Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Patricia McClain was at a nail salon having her nails done when Defendant Timothy Hobbs entered and became belligerent. After an argument between the two, Defendant left the salon, only to return later. He spit in Ms. McClainâs face, and threw a rock through her vehicleâs windshield. The State charged Defendant with domestic battery, injury to property and requested a âhabitual criminalâ sentence enhancement. Ultimately the district court convicted Defendant and sentenced him to 10 to 25 years in prison for domestic battery with an additional year for property damage. Defendant appealed, challenging whether spitting on another constituted battery under state law. Furthermore, Defendant challenged whether the evidence introduced against him at trial was sufficient to support the enhanced sentence. The Supreme Court ruled that spitting does constitute battery under state law, and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction and the sentence he received. The Court affirmed the district courtâs decision.

Appellant Lazario Ruiz was a City of North Las Vegas police officer. While off duty, Appellant got into an argument with his brother and a business associate. An investigation was launched. Based on what it perceived to be a lack of truthfulness and unprofessional conduct, the North Las Vegas Police Department (NLVPD) terminated Appellantâs employment. Following his termination and pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the police Union filed a grievance on behalf of Appellant. The Unionâs grievance asserted several specific violations of Appellantâs rights from the interview the NLVPD conducted. The grievance was sent to arbitration pursuant to the CBA. After a hearing, the arbitrator concluded that the NLVPD had just cause to terminate Appellant. The Union then assigned its right to challenge the arbitratorâs decision back to Appellant, and Appellant individually petitioned the district court to vacate the decision. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Appellantâs right to challenge the arbitratorâs decision was not assignable. The City argued that Appellant lacked standing to bring a lawsuit since it was the Union who was a party to the arbitration, and not Appellant. The district court dismissed Appellantâs case, and Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. After a careful review of the CBA, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant did have standing to sue the City in district court following arbitration. The Court reversed the district courtâs judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1990, Appellant Robert Stockmeier pled guilty to sexually assaulting a nine-year-old boy. Appellantâs pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) stated that Appellant used a weapon during the course of the offense, but the record at trial did not reflect that a weapon was used. Appellant objected to the statement pertaining to the weapon in his PSI. The sentencing court noted Appellantâs objections to the PSI, but did not rule on them. The court then sentenced Appellant to two consecutive life sentences, to which Appellant did not directly appeal. Instead, Appellant filed two post-conviction petitions in an attempt to set the PSIâs record straight. At a hearing, the district court stated that it believed that any inaccuracies in the PSI should be corrected. The State and Appellant conferred to adjust the PSIâs wording to better reflect the facts of his case, but they could not agree on the terms. The court stepped in to make the necessary amendments to the PSI, but refused the make the changes pertaining to use of a weapon. Years later, Appellant was eligible for parole. The Parole Board denied Appellantâs parole based in part on the factually incorrect PSI. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the entire record. The Supreme Court held that because Nevada lacked a statutory or administrative process by which a prisoner may challenge alleged inaccuracies in a PSI, the prisoner must petition the district court for relief. If the matter cannot be resolved at the district court, then a prisoner may petition the Supreme Court. In Appellantâs case, the Court found that neither the appellate court nor the Parole Board had authority to amend Appellantâs PSI. Only after the PSI is set as accurate can the Parole Board rely on it to make future determinations of a prisonerâs parole. Therefore, the Court remanded Appellantâs case for further proceedings.

Appellant Dlynn Landreth and Respondent Amit Malik lived together between 2001 and 2004 and moved multiple times through multiple states. The couple never married and had no children. Ms. Landreth ended the relationship prior to moving to Nevada and purchased a home shortly after moving to Las Vegas. The couple briefly reunited, but by September, 2005, the relationship was over. Mr. Malik contended that the decision to move to Las Vegas was a joint decision and that Ms. Landreth used joint money for the down payment on the house. In 2006, Mr. Malik sued Ms. Landreth in family court seeking half of the equity in the house. Ms. Landreth had difficulty obtaining counsel and raising a defense to Mr. Malikâs complaint. She asked for multiple extensions of time, each of which Mr. Malik granted. In February, 2007, Mr. Malik grew weary of the delays and asked the court to enter a default judgment and grant him equity in the Las Vegas house. The court entered a default against Ms. Landreth, and she appealed, arguing that the family court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case since family law was not implicated by the underlying facts. Ms. Landreth also argued that she did not receive proper notice of the default judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that the family court maintained all the constitutional powers of a district court judge and had jurisdiction over Mr. Malikâs claim. Furthermore, the Court found that Mr. Malik did not serve Ms. Landreth with proper notice of his intent to seek a default judgment against her. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Shoen family controls AMERCO. AMERCO engaged in numerous business transactions with SAC entities, which are real estate holding companies controlled by AMERCO shareholder and executive Mark Shoen. Based on several of those transactions, Appellants-Shareholders filed an underlying shareholder derivative lawsuit against AMERCOâs former and current directors and the SAC entities, primarily for breach of fiduciary duty. However, appellants failed to make a demand for corrective action on AMERCOâs board of directors. Subsequently, AMERCO moved to dismiss the lawsuit. Appellants appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed that decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again granted AMERCOâs motion to dismiss, this time because of a settlement agreement that dated back to 1995 in which shareholders agreed not to bring shareholder derivative lawsuits against AMERCO. Appellants sought the Supreme Courtâs review of the district courtâs second dismissal of their case. They asked whether the settlement bars their present lawsuit against AMERCO. The Supreme Court found that the settlement does not bar Appellantsâ case. The Court again reversed the district courtâs decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Mildred Powell filed an insurance claim with respondent Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company to cover damage to her house. Liberty Mutual denied the claim, stating that the damage was excluded under the âearth movement exclusionâ in Appellantâs insurance policy. Appellant took Liberty Mutual to the district court. The court eventually granted Liberty Mutualâs motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the âearth movement exclusionâ of the policy excluded coverage of the damage. Appellant challenged the district courtâs review of the policy, arguing that it was contrary to state law on a similar âearth movement exclusion.â The Supreme Court concluded that Liberty Mutualâs policy was ambiguous held in light of the applicable state law. The Court held that the district court erred in granting the company summary judgment, and reversed its holding. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2006, Respondent Cordillera Fund, LP, purchased shares in Appellant American Ethanol for $3 per share. In 2007, shareholders of American Ethanol sought to merge with AE Biofuels, and notified their shareholders of its intent. Respondent notified American Ethanol of its intent to dissent, and demanded payment for its shares. The merger was approved by the shareholders. When the merged company refused to pay, Respondent filed suit at the district court. Ultimately the issue for the district court to resolve involved the fair value of Respondentâs shares at the time of the merger. Appellants offered respondent $0.15 per share; Respondent maintained the fair value was $3 per share. The parties went to court because neither could agree on the value. The court entered a judgment in favor of Respondent, determining that $3 per share was the fair value. On appeal, Appellants contended that the district court abused its discretion in determining the fair value of the shares. The Supreme Court concluded that appellants did not demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion, and affirmed the courtâs ruling in favor of Respondent.

In May, 2008, Real-Party-In-Interest Roxanne Cagnina arrived at Centennial Hills Hospital for medical treatment. During her stay, she was allegedly sexually assaulted by a member of the hospital staff. She brought a civil suit against the staff member and his employer, Petitioner Valley Health System. During discovery, Cagnina sought to have Valley Health produce records of other incidents or complaints of improper conduct by employees or staff or others. Valley Health objected, and Cagnina filed a motion to compel a response. The motion was heard before a discovery commissioner who recommended to the trial court that Cagninaâs motion be granted. The court affirmed the commissionerâs recommendation, but Valley Health still objected. It sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court, arguing that the records were privileged, and that the district court erred by affirming the discovery commissionerâs recommendation to hand over the records. On review, the Supreme Court found that Valley Health failed to raise its privilege argument before the discovery commissioner. The Court dismissed Valley Healthâs application for a writ of mandamus, and affirmed the decision of the lower court.

In 1985, Appellant Eugene Donlan was sentenced to probation by a California court for lewd and lascivious behavior involving a child. He was required to register as a sex offender. In 2005, Appellant moved to Nevada. Appellant had regularly registered as a sex offender since moving to Nevada. Almost 25 years after his conviction, California terminated Appellantâs registration requirement. Appellant then petitioned the district court in Nevada to terminate his registration requirement here. After a hearing, the district court denied Appellantâs petition. Appellant argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in denying his petition. The Supreme Court concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to disregard its own mechanism for protecting its citizens just because California terminated its registration requirement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district courtâs order that denied Appellantâs petition to stop registering as a sex offender in Nevada.