Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mallory Warburton was working for the City of North Las Vegas when she was involved in a car accident and suffered numerous injuries. The City started paying workers' compensation benefits to Warburton at a rate of $10 an hour. At the time of the accident, Warburton was expected to make $12 an hour because of a promotion to manager of one of the City's pools. After an administrative appeal, a hearing officer instructed the City to redetermine Warburton's benefits using the $12-an-hour rate of pay for a pool manager. An appeals officer reversed, concluding Warburton's benefits should be based on the $10-an-hour rate of pay she was actually receiving at the time of the accident. The district court reversed the appeals officer's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence and that substantial evidence supported the district court's determination that (1) Warburton's primary job at the time of the accident was that of pool manager, and (2) Warburton's workers' compensation benefits must be determined using an average monthly wage calculation at the $12-an-hour rate of pay. View "City of North Las Vegas v. Warburton" on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals arose from the same underlying district court action in which the district court issued a final judgment against Appellants in consolidated civil cases alleging various tort, contract, and declaratory relief claims. Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment and paid the requisite filing fee. That appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court as docket number 55200. Docket number 55981 was an appeal from a subsequent award of attorney fees entered in the same district court case. Because the notice of appeal was not accompanied by the requisite filing fee, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Docket number 56473 was an appeal from a subsequent order denying a motion to set aside the judgment entered in the same district court case underlying the previous two appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal for failure to pay the filing fee. Appellants submitted the instant motions for reconsideration in docket numbers 55981 and 56473, asking the Court to permit them to pay the fees necessary to reinstate the appeals. The Supreme Court denied the motions, stating that due to limited judicial resources, failure to pay the requisite fee in a timely matter will result in dismissal. View "Weddell v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Respondent Aaron Hughes faced several criminal charges for allegedly creating three digital videos of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old. The district court granted Hughes' motion to dismiss one of the charges against him for child pornography, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.710, after finding that the statute was vague and that it only applied to production of pornography involving individuals under sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "minor" in the statute is not constitutionally vague because it has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning as an individual under eighteen years of age; and (2) under section 200.710, it is unlawful to use a person under eighteen years of age in producing a pornographic performance. Remanded. View "State v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Jerome Ford was convicted of pandering of prostitution pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.300(1)(a), which criminalizes the act of soliciting another person with the specific intent that, in response to the solicitation, she become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution. Ford appealed, contending that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute does not criminalize such a substantial amount of protected expressive activity as to be unconstitutionally overbroad, and statute is not impermissibly vague; (2) the statute applies even when the target is an undercover police officer who disavows having been or intending to become a prostitute; but (3) the jury instructions in this case did not adequately describe the specific intent required for pandering, and the error affected Ford's substantial rights. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ford v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner William Daane defaulted on a loan secured by a mortgage on his residence. CR Title Services, the trustee of the deed of trust, filed a notice of default to initiate the foreclosure process. Daane opted to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation Program (Program). The district court later found that CitiMortgage, the beneficiary of the deed of trust, had participated in the mediation in bad faith. After the foreclosure process was reinitiated, Daane again elected for mediation in the Program. Daane subsequently brought a petition for a writ of prohibition, seeking to preclude the Program from proceeding with further mediations or issuing a letter of certification. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that a writ of prohibition was unwarranted to preclude the Program from conducting further proceedings with respect to Daane's residence because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. View "Daane v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Eric Spannbauer, a police officer with the North Las Vegas Police Department, was asked to resign by the City Police Department Association. Spannbauer resigned, signing a letter of agreement prepared by the Department. Spannbauer later filed a complaint with the Employee-Management Relation Board (EMRB) against the Association, the City, and the Department, alleging multiple prohibited practices in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288, including gender discrimination. The EMRB found that the City and Department had committed prohibited labor practices and that the Association had breached its duty of fair representation. The City and the Department petitioned the district court for judicial review, which the district court denied. The City, on behalf of itself and the Department, filed an appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the EMRB's finding that the City and Department discriminated against Sannbauer on the basis of his gender in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288.110(1)(f); and (2) the EMRB appropriately disregarded the resignation agreement, including the covenant not to sue, as there was substantial evidence that the agreement was a culmination of prohibited practices in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 288.270(1). View "City of North Las Vegas v. State Employee-Mgmt. Relations Bd." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Ramon Adam was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. During trial, Appellant sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the purchaser. The district court rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the trafficking statute and prior caselaw, holding that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The Court further held (1) the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged under, whether sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual constructive possession; and (2) any prior precedent inconsistent with this opinion was overruled. View "Adam v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this extraordinary writ proceeding was whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.259(1) compels dismissal where the initial pleading in an action alleging nonresidential construction malpractice was served without filing the attorney affidavit and expert report required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258(1) and (3). The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that a defective pleading served in violation of section 11.258 is void ab initio and of no legal effect and, thus, cannot be cured by amendment. The Court held that because the initial pleadings served by certain real parties in interest in this case did not include the attorney affidavit and expert report as required by section 11.258, those pleadings were void ab initio, and the district court did not have discretionary authority to allow the parties to amend their pleadings to cure their failure to comply with section 11.258. View "Otak Nevada, L.L.C. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Kelly Encoe alleged that he was struck by a taxicab owned by petitioner Yellow Cab of Reno and driven by Timothy Willis. In his amended complaint, Encoe asserted that Yellow Cab was liable for Encoe's injuries under a respondeat superior theory. Yellow Cab moved for summary judgment, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat. 706.473 authorized it to lease the taxicab to Willis as an independent contractor, and because Willis was an independent contractor, Yellow Cab could not be held liable for the incident. The district court denied Yellow Cab's motion, determining that the nature of the relationship between Yellow Cab and Willis was a question of fact for the jury, without addressing Section 706.473's potentially dispositive application. The Supreme Court denied Yellow Cab's petition for a writ of mandamus but granted Yellow Cab's petition for a rehearing because it overlooked a material question of law regarding the application of Section 706.473. The Court ultimately denied the writ due to policy but noted that the district court may wish to reconsider its reasoning for denying summary judgment because it did not render a thorough resolution of the issues before it on summary judgment. View "Yellow Cab of Reno v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

Respondent Andrea McNulty filed a complaint in a district court located in Washoe County, alleging tort claims against appellant Ben Roethlisberger and eight other defendants. The events on which the allegations were based occurred in Douglas County. Roethlisberger was a resident of Pennsylvania. Roethlisberger filed a motion to change venue to Douglas County, arguing that venue was improper in Washoe County because no defendant resided there. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Roethlisberger asserted that (1) because a codefendant actually resided in Douglas County, and because no other defendant resided in Washoe County, venue was improper there, and (2) the district court abused its discretion in concluding that convenience and the ends of justice did not require removal to Douglas County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as venue was not improper as to appellant, he lacked standing to challenge venue based on his codefendant's place of residence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to change the place of trial. View "Roethlisberger v. McNulty" on Justia Law