Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent was hired as an expert witness in two Nevada civil court cases. To prepare for the cases, Respondent inspected the crime scenes, took measurements and photographs, and reviewed security measures and devices. Respondent did not hold a Nevada private investigator's license. The State Private Investigator's Licensing Board cited Respondent for engaging in the business of a private investigator with a Nevada license in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 648.060. The district court dismissed the citation, holding that Respondent's investigative activities were incidental to his formation of expert testimony and therefore fell outside chapter 648's licensing scheme. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent's actions fell outside the Nevada licensing requirement. View "State v. Tatalovich" on Justia Law

Petitioner brought a shareholder derivative suit on behalf of real party in interest Universal Travel Group (UTG) against the officers and directors of the UTG (collectively, the Jiang parties). The Jiang parties all resided in China. When Petitioner was unable to locate the Jiang parties' addresses, Petitioner moved the district court pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) to permit service by publication. UTG opposed the motion, arguing that Petitioner was required to comply with the terms of the Hague Convention (Convention). UTG later provided Petitioner with the Jiang parties' addresses in China. The district court denied Petitioner's motion to permit service of publication, concluding that such service was not allowed by the Convention when a defendant's address is known. The district court then ordered to serve the Jiang parties in compliance with the terms of the Convention. Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, arguing that the terms of the Convention did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that, based on the plain language of Rule 4(e)(1), a party residing outside of the United States whose address is known must be served according to the terms of the Convention. View "Loeb v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Geanie and Kevin were married by newly elected district court judge Bryce Duckworth. Although Duckworth had sworn his oath of office four days earlier, he was not authorized to take the bench for another several days. After Geanie filed for divorce from Kevin three years later, the district court dismissed the divorce complaint as moot, concluding there was no valid marriage because Duckworth did not have the authority to solemnize the marriage until his term actually started. Geanie did not appeal the district court's dismissal order. One year later, Geanie filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court's order. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Geanie's failure to timely challenge the district court's order by appeal or otherwise precluded writ relief. View "Bradford v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting inflammatory lyrics to a rap song Defendant wrote in jail awaiting extradition to Nevada; (2) the district court did not plainly err in admitting a coconspirator's out-of-court statement that Defendant "went off" and "just started shooting"; (3) the district court did not err in failing to suppress a statement Defendant made to Nevada detectives during a non-custodial interrogation; and (4) Defendant's remaining assignments of error also failed. View " Holmes v. State" on Justia Law

Sierra International purchased a manufacturing facility's operations. Sierra later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants, the facility and its president, hired Respondent (MCW) to represent them in Sierra's bankruptcy action. Sierra's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2006, Appellants filed an action against MCW, alleging professional malpractice arising from its representation of Appellants in the bankruptcy action. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(e)(2). In 2010, Appellants filed a second complaint against MCW, reasserting the claims in their first complaint. MCW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations because the appropriate accrual date was 2006, the date of the filing of the first complaint. Appellants responded by asserting that Hewitt v. Allen, which provides that the statutory limitation period of a claim of legal malpractice involving the representation of a client during litigation does not commence until the underlying litigation is concluded, governed. The district court held that 2006 was the appropriate accrual date and that Hewitt was inapplicable because a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holing that Sierra's bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding under Hewitt. View "Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in the possession of a deadly weapon and related counts. The Supreme Court identified certain errors in Defendant's sentence on direct appeal and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. After Defendant was resentenced, he filed five successive post-conviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted Defendant's untimely and successive fifth petition, concluding that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing and ordering a new sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in determining that Defendant established good cause sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to a consideration of his habeas petition on the merits. Remanded. View " State v. Greene" on Justia Law

Appellants agreed to purchase a restaurant and real property on which the restaurant was located from Respondent. After Appellants failed to make payments on the promissory note, Respondent filed an action against Appellants to recover the principal and unpaid interest. According to Respondent, a third buy-and-sell agreement between the parties was the operative agreement. But during trial, Appellants presented evidence that a fourth written agreement, which was allegedly later destroyed by Respondent or his brother, existed containing the agreed-upon purchase price and terms of the sale. The district court concluded that Appellants' evidence of the destroyed fourth agreement was barred by the statute of frauds because Appellants failed to produce the written agreement. The court then found that Appellants breached the third agreement and entered judgment for Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a writing that is subsequently lost or destroyed, and oral evidence is admissible to prove the existence and terms of the lost or destroyed writing. Remanded. View " Khan v. Bakhsh" on Justia Law

Logan D. was adjudicated delinquent for lewdness with a minor for an offense that occurred when Logan was seventeen years old. The law at the time of Logan's adjudication provided the juvenile court with discretion to require Logan to submit to adult registration and community notification if it determined that Logan was not rehabilitated. The Legislature subsequently passed a bill mandating that all juveniles ages fourteen an older adjudicated for certain sex offenses register as adult sex offenders and be subject to community notification. Logan and twenty other juveniles filed motions asking the juvenile court to find the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile sex offenders. The juvenile court declared the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile sex offenders. The State filed a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the retroactive application of mandatory sex offender registration and community notification requirements on juveniles adjudicated for certain sex offenses did not violate the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant in this case was in custody awaiting trial on a charge of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant successfully litigated a motion to suppress his incriminating statement to police based on his assertion that his statement was obtained through the use of extrinsic falsehoods. The State appealed the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court subsequently set a trial date and denied the State's request to stay the trial pending resolution of its appeal. The State subsequently renewed its motion with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the State's request for a stay, holding (1) four factors govern the Court's exercise of discretion in ruling on a stay motion of a criminal proceeding pending resolution of an interlocutory suppression appeal; and (2) the factors weighed in favor of granting the state's motion in this case and staying the trial pending resolution of the State's appeal. View " State v. Robles-Nieves" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and related charges. Defendant timely appealed but died before his appeal was decided. Defendant's attorney filed a suggestion of death and a motion for abatement, arguing that the district court should abate the conviction and remand with instructions to dismiss the charging document. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an attorney may file a substantive motion on a deceased client's behalf in a criminal case when, as in this case, a personal representative has not been substituted as a party to the appeal. The Court denied counsel's motion for abatement, holding (1) the attorney lacked authority to act on Defendant's behalf in these circumstances; (2) if a party dies pending a review of his appeal, the appeal will be dismissed unless the decedent's personal representative is substituted in as a party to the appeal within ninety days of the decedent's death; and (3) because the court's process caused the delay in filing the motion for substitution, in this instance only, the time for filing the substitution motion shall be extended. View " Brass v. State" on Justia Law