Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant filed a civil complaint against Respondent. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint and filed a motion for an order declaring Appellant to be a vexatious litigant. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and declared Appellant to be a vexatious litigant. Appellant's appeal was untimely as to the order of dismissal but timely as to the vexatious litigant order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the vexatious litigant order was substantively appealable. The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that vexatious litigant orders are not independently appealable under any statutory provision. View "Peck v. Crouser" on Justia Law

Respondents sought to permanently enjoin their neighbor, Appellant, from constructing a wind turbine on his residential property, asserting that the proposed turbine would constitute a nuisance. The district court agreed and granted the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the order granting a permanent injunction prohibiting the wind turbine's construction, holding (1) the aesthetics of a wind turbine alone are not grounds for finding a nuisance, but a nuisance in fact may be found when the aesthetics are combined with other factors, such as noise, shadow flicker, and diminution in property value; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that the proposed residential wind turbine would be a nuisance in fact. View "Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision" on Justia Law

Kourtney Morrow filed a complaint for divorce from Craig Morrow and a motion for child custody. A hearing on the motion was set to be heard by Judge Robert Teuton. On April 20, 2012, Kourtney served Craig with the summons, complaint, and motion. On May 4, 2012, Craig made his first appearance and filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Teuton. The matter was reassigned to Judge Cynthia Steel, who rejected the peremptory challenge and transferred the matter back to Judge Teuton, ruling that the time to file a peremptory challenge had expired on April 30, 2012, ten calendar days after Kourtney served Craig with the complaint and motion. Craig filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the time to file a peremptory challenge cannot expire until a party has made a first appearance. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the requested writ, holding (1) the time to file a peremptory challenge begins to run upon proper notice of a hearing and may expire regardless of whether a party has appeared in the action; but (2) the ten-day window in which to file a challenge excludes intermediate nonjudicial days, and thus, the instant peremptory challenge was timely filed. View "Morrow v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Petitioner, and Richard Tannery was appointed to represent Petitioner. A notice of intent to seek an indictment was served by facsimile transmission to Tannery's office. The grand jury ultimately returned an indictment against Petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of reasonable notice. The district court denied the motion. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the State's facsimile service of the grand jury notice was inadequate. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that a facsimile service of a notice of intent to seek an indictment constitutes adequate service under Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.241(2), as section 172.241(2) does not require personal service, and Nev. Rev. Sat. 178.589(1) permits facsimile transmission of motions, notices, and other legal documents where personal service is not required. View "Davis v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant Corporation executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on property to Respondents. Appellant did not pay annual property taxes, and a delinquent-tax certificate was issued. Because Corporation also did not make the payments due on Respondents' note, Respondents recorded a notice of default and election to sell. After a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, Respondents purchased the property and brought this action against Appellants for the deficiency. Because Respondents did not record the trustee's deed until after the two-year period to redeem the property from the delinquent-tax certificate ran out, the county treasurer held the property in trust until Respondents paid the back taxes and penalties due. Appellants argued that Respondents could not validly foreclose while the county treasurer held the property in trust on the delinquent-tax certificate and that, without a valid foreclosure, Respondents were precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment. The district court disagreed and awarded Respondents a deficiency judgment against Corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the foreclosure sale was proper, and thus, the deficiency judgment was also proper. View "Bldg. Energetix Corp. v. EHE, LP" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault in an Alford plea. Before sentencing, John Pacult, a licensed social worker, performed a psychosexual evaluation of Appellant. After conducting a series of assessments, Pacult concluded that Appellant had a high risk to reoffend. Appellant filed a motion to strike the psychosexual evaluation and to order a new psychosexual evaluation and presentence investigation (PSI) report. The district court denied Appellant's motion and sentenced him to prison. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether Pacult's evaluation comported with currently accepted standards of assessment. After a hearing, the district court held that Pacult's evaluation was proper. The court then denied Appellant's request for a new psychosexual evaluation and reinstated the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the evaluation was based upon currently accepted standards of assessment. View "Blackburn v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery, and the district court entered a judgment of conviction. Appellant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the petition in part, finding that Appellant had been deprived of his right to a direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court clerk filed a notice of entry of the decision and order and, on the same day, prepared and filed a notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf. At issue on appeal was whether the district court clerk had the authority to file the notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf. The Supreme Court held that the clerk did not have the authority in this case, as the notice of appeal did not specify the judgment of conviction, and the court clerk may not prepare and file a notice of appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with instructions to the court clerk to prepare and file a notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf from the judgment of conviction, as directed by the district court pursuant to Nev. R. App. P. 4(c). View "Abdullah v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was the beneficiary of three life insurance policies insuring her husband. After the death of Appellant's husband, Appellant and one of the insurers (Insurer) disputed how the policy proceeds would be paid to Appellant. Appellant, a Nevada domiciliary, filed a complaint against Insurer on behalf of herself and a nationwide class of similarly situated persons in federal court in New Jersey, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. Sitting in diversity, the U.S. district court granted Insurer's motion to dismiss without prejudice. Appellant subsequently filed this action against Insurer in a Nevada state court, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duties arising from a confidential relationship, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed all of Appellant's claims on issue preclusion grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) here, New Jersey preclusion law applies under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.; and (2) under New Jersey law, Appellant would be precluded from relitigating her claims in Nevada. View "Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Appellant, a Nevada political action committee, sought to enact a law through Nevada's ballot initiative process to provide a new funding sources for the state's public school K-12 education need. The proposed law, entitled "The Education Initiative" would impose a two-percent margin tax on all Nevada businesses with annual revenue of more than $1 million. Respondent filed a complaint challenging the Initiative. After finding that Initiative's description of effect was misleading, the district court granted the requested relief in part by enjoining the Secretary of State from presenting the Initiative to the Legislature. The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's order invalidating the Initiative, holding that the description of effect at issue in this case satisfied the requirement that the description contain a straightforward, succinct, and nonargumentative statement of what the Initiative will accomplish and how it will achieve those goals. View "Educ. Initiative PAC v. Comm. to Protect Nev. Jobs" on Justia Law

The City brought an eminent domain action to acquire a forty-foot-wide strip of real property from Respondent. Respondent's predecessor-in-interest originally acquired title to this property through a federal land patent that reserved a thirty-three-foot-wide easement across the strip of property for "roadway and public utilities purposes." The City asserted that it sought to utilize its existing rights to the thirty-three-foot right-of-way under the federal land patent's easement and to attain, by condemnation, the remaining seven-foot portion of land. The district court granted Respondent partial summary judgment and awarded Respondent $394,490 in compensation, concluding that the City lacked any right to use the easement because the federal patent did not specifically name the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the federal land patent did not create a thirty-three-foot-wide easement, as the plain meaning of the patent's language created a valid public easement; (2) determining that the City's proposed use of the easement constituted a taking, as the use of this easement was within its scope and did not strip Respondent of a property interest; and (3) awarding Respondent just compensation and attorney fees. View "City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law