Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Regents Bank issued two loans to Appellant. After Appellant failed to repay either loan, Regents filed a complaint in district court for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure. The district court stayed the proceedings and compelled arbitration as provided in the loan documents. The arbitrator ultimately ruled in Regents' favor. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and later entered an amended judgment and order of sale. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) Regents employed undue means in procuring the award, and (2) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in refusing to void one of the loans. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitration award, holding (1) Appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the award was procured through intentionally misleading conduct; and (2) the arbitrator's refusal to void one of the loans was not a manifest disregard of the law. View "Sylver v. Regents Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Chrysler Group, LLC, a motor vehicle manufacturer, reimbursed two buyers of defective vehicles the full purchase price, including sales tax, pursuant to Nevada's lemon law. Thereafter, Chrysler sought refunds of the sales taxes that the vehicles' retailers had collected and remitted when they originally sold the vehicles to the buyers. The Department of Taxation had previously refunded lemon law sales tax reimbursements to manufacturers but denied Chrysler's refund requests because the state attorney general's office advised the Department that there was no statutory authority for such refunds. The district court concluded that Chrysler was entitled to a refund. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nevada law did not allow for such a refund and the Department was not required to adhere to its prior erroneous interpretation of the law. View "State, Dep't of Taxation v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law

Homeowner attended a first Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) mediation with Citimortgage, after which Defendant was denied a loan modification. The district court subsequently ordered a second mediation. PennyMac Corp. later obtained beneficial interest in the deed of trust and promissory note and attended the second mediation. The mediator determined that PennyMac failed to bring the promissory note, deed of trust, and other documents to the mediation and that PennyMac's representative lacked authority to negotiate. Homeowner filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions, attorney fees, and a judicially imposed loan modification. The district court imposed sanctions against PennyMac but declined to impose a loan modification or monetary sanctions beyond the amount of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Homeowner had standing to challenge the district court's order on appeal; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in denying an FMP certificate and in determining sanctions. View " Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp." on Justia Law

Respondent, a firefighter, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits after he was diagnosed with cancer within four years from the commencement of his employment with the City. Respondent asserted that his cancer was a compensable occupational disease that resulted from his work as a firefighter. The City denied the claim for benefits. A hearing officer with the Department of Administration Hearings Division affirmed the denial of the claim because Defendant had not been employed as a firefighter for five years pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.453. An appeals officer reversed, holding that Defendant satisfied Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.440's requirements for proving a compensable occupational disease. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in upholding the appeals officer's determination that a firefighter such as Evans, who fails to qualify for section 617.453's rebuttable presumption can still seek workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 617.440 by proving that his cancer is an occupational disease that arose out of his employment; and (2) the appeals officer correctly found Respondent's cancer was a compensable occupational disease. View "City of Las Vegas v. Evans" on Justia Law

Mother and Father shared joint legal and physical custody of their minor child. Based on evidence of domestic violence, Mother obtained a fictitious address from the Secretary of State, who could not disclose Mother's true address without a court order. Father subsequently filed in the Supreme Court an original petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order directing the Secretary to remove Mother from the fictitious address program. At issue before the Court was whether Father may seek the disclosure of Mother's home address. The Supreme Court denied the petition, concluding that the Court was not the proper court to consider Father's petition for extraordinary relief. The court then held (1) as a co-parent, Father may seek the disclosure of Mother's address in the district court by extraordinary writ; and (2) in determining whether to grant the writ, the district court must consider whether Mother can establish that Father was a perpetrator of domestic violence, and if established, the burden shifts to Father to show that despite the domestic violence, disclosure is in the child's best interest. View "Falconi v. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

The State charged Respondent with misdemeanor and felony crimes stemming from a domestic violence incident. A justice of the peace, who was sitting as a district court hearing master pursuant to Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EDCR) 1.48, which allows justices of the peace to serve as district court hearing masters, presided over Defendant's preliminary hearing. Respondent pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of battery, and the judge sentenced him on that charge. The judge then accepted Respondent's plea to the felony charge. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his felony plea on the ground that it was accepted by a justice of the peace, who lacks jurisdiction to accept a felony plea. The district court granted Respondent's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a justice of the peace who has been appointed as a hearing master performs the duties set forth in EDCR 1.48(k), she is acting pursuant to her authority under EDCR 1.48, not as part of her jurisdiction as a justice of the peace. View " State v. Frederick" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint for professional negligence against a doctor of podiatric medicine and his employer. Appellant filed the complaint without a supporting Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 affidavit of merit because podiatrists are not considered "physicians" under chapter 41A for medical malpractice claims purposes. While Appellant's case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Fierle v. Perez concluding that an affidavit of merit is required under section 41A.071 for both medical malpractice and professional negligence complaints. Relying on Fierle, the district court dismissed Appellant's complaint without prejudice. Appellant was subsequently unable to file a new complaint because the statute of limitations for her claims had expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in Fierle, the Court expanded the reach of section 41A.071 beyond its precise words, and therefore, Fierle was overruled; (2) professional negligence actions are not subject to the affidavit-of-merit requirement based on the unambiguous language of section 41A.071; and (3) therefore, the district court erred when it dismissed Appellant's professional negligence complaint for lack of a supporting affidavit of merit. View " Egan v. Chambers" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and coercion. Defendant moved to suppress the confession he made while at the police station, claiming that interrogation began after he invoked his right to counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Defendant asked "Can I get an attorney?" but denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's statement was ambiguous and that there was no substantive questioning until after Defendant was given a second set of Miranda warnings at the police station and waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the question "Can I get an attorney?" is an unequivocal request for the aid of counsel, triggering the requirement that all interrogation immediately cease; (2) once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, there may be no further interrogation unless the suspect reinitiates contact with the police, there is a sufficient break in custody, or the suspect is provided the aid of the counsel that he requested; and (3) Appellant's confession was inadmissible, and the error in admitting the confession was not harmless. Remanded. View " Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. The district court determined that restitution should be imposed as part of the sentence but did not set an amount of restitution. Instead the court ordered Appellant to appear within sixty days after his release from prison to have the court determine the restitution at that time. Appellant appealed, arguing that Nevada law requires that the district court set an amount of restitution when it determines that restitution is appropriate as part of a sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because the judgment of conviction contemplated restitution in an uncertain amount, it was not final and therefore was not appealable. View " Slaatte v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of willfully endangering a child as a result of child abuse, a gross misdemeanor, and battery by strangulation, a felony. Appellant's defense was parental discipline privilege as to the child abuse charge and self-defense as to the battery charge. Appellant challenged (1) the district court's admission of evidence that Appellant had struck one of his sons in public and that Defendant got into an argument with nursing staff about his son, and (2) the court's admission of testimony from a witness reporting that she also had a heated exchange with Appellant over his disciplining a young boy. Appellant alleged the admission of this evidence violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045's prohibition against using character or prior-bad-act evidence to prove criminal propensity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) one of the episodes involving one of Defendant's sons was properly admitted to refute Appellant's claim of parental privilege; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony about the incident involving Appellant's discipline of the young boy, but the error was harmless. View " Newman v. State" on Justia Law