the PPD award based on the seventeen percent impairment rating for the current injury was proper. View "Pub. Agency Comp. Trust v. Blake" on Justia Law

The children of Helen Klasch brought a wrongful-death action against Walgreens Pharmacy after Klasch had a fatal reaction to medication dispensed by Walgreens. The pharmacy had information before releasing the medication to Klasch that she was allergic to the medication. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Walgreens on the basis that, under the learned-intermediary doctrine followed in a majority of jurisdictions, the pharmacist's limited duty was to properly fill the prescription, as written by the physician, unless there was plain error or the prescription was obviously fatal. The Supreme Court (1) adopted the learned-intermediary doctrine in the context of pharmacist/customer tort litigation because the public-policy considerations behind doctrine were sound; but (2) in circumstances in which a pharmacist has knowledge of a customer-specific risk with respect to a prescribed medication, the learned-intermediary doctrine does not insulate a pharmacist from liability, and the pharmacist has a duty to exercise reasonable care in warning the customer or notifying the prescribing doctor of this risk. Remanded to resolve factual issues as to breach of duty and causation of injury. View "Klasch v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Allen Smith was fatally shot by Daniel Ott after an altercation in the lounge of the Silver Nugget. Smith's Estate filed suit against the Silver Nugget asserting negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for the Silver Nugget on the ground that it did not owe Smith a duty of care under Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.015. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the duty element of a negligence cause of action must be determined as a matter of law by considering whether the wrongful act that precipitated the plaintiff's injury was foreseeable; (2) section 651.015's definition of "foreseeable" provides the appropriate framework for conducting this inquiry in the context of innkeeper liability by codifying the common-law approach that was set forth in Doud v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp.; and (3) because the district court properly applied section 651.015 in determining that the act leading to the victim's death was not foreseeable, Silver Nugget did not owe the victim a duty as a matter of law, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Silver Nugget. View "Estate of Smith v. Mahoney's Silver Nugget" on Justia Law

Southern Wine and Spirits, an importer and wholesaler of certain Bordeaux wines and French champagnes in Nevada, was granted the exclusive Nevada importer of certain Bordeaux wines and French champagnes. Southern Wine filed suit against Appellants, two importers and wholesalers of liquor in Nevada, after Southern Wine discovered Appellants were importing and selling the wines and champagnes in Nevada. Southern Wine sought a permanent injunction, alleging that Appellants' unlawful importation and sales of the wines and champagnes violated its exclusive trade and franchise rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. 369 and 597. The district court permanently enjoined Appellants from further importing and selling the wines and champagnes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted injunctive relief where (1) Southern Wine complied with the requirements of the statutes, and therefore, Southern Wine established exclusive trade rights to import the wines and champagnes; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Appellants infringed on Southern Wine's exclusive trade rights; and (3) Southern Wine was successful in demonstrating the merits of its action for permanent injunctive relief. View "Chateau Vegas Wine v. S. Wine & Spirits" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the district court had the authority to appoint an unwilling director trustee of a dissolved corporation for the purpose of defending actions against the corporation that arose post-dissolution and after completion of the winding-up process. Lawrence Canarelli, the trustee in this case, filed a writ for extraordinary relief compelling the district court to vacate its order appointing him as trustee in the underlying matters. The Supreme Court granted the trustee's petition and issued a writ of mandamus, holding that Canarelli could not be compelled by the district court to act as director trustee for the dissolved corporation under the relevant statutes. View "Canarelli v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant Edward Wilson pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and related felonies in the killing of an undercover police officer in 1979. A three-judge panel sentenced Wilson to death for the murder. In 2005, Wilson filed his third post-conviction petition, raising several claims for relief. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that Wilson's claims was procedurally defaulted and that he failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice. At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. State (McConnell I) in 2004 invalidated two of the aggravating circumstances used to make Wilson eligible for the death penalty. The Supreme Court concluded that McConnell I did not preclude the State from relying on the same predicate felony to support felony murder and felony aggravating circumstances when Appellant had pleaded guilty to first-degree murder based on both premeditated and deliberate murder and felony murder. Because the Court concluded that this and Wilson's remaining claims did not warrant relief, it affirmed the district court's order. View "Wilson v. State" on Justia Law