Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondents, the county board of county commissioners and county treasurer, attempted to provide refunds to property owners who paid excessive property taxes due to improper appraisals. To cover the cost of the refunds, Respondents withheld amounts from property tax distributions made to various county taxing units that had previously benefited from the excessive property taxes. Appellant, one of the taxing units from which distribution amounts were withheld, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents to cease withholding portions of the distributions. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying extraordinary relief, holding that Respondents were within their authority to withhold distributions, and because the manner in which they withheld distributions was discretionary, the political question doctrine precluded judicial review. View "N. Lake Tahoe Fire Prot. Dist. v. Washoe County Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Following a dispute over unpaid property assessments, a homeowners association, management company, and an assessment collection company (collectively, the HOA) sold McKnight Family, LLP's properties at a trustee sale. McKnight filed a complaint against the HOA and the purchaser of one of the properties, alleging several claims, including one for quiet title. McKnight also filed a motion to set aside the sale based on improper notice. The district court denied McKnight's motion to set aside the sale, determining that the HOA properly served McKnight. The court then dismissed McKnight's complaint, determining that, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.310, the claims should have been submitted to a form of alternative dispute resolution before McKnight could bring the claims in district court. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that most of McKnight's claims were subject to section 38.310; and (2) erred in dismissing McKnight's claim for quiet title because that claim was not subject to section 38.310. The Court also reversed the district court's order denying the motion to set aside the trustee's sale, concluding that the court should reconsider the motion once it resolves the quiet title claim on remand. View "McKnight Family, LLP v. Adept Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Among the issues in this appeal was whether a juvenile court has authority under Nev. Rev. Stat. 62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision without the written approval of the district attorney. In this case, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that Respondent, a juvenile, committed unlawful acts that would be felony and gross misdemeanor charges if committed by an adult. The juvenile court dismissed the State's petition without the district attorney's written approval and referred Respondent to the probation office for informal supervision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 62C.230(1)(a) grants the juvenile court the authority to dismiss a petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision only if the district attorney gives written approval for placement of the juvenile under informal supervision where the acts alleged in the petition would be a felony or gross misdemeanor if committed by an adult; and (2) the juvenile court is limited by the provisions of Nevada Revised Statutes Title 5 when exercising its authority to carry out its duties in overseeing juvenile justice matters. Remanded. View "In re Steven P." on Justia Law

Century Steel and Pacific Coast Steel (PCS) filed third- and fourth-party complaints and amended complaints against Converse Professional Group after being brought into commercial construction litigation as defendants. PCS and Century, subcontractors whose work Converse had inspected, sought to recover damages that allegedly arose from the deficient performance of Converse's services. Converse filed motions to dismiss the complaints, asserting that the initial pleadings were void ab initio and could not be cured by the amended pleadings because PCS and Century failed to file an attorney affidavit and expert report that Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258 requires for actions involving nonresidential construction. The district court denied the motions after expressing concern that Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.259 could require dismissing the entire litigation. The Supreme Court granted Converse's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the dismissal of the amended pleadings, holding (1) PCS's and Century's pleadings subjected them to section 11.258's attorney affidavit and expert report requirements; and (2) the Otak Nevada, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court court correctly construed section 11.259(1) as requiring the dismissal of an amended pleading, rather than the entire action, that followed an initial pleading that was filed without adhering to section 11.258. View "In re CityCenter Constr. & Lien Litig." on Justia Law

At a foreclosure mediation, Homeowners and representatives of Lender agreed that foreclosure proceedings would be halted while Homeowners were being considered for a loan modification. Several months later, Homeowners petitioned for judicial review, asserting that Lender breached the parties' agreement. The district court granted the petition, finding Lender had violated the agreement and directing Lender to participate in and pay for further mediation. The Supreme Court dismissed Lender's appeal, holding (1) to preserve and promote the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, an order remanding for further mediation generally is not final and appealable; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal because, given the remand for additional mediation, the district court's order was not final and appealable. View " Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Sha'Kayla St. Mary and Veronica Damon became romantically involved and decided to have a child together. The couple subsequently drafted a co-parenting agreement. Using Damon's egg and an anonymous donor's sperm, St. Mary gave birth to a child through in vitro fertilization. After their relationship ended, the parties disputed who had custodial rights over the child. The district court (1) concluded that St. Mary was a mere surrogate and therefore not a parent entitled to any custodial rights; and (2) refused to uphold the parties' co-parenting agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that St. Mary was a surrogate lacking any legal rights to parent the child without holding an evidentiary hearing on that issue; and (2) the parties' co-parenting agreement was not void as unlawful or against public policy, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in deeming the agreement unenforceable. View " St. Mary v. Damon" on Justia Law

Because Petitioner tested positive for drugs prior to a hearing in the juvenile drug court, the judge held Petitioner in contempt of court. Petitioner moved to stay the contempt order, contending that she could not be held in direct contempt because she did not not cause any disturbance in the presence of the court or violate any court order. The juvenile court refused to change its contempt ruling. One month after Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, the juvenile court vacated its order finding Petitioner in direct contempt. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition as moot, holding that because the district court vacated its contempt order, the proceeding was moot, and no exception to the mootness doctrine applied. View "Paley v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Respondent purchased a luxury motor home manufactured by Appellant and took possession of the motor home despite noticing problems with the motor home during inspection. The motor home subsequently experienced significant electrical problems, and Respondent attempted to revoke her acceptance of the motor home from Appellant. Appellant rejected the revocation. Respondent filed suit against Appellant, asserting causes of action for revocation of acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court found in favor of Respondent and awarded her damages that included the purchase price of the motor home. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but reversed the award of attorney fees, holding (1) Respondent was entitled to revoke acceptance of the motor home where privity existed between Respondent and Appellant because Appellant interjected himself into the sales process and had direct dealings with Respondent to ensure completion of the transaction; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding incidental and consequential damages but abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. View " Newmar Corp. v. McCrary" on Justia Law

Saxon Special Servicing serviced a promissory note that secured a home loan for Appellants. After Appellants stopped making payments to Saxon, a notice of default was recorded. Appellants elected to mediate in Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP). Saxon provided all of the required documents for the mediation, including an eighty-three-day-old broker's price opinion (BPO). The mediator ultimately determined that Saxon failed to provide "an appraisal within sixty days of mediation" because the BPO was not prepared within sixty days of the mediation. The district court concluded that the parties had negotiated in good faith with valid authority and that there was no reason to withhold the FMP certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the petition for judicial review, holding (1) the mediation rule requiring an appraisal or broker's price opinion that is no more than sixty days old at the time of the mediation requires substantial, rather than strict, compliance; and (2) Saxon substantially complied with the foreclosure mediation rule requiring a current appraisal. View " Markowitz v. Saxon Special Servicing" on Justia Law

Real party in interest, a homeowner's association (HOA), filed construction defect actions against Petitioners. During discovery, Petitioners disclosed some of their primary insurance agreements to the HOA pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(a)(1)(D). Petitioner refused to disclose additional undisclosed policies covering it that may have been purchased by its parent companies. A special master ordered Petitioner to disclose those agreements. Petitioner objected to the order and filed this writ petition, contending that the disclosed insurance policies were more than sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be entered against them. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that section 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of any insurance agreement that may be liable to pay a portion of a judgment. View "Vanguard Piping v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law