Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Father received sole custody of Child, Father and Child lived with Grandmother. Father and Child then moved. Later, Father stopped allowing Child to see Grandmother. Grandmother then sought court-ordered nonparental visitation. Father filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which the district court denied. The parties then reached a settlement of the visitation issues, and the district court issued a visitation order effecting the provisions of the parties' stipulation. Later, Grandmother filed a motion to compel Father to comply with the stipulated visitation order, which the district court denied, finding, inter alia, that continued visitation was not in Daughter's best interest. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) modification or termination of a nonparent's judicially approved visitation rights is only warranted upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances that affects a child's welfare such that it is in the child's best interest to modify the existing visitation arrangement; and (2) the district court failed to articulate any substantial change in circumstances before it terminated Grandmother's nonparent visitation rights, and therefore, it was not in the best interests of Child to terminate visitation. Remanded. View "Rennels v. Rennels" on Justia Law

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) was named as a defendant in an action alleging civil rights violations. LVMPD had an insurance policy with respondent Coregis Insurance to protect against liability for police officer actions when the damages exceeded a certain amount. Coregis denied LVMPD coverage for the civil rights claims because LVMPD did not notify Coregis of its potential liability until ten years after the incident that led to the lawsuit. After settling the action, LVMPD filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a judicial determination that Coregis was required to defend and indemnify LVMPD for damages related to the civil rights claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Coregis, concluding that LVMPD's notice was clearly late and that Coregis was prejudiced by the late notice. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding (1) when an insurer denies coverage of a claim because the insured party failed to provide timely notice of the claim, the insurer must demonstrate that notice was late and that it was prejudiced by the late notice in order to assert a late-notice defense to coverage; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of LVMPD's notice. Remanded. View "Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Coregis Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Collie Hawkins was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, Hawkins contended that the district court erred by rejecting his challenges to the State's peremptory challenges of three jurors as impermissible race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court did not err by rejecting Hawkins' challenge because Hawkins (1) failed to show purposeful discrimination or pretext or to offer any analysis of the relevant considerations, and (2) offered no relevant argument on appeal other than a summary conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons for removing the jurors were pretextual. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

Pedro Gallegos was injured by David Gonzalez in a car accident. At the time of the accident, Gonzalez was driving a car rented from respondent Malco Enterprises, for which he purchased a liability insurance policy issued by respondent First American and managed by respondent Knight Management. Gallegos obtained a default judgment against Gonzalez. After Gallegos was unable to collect on the judgment, he sought a judicial assignment of Gonzalez's unasserted claims against respondents, which was granted. Gallegos brought the assigned claims, which related to Gonzalez's insurance policy with respondents, in a separate district court action. Respondents moved for summary judgment on the basis that the previous district court could not assign the right of action in a proceeding supplementary to the execution of the judgment, and thus, Gallegos lacked standing to bring Gonzalez's claims. The district court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, vacating the earlier assignment order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) rights of action held by a judgment debtor are subject to execution toward satisfaction of a judgment and may be judicially assigned; and (2) Gallegos properly asserted a right of action assigned to him by another district court. Remanded. View "Gallegos v. Malco Enterprises of Nev., Inc." on Justia Law

A California district court found that Desert Outdoor Advertising engaged in unlawful business practices through its violation of city ordinances prohibiting Desert Outdoor's erection of an outdoor billboard. The court imposed civil statutory penalties on Desert Outdoor and entered a civil judgment in favor of the city. The city filed its California judgment in a Nevada district court, seeking enforcement of the judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Desert Outdoor then filed a motion to set aside the foreign judgment and quash execution of the judgment. The district court granted Desert Outdoor's motion, concluding that because California's judgment was penal, it was not entitled to full faith and credit. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the California judgment in this case was penal in nature, and as such, was not enforceable in Nevada under Huntington v. Attrill, which provides an exemption to the Full Faith and Credit Clause such that other states' penal judgments are unenforceable in Nevada. View "City of Oakland v. Desert Outdoor Adver." on Justia Law

This case involved consolidated petitions for writs of mandamus challenging district court rulings regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. The petitions arose out of two separate actions resulting from an outbreak of heptitis C at an endoscopy clinic. Plaintiffs sued defendants, pharmaceutical companies, for strict products liability. The Supreme Court held that (1) a nurse can testify regarding matters within his or her specialized area of practice but not as to medical causation unless he or she has obtained the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, or training to identify cause; and (2) the standard for defense expert testimony regarding medical causation differs depending on how the defendant utilizes the expert's testimony. When a defense expert traverses the causation theory offered by the plaintiff and purports an independent causation theory, the testimony must be stated to a reasonable degree of medical probability pursuant to Morsicato v. Sav-On Drug Stores. However, when a defense expert's testimony of alternative causation theories controverts an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the testimony must only be relevant and supported by competent medical research. View "Williams v. U.S. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Brian Rose was convicted of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. During the trial, the State relied on the felony-murder rule as one of its theories for second-degree murder. On appeal, Rose contended that assault with a deadly weapon cannot not be used as a predicate felony to obtain a second-degree murder conviction under the felony-murder rule because it merges with the homicide and thus is barred by the merger doctrine. Therefore, Rose argued that the State's reliance on this theory and its instructions regarding second-degree felony murder were improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) assaultive-type felonies that involve a threat of immediate violent injury merge with a charged homicide for purposes of second-degree felony murder and therefore cannot be used as the basis for a second-degree felony-murder conviction; (2) because the crime at issue in this case could be assaultive based on the manner in which it was committed, the district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury to determine whether the felony underlying the second-degree felony-murder theory was assaultive; and (3) the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. Remanded. View "Rose v. State" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, police officers developed what the district court found was a reasonable suspicion that the car's passenger, appellant Arturo Cortes, was armed and dangerous. The police ordered Cortes out of the car and subjected him to a patdown search, which produced the evidence underlying the conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Arturo appealed the conviction, urging the Supreme Court to reject the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion or to interpret the Nevada constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures more strictly than the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment in Arizona v. Johnson. The Court saw no basis for departing from Johnson's application of Terry v. Ohio to traffic-stop frisks and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cortes v. State" on Justia Law

Jessica Winkle pleaded guilty to causing the death of another by driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of the statute currently codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.430. Winkle was sentenced to two to five years in state prison. Before the expiration of her minimum term, Winkle was released to a program for alcohol treatment and residential confinement. After determining that Winkle was still in residential confinement and had not served in minimum two-year term, Howard Skolnik, Director of the Department of Corrections, directed that Winkle be rearrested and returned to incarceration. Winkle sought a writ of mandamus directing respondents, Skolnik and the warden of the Jean Conservation Camp, to release her to the program. The Supreme Court granted the writ, concluding that (1) the express language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.427 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.429 mandates release of qualified offenders to the program for alcohol treatment and residential confinement; and (2) the express language of section 209.429(4)(a) deems an assignment to the program as "imprisonment" for the purposes of section 484C.430 and not a release on parole. View "Winkle v. Foster" on Justia Law

After Clark and Sullivan Constructors (C&S), a general contractor, solicited bids for a public works project, Dynalectric, a subcontractor, submitted a bid to perform electrical work on the project. C&S incorporated Dynalectric's bid into its bid for the contract, and C&S was awarded the project. Subsequently, Dynalectric repudiated its obligations to C&S. C&S sued Dynalectric in district court under various theories of liability, including promissory estoppel. The district court entered judgment for C&S on its promissory estoppel claim and awarded C&S $2,501,615 in damages, which represented the difference between Dynaletric's bid and the amount C&S paid the three replacement contractors to complete the work. Dynalectric appealed, contending that the district court applied the incorrect measure of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the determination of the appropriate measure of damages in any given case turns on considerations of what justice requires and the foreseeability and certainty of the particular damages award sought; and (2) the presumptive measure of damages for a general contractor that reasonably relies on a subcontractor's unfulfilled promise is the difference between the nonperforming subcontractor's original bid and the cost of the replacement subcontractor's performance. View "Dynalectric Co. of Nev., Inc. v. Clark & Sullivan Constructors, Inc." on Justia Law