Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Policyholder Robert Sparks was sued by victims and families of an automobile accident in which Sparks was involved. Sparks's insurance company, Benchmark, filed an interpleader action, seeking permission to deposit the $30,000 policy limits with the district court for dispersal to the plaintiffs. Benchmark then filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a determination that once the court accepted the deposited funds, Benchmark would have no further obligation to defend Sparks in the underlying tort lawsuit. The district court granted Benchmark permission to deposit the policy liability limits but denied it's motion for summary judgment, determining that Benchmark's duty to defend Sparks extended beyond its tender of the policy limits. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the policy did not unambiguously alert Sparks that Bench could terminate its duty to defend him by depositing the policy's limits with the district court; and (2) that a policyholder in Sparks' position would reasonably expect his insurer to procure a settlement on his behalf or defend him until the policy limits have been used to satisfy a judgment entered against him. View "Benchmark Ins. Co. v. Sparks" on Justia Law

In 2006, appellant’s vehicle was stolen from respondent hotel’s valet parking lot. Appellant’s insurer issued a check to appellant for the cost of the vehicle but not including the cost of customizations. Appellant filed a lawsuit in district court against respondent, alleging negligence and breach of a bailment contract and seeking damages exceeding $10,000. The district court determined that Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.101(1) shielded respondent from liability and entered summary judgment in favor of respondent. Appellant appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found as a threshold matter appellant to be a real party in interest with standing to sue because appellant was not fully compensated by his insurer for his losses and thus the principle of total subrogation did not apply. The Court also held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.101(1) did not protect respondent against liability arising out of the theft of appellant’s vehicle because the statute, which limits the liability of hotels for the theft or destruction of any property brought by a patron upon the premises or "left in a motor vehicle upon the premises," unambiguously places motor vehicles outside of its scope. View "Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of a controlled substance causing substantial bodily harm. Part of the evidence heard by the jury came from a paramedic who took appellant by ambulance to the hospital. The paramedic testified that appellant confided he had smoked marijuana before the accident. Appellant argued that his statement to the paramedic was inadmissible because it was protected by Nevada’s doctor-patient privilege. The district court rejected the argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term “doctor,” as defined in Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.215(2), does not include EMTs or paramedics, and thus the doctor-patient relationship required for the privilege to attach did not arise simply because appellant spoke to the paramedic in confidence. The Court also held that the statement was not privileged under Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.225, which protects communications among the patient and persons “under direction of the doctor” because the paramedic was acting as an independent EMT and not under the supervision or direction of a doctor in a doctor-patient relationship with appellant. View "Rogers v. State" on Justia Law

A group of homeowners brought suit against respondent, a developer and general contractor. Respondent then filed a third-party complaint against appellant, its subcontractor, pursuant to the indemnity clause in their contract. During trial, the district court granted respondent’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury found respondent ninety-nine percent at fault, and the district court held appellant liable for the resulting judgment. Appellant appealed. At issue was whether an indemnity clause in a construction contract obligates the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for its partial negligence for constructional defects, regardless of whether the subcontractor is also negligent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the indemnification clause in the parties’ contract did not explicitly or expressly state that appellant would need to indemnify respondent for respondent’s own negligence but linked appellant’s indemnification duties to defects caused by appellant only. View "Reyburn Lawn v. Plaster Development Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, Brian M. Walsh filed a complaint against, among others, petitioner Benjamin A. Lund. Petitioner added counterclaims of his own against Walsh and several additional counterclaim defendants. The district court dismissed the counterclaims against the new parties. Lund then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court. At issue was whether a defendant could, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 13(h), bring a counterclaim that adds new parties to the action. Under that rule, if there is at least one original party included in the counterclaim, a defendant may add new parties to the action through a counterclaim if the nonparty meets the joinder requirements under Nev. R. Civ. P. 19 or 20. The Court held the district court failed to apply the proper Rule 13(h) analysis and directed the district court to vacate its order dismissing the counterclaims and to reconsider the decision in light of its opinion. Because the petitioner failed to fully develop his petition for extraordinary relief by necessarily addressing Nev. R. Civ. P. 19 or 20, the Court rejected petitioner’s request that it order the dismissed counterclaims reinstated. View "Lund v. District Court" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with a felony DUI, pleaded not guilty and went to trial where a jury convicted him. At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340, which allows a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a first felony DUI to undergo treatment. The appellant argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that right in violation of due process and equal protection. The district court determined that while there is a fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no fundamental right to participate in an alcohol treatment diversion program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the possibility of entering an alcohol treatment program is a form of leniency available in exchange for a guilty plea and does not penalize a defendant for exercising the fundamental right to a jury trial; and (2) all defendants charged with felony DUI are given the same protection of the law enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances, and therefore the statute does not violate equal protection. View "Aguilar-Raygoza v. State" on Justia Law

Confronting a statewide budget crisis, the Nevada Legislature undertook several revenue-adjustment and cost cutting measures in an effort to balance the State's budget. Those measures were codified in Assembly Bill 6 (AB 6). In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked whether parts of AB 6 violated the Nevada Constitution. The disputed section of the bill applied only to Appellant Clean Water Coalition (CWC), and converted money collected as user fees into a tax. The CWC used moneys it collected from households and businesses to implement the Systems Conveyance and Operations Program (SCOP) which involved the planning, design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of a regional system to convey effluent from existing and future wastewater treatment facilities to its outfall in the Colorado River system. The CWC collected fees from 2002 until 2010. SCOP was tabled, and the funds collected for the wastewater facilities were transferred to the State's General Fund. M Resort and other businesses that had paid the fees sued the State, challenging the conversion of the CWC fees into what they argued was essentially a special tax. "Special taxes" are prohibited by the state constitution. The Supreme Court held that because AB 6 "burdens only the CWC in its efforts to raise revenue for the state, it is an impermissible local and special tax" under the state constitution. The Court found AB 6 unconstitutional.

The district courts reached different conclusions regarding whether inmates were entitled to due process protections related to their parole release hearings. In 2007, Respondent Richard Morrow was certified as not being a "high risk to reoffend" and granted parole. Before being released, the Parole Board's Psychological Review Panel assessed him as a "Tier III" sex offender which precluded Morrow from being released. Due to the new assessment, the Parole Board ultimately decided to defer Morrow's parole for two years. Morrow challenged the Parole Board's procedure by filing a writ of mandamus at the district court seeking a new parole hearing. Morrow argued that the Board violated his due process rights because it did not notify him of the reconsideration, and it denied him access to the documents it relied on when it deferred his parole. The district court granted the writ and directed the Board to schedule a new hearing. The Board appealed that decision. Appellant Brian Kamedula was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. In 2008, the Parole Board denied Kamedula parole, and he appealed to the district court. Kamedula argued that the Board violated his due process rights by denying him the ability to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses during the parole hearing. The Board moved to dismiss the appeal, which the district court granted. Kamedula appealed that decision. In considering the issue on appeal, the Supreme Court noted that no statutory due process protections applied in these particular cases because the possibility of release on parole is not a protectable liberty interest for an inmate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court in Morrow's case, and affirmed the court in Kamedula's case.

After the Nevada Tax Commission denied Petitioner Southern California Edison's claims for refunds of use taxes, Edison filed a complaint in the district court seeking relief. The district court ordered that the matter should proceed on the administrative record as a petition for judicial review pursuant to the state Administrative Procedures Act. Edison petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the lower court to treat Edison's complaint as an independent civil action. The Supreme Court concluded that a "petition for judicial review" is the proper vehicle for challenging the Tax Commission's decisions on claims for sales and use tax refunds. However, the Department of Taxation was "judicially estopped" from requesting that Edison proceed in such a manner in this case because it specifically told Edison that trial de novo would be available if Edison was unhappy with the Commission's decision. The Court granted Edison the writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Roy Sparks and Jeffrey Clack got into a fistfight during a college football tailgate event. Appellant was injured, and he filed suit against Clack and several entities that sponsored the event. Appellant also named fictitious "Roe" and "Doe" defendants for other parties they couldn't identify but that they felt were liable. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed Appellant's case, finding that Appellant did not try hard enough to find all the persons he felt were liable for his injuries. Furthermore, the court held that Respondent Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc. was not responsible for the conduct of persons like Mr. Clack at the tailgate. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Appellant's case.