Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

American Home Shield of Nevada (AHS) sought a refund on insurance premium taxes it had erroneously paid on service contracts for four years exempt from taxation under statute. The department of taxation granted AHS a refund for two years but denied AHS a refund for the other years based on a statutory one-year limitations period. The department also denied AHS interest. The district court granted AHS's petition for judicial review, concluding that (1) Humboldt County v. Lander County obligated the department to refund the taxes, and (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.2935 entitled AHS to interest. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting the petition for judicial review, holding (1) the department did not err when it determined that AHS's refund taxes for certain years were barred by the one-year limitation period, (2) the district court's reliance on Humboldt County in determining that AHS was entitled to a refund of all of its erroneous tax payments was misplaced, and (3) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 680B.120 is the applicable statute governing AHS's refund request and it does not provide for interest, the district court erred by determining that AHS was entitled to interest on its refunds. View "State Tax Comm'n v. American Home Shield of Nev., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Wade and Brenda Smith owned shares of common stock in Pachinko World. Cede & Co. held the shares in street name, making appellants the beneficial owners. After Pachinko World merged into Kisorin, Kisorin sent out a dissenters' rights notice to the minority stockholders. Instead of giving direct notice to appellants, Kisorin provided Cede & Co. with the dissenter's notice. As a result, appellants sent their dissenter's demand forms outside the 45-day period allotted. Kisorin informed appellants that Wade Smith's demand for payment was past due and he would be paid the merger consideration set forth in the notice. Kisorin subsequently filed a petition in the district court for a declaratory judgment. Both parties then moved for summary judgment. The district court entered summary judgment against appellants, and appellants appealed. At issue was whether a corporation is required to deliver a dissenters' rights notice to all stockholders, irrespective of whether the stockholders hold the stock in street name or are beneficial stockholders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due to the impracticality of delivering notice to beneficial owners, Nevada corporations are required to send dissenters' notices only to record stockholders, including those holding the stock in street name. View "Smith v. Kisorin USA, Inc." on Justia Law

David Saletta was found guilty by a jury of indecent exposure. After the verdict was published and in response to Saletta's request for a jury poll, the district court polled the jury. During the poll, the seventh juror dissented from the verdict, after which the district court continued its poll. The court then questioned the seventh juror about her reasons for changing her mind. Saletta moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. The jury was ordered to resume deliberation, and a subsequent jury poll resulted in a unanimous verdict. Saletta appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that (1) the district court's polling method was not coercive under the three factors identified in U.S. v. Gambino; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by continuing to poll the jury after a juror retreated from the verdict under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.531; and (3) the district court erred by questioning the dissenting juror, the error was plain, and it affected Saletta's substantial rights. Remanded. View "Saletta v. State" on Justia Law

Redrock Valley Ranch (RVR) proposed to export water from one hydrographic basin to another in northern Nevada. Both basins lie in Washoe County. The state engineer approved the transfer applications. The county, however, declined to grant RVR a special use permit for the pipelines, pump houses, and other infrastructure needed to make the water exportation plan a reality after determining that the issuance of the special use permit could potentially be detrimental to the public, adjacent properties, or surrounding area. The district court upheld the denial of the special use permit, concluding that substantial evidence supported the county's decision and that the denial did not amount to an abuse of discretion. RVR appealed, arguing that the county did not have authority to deny the special use permit application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state engineer's ruling neither preempted nor precluded the county from denying RVR's application for a special use permit for the reasons it did and that substantial relevant evidence supported the county's denial of the permit. View "Redrock Valley Ranch v. Washoe County" on Justia Law

The Pasillases purchased a home with a loan from American Brokers Conduit. The note and deed of trust were assigned to HSBC, and later, Power Default Services became a substitute trustee. The servicer for the loan was American Home Mortgage Servicing (AHMSI). After defaulting on their mortgage, the Pasillases elected to mediate pursuant to the foreclosure mediation program provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086. Two mediations occurred but neither resulted in a resolution. Afterwards, the mediator filed a statement indicating that the respondents HSBC, Power Default, and AHMSI failed to participate in good faith and failed to bring to the mediation each document required. The Pasillases subsequently filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions. The district court refused the request. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the respondents did not bring the required documents to the mediation and did not have access to someone authorized to modify the loan during mediation, the district court erred in denying the Pasillas's petition for judicial review. Remanded to determine sanctions. View "Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law

Appellant Moises Leyva received a quitclaim deed in exchange for taking over monthly mortgage payments on a house. Leyva did not expressly assume the mortgage note. After defaulting on the mortgage, Leyva elected to pursue mediation with the lender, Wells Fargo, through the state foreclosure mediation program. Leyva then filed a petition for judicial review in district court, claiming that Wells Fargo mediated in bad faith and should be sanctioned because it failed to produce essential documents. The district court concluded that Wells Fargo did not act in bad faith. On appeal, the Supreme Court held, as a threshold matter, that the foreclosure mediation statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086, and the foreclosure mediation rules (FMRs) dictate that a homeowner, even if he is not the named mortgagor, is a proper party entitled to request mediation following a notice of default. The Court then concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Leyva's petition for judicial review, holding that (1) Wells Fargo failed to produce the documents required under the statute, and (2) Wells Fargo's failure to bring the required to the documents to the mediation is a sanctionable offense under the statute and FMRs. Reversed and remanded. View "Leyva v. Nat'l Default Servicing Corp." on Justia Law

The Nevada legislature amended a law to require the Colorado River Commission (CRC) to transfer land to Clark County. The state land registrar refused to deed a portion of the land to the county, believing the land, which was adjacent to the Colorado River, was nontransferable under the public trust doctrine. Clark County filed a complaint for declaratory relief, and Lawrence filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Clark County then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the county's motion and ordered Lawrence to deed the disputed land to the county. Lawrence appealed. At issue was whether state-owned land once submerged under a waterway can be freely transferred to the county or whether the public trust doctrine prohibits the transfer. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that judgment on the pleadings was improper. The Court concluded that whether the formerly submerged land is alienable turns on the unanswered questions of whether the stretch of water that once covered the land was navigable at the time of Nevada's statehood, whether the land became dry by reliction or by avulsion, and whether transferring the land contravenes the public trust. View "Lawrence v. Clark County" on Justia Law

Appellant Joonsong Jitnan and his wife instituted a personal injury action against Ryan Oliver for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. During the voir dire, appellants exercised a challenge for cause to a prospective juror. The district court denied the challenge for cause, and appellants subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge on the prospective juror. After the trial, Jitnan appealed, arguing (1) the district court abused its discretion denying the challenge for cause to the prospective juror, and (2) the court's erroneous denial of the challenge for cause required reversal because in using a peremptory challenge to cure the district court's error, appellants lost one of their peremptory challenges, which was prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a prospective juror expresses a potentially disqualifying bias or prejudice and is inconsistent in his or her responses regarding that preconception upon further inquiry, the district court must set forth the reasons for its grant or denial of the challenge for cause; and (2) although the district court in this case failed to set forth its reasons for denying the challenge for cause, there was no prejudicial error requiring reversal because the jury that decided appellants' case was fair and impartial. View "Jitnan v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Debbie Costello and Philip Casler were involved in an automobile accident, after which Casler died from unrelated causes. Costello submitted a claim with Casler's insurance provider, American Family, for injuries relating to the accident. After the statute of limitations expired, Costello submitted a motion in the district court pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 25, seeking to substitute the special administratrix of Casler's estate for Casler. American Family submitted a countermotion for summary judgment, arguing that any amendment adding a party was now time-barred because the statute of limitations had expired. The district court granted Casler's countermotion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under Nev. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an amendment to a complaint adding a decedent's estate as a party to an action will relate back to the date of the original pleading filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations; and (2) a decedent insurer's notice and knowledge of the institution of an action may be imputed to the decedent's estate for purposes of satisfying the relation back requirements of Rule 15(c). Remanded. View "Costello v. Casler" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an ongoing conflict between Washoe County and certain taxpayers in Incline Village and Crystal Bay regarding property tax valuation, equalization, and collection. At issue was whether the district court properly issued a writ of mandamus requiring the county treasurer to refund excess taxes paid by the respondent taxpayers for the 2006-2007 tax year. The taxpayers paid the excess taxes because of a stay imposed in a pending appeal challenging a prior year's assessments. The Supreme Court held that (1) the district court properly issued the writ of mandamus because the taxpayers paid more than was due and typical administrative remedies to recover overpaid taxes do not apply where the taxpayers were successful at all levels below; and (2) the treasurer had a duty to refund the excess taxes pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.2935. View "Berrum v. Otto" on Justia Law