Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two individuals were involved in a car accident, after which one party sued for damages, alleging a traumatic brain injury and seeking nearly $2 million. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would undergo a neuropsychological examination, but they disagreed on the terms governing the examination. The defendant argued that Nevada’s Rule of Civil Procedure 35 (NRCP 35) should control the process, while the plaintiff asserted that a new statute, NRS 629.620, provided additional rights and should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada ruled that NRCP 35 governed the examination but imposed several conditions, including disclosure of raw test data to the plaintiff’s counsel (with restrictions), permitting non-neuropsychologist experts to review the data, allowing the exam to be audio recorded, and permitting the presence of a court-certified interpreter. The defendant sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned for extraordinary relief from the Nevada Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 629.620 is unconstitutional to the extent it governs discovery in civil litigation and conflicts with NRCP 35. The court found that NRCP 35 is a procedural rule within the judiciary’s domain, and legislative attempts to alter its operation via NRS 629.620 violate the separation of powers. Regarding the specific exam conditions, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing disclosure of raw data to counsel with a protective order. However, it found the district court abused its discretion by permitting audio recording and the presence of an interpreter without a showing of good cause. The court granted the writ in part, directing the district court to modify those conditions, and denied relief as to the other challenged conditions. View "POWERS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

A married couple who appeared on a reality television series operated a YouTube channel, while another individual and her husband operated a separate channel focused on reality TV gossip. The second channel discussed the couple and made several statements about them, some of which were highly negative and specific. The couple filed a lawsuit against the channel operators, alleging defamation and civil conspiracy based on these statements. Additional claims were made regarding comments about financial fraud, racist remarks, and accusations of criminal conduct and murder.The case was reviewed by the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada. After the couple amended their complaint, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes. The district court granted the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety, dismissing all claims, and subsequently awarded attorney fees to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed both the dismissal and the fee award.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It clarified that under the anti-SLAPP analysis, courts must independently evaluate each alleged statement to determine whether it is protected communication. The Court held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint entirely, as defendants had not met their burden under the first prong for four specific statements (involving allegations of financial fraud, racist conduct, and murder). For the remaining statements, the defendants met their burden, and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the dismissal, remanding for further proceedings on the four unprotected statements, and reversed the attorney fee award, instructing the district court to reconsider fees based on partial success. View "ROSENBROOK VS. LLOYD C/W 85175" on Justia Law

The case involves a civil lawsuit in which the respondent alleges that the appellant sexually assaulted her in a Las Vegas hotel room in the late 1980s or early 1990s. The respondent claims that after being drugged, her hand was covered in lotion and she was forced to masturbate the appellant. She and other plaintiffs seek damages for various torts, including battery and assault, arguing that their claims are timely due to a Nevada statute that eliminates limitations periods for civil actions arising from sexual assault as defined under state law.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed the case and was faced with the question of whether the alleged conduct—specifically, forced masturbation without genital or anal intrusion—constitutes sexual assault under Nevada’s criminal statutes. The appellant moved to dismiss, asserting that the conduct in question does not meet the statutory definition of sexual assault and, therefore, the limitations period had expired. The federal district court certified this question to the Supreme Court of Nevada for resolution.The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed the certified question by interpreting the relevant statutes, NRS 200.364(9) and NRS 200.366. The court held that, under the plain language of these statutes, "sexual penetration" requires an intrusion into a genital or anal opening, whether by a body part or an object. The court concluded that forced masturbation, in the absence of such intrusion, does not fall within the statutory definition of sexual assault. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada answered the certified question in the negative, clarifying that this specific conduct is not considered sexual assault under the relevant state law. View "Cosby v. Leslie" on Justia Law

A Nevada resident was injured when a lithium-ion battery exploded in his pocket, causing severe burns. He had purchased the battery individually from a local vape shop, with no warnings or instructions provided. The battery in question was manufactured by a South Korean company and its American subsidiary, which design and sell these batteries as industrial components intended for integration into products such as power tools, not for standalone consumer use. Despite efforts by the manufacturer to prevent individual sales and warn against improper use—including sending cease-and-desist letters and posting warnings online—third-party retailers in the United States, including Nevada, sold the batteries individually.After the injury, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit in Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court against the manufacturer and its subsidiary. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that they did not sell or market individual batteries for standalone use in Nevada. The district court agreed, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his injuries arose out of or were related to the manufacturer’s contacts with Nevada, and dismissed the case. The dismissal was certified as final, and the plaintiff appealed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo. It held that, while the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of Nevada’s market by selling batteries as components for incorporation into end products, the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a standalone battery acquired through a different, unauthorized stream of commerce. Because there was no evidence that the manufacturer placed individual battery cells into the Nevada consumer market, the court found no sufficient connection between the company’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s injury. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Franceschi v. LG Chem, LTD." on Justia Law

A patient with multiple serious health conditions was taken to a hospital after being found unconscious by his minor daughter. He was treated briefly and discharged in the middle of the night, despite the absence of any adult at home to care for him. His wife, who was away at the time, had expressed concerns to the hospital staff about his ability to manage his condition at home, but her concerns were neither documented nor communicated to the attending physician. The patient was sent home alone via ride-share, and was later found by his wife in a severely deteriorated state. He died after subsequent hospitalization.The patient’s wife filed suit in the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada, alleging professional negligence as well as ordinary negligence, including a claim for negligent credentialing, hiring, training, supervision, and retention. The defendants moved to dismiss the ordinary negligence claim, arguing it was inseparable from professional negligence. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that some aspects—such as discharge decisions—were administrative and could support a claim for ordinary negligence. The district court also denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration after new case law was issued.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that claims relating to the discharge decision and alleged failures in credentialing, hiring, training, supervision, and retention were not independent of the medical relationship and therefore sounded in professional negligence, not ordinary negligence. The court ruled that such claims must be subsumed under the existing professional negligence claim and are subject to the requirements for professional negligence actions. The court directed the district court to vacate its prior order and subsume the challenged claim under the professional negligence claim. View "RENOWN REGIONAL MED. CENTER VS DIST. CT." on Justia Law

A correctional officer employed by a city for over a decade contracted COVID-19 after close contact with an infected coworker. He was hospitalized twice and diagnosed with COVID-19, pneumonia, and related lung issues. He filed a workers’ compensation claim for occupational lung disease, asserting that his illness was work-related. The insurer denied the claim, and the officer sought administrative review. His treating physician classified his COVID-19 infection as a disease of the lung.An appeals officer reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of benefits. The officer found that, while the claimant was entitled to a statutory presumption that his lung disease arose out of and in the course of employment due to his years of service, he failed to show that his lung disease was caused by exposure to heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas, or other noxious gases, as required by the relevant statute. The Eighth Judicial District Court reviewed the administrative decision and denied the officer’s petition for judicial review, concluding that the appeals officer’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not erroneous.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that, under NRS 617.455, a claimant must satisfy both the requirement that the lung disease arose out of and in the course of employment (for which a conclusive presumption may apply) and the separate requirement that the disease was caused by exposure to heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas, or other noxious gases. The conclusive presumption does not eliminate the need to prove the exposure element. Because the claimant did not show his lung disease was caused by the required type of exposure, the court affirmed the denial of his claim. View "Holguin v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at High Desert State Prison in Clark County, Brian Caperonis was killed by other inmates. His father, William Joseph Caperonis, acting individually and as the special administrator of Brian’s estate, filed a civil complaint against the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and several of its employees. The claims included civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, and various negligence claims related to Brian’s death.NDOC moved to dismiss the state law negligence claims, arguing that the estate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243. NDOC asserted that, as the estate stands in the shoes of the decedent, it was required to file an administrative claim before pursuing litigation. William opposed, contending that the exhaustion requirement applied only to living inmates and not to the estates of deceased prisoners. The Eighth Judicial District Court denied NDOC’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plain language of the statutes and the relevant administrative regulations did not extend the exhaustion requirement to estates of deceased inmates.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed NDOC’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the administrative exhaustion requirements in NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 do not apply to the estate of a deceased prisoner. The court reasoned that the statutory language is limited to “a person who is or was” in NDOC custody and does not contemplate survival claims by estates. The court also found that the administrative regulations provide no mechanism for an estate to pursue such remedies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied NDOC’s writ petition, affirming the district court’s decision. View "Department of Corrections v. District Court" on Justia Law

Rose, while 24 weeks pregnant with M.W., was traveling by Greyhound bus from Washington State to Las Vegas. During the journey, she boarded a bus in Redding, California, where another passenger, Asaandi Coleman, opened fire, injuring Rose. Rose was treated in California and later transferred to Las Vegas, where she suffered complications leading to an emergency C-section for M.W. M.W. has required constant medical care since birth. M.W.'s father filed a negligence lawsuit against Greyhound, alleging negligence and negligent hiring, training, retaining, supervising, and equipping.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Greyhound, applying the Calder effects test, which is used for intentional torts. The court found that Greyhound did not purposefully direct its conduct toward Nevada, the cause of action did not arise from Greyhound's contacts with Nevada, and exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in applying the Calder effects test, as it only applies to intentional torts, and the claims against Greyhound were based on negligence. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, determining that even under the correct test for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Greyhound's contacts with Nevada were not sufficiently related to the negligence claims, which arose from events in California. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order dismissing the action. View "WHITLEY VS. GREYHOUND LINES, INC." on Justia Law

Oscar Hernandez allegedly sustained injuries from a RIDGID-branded nail gun purchased from Home Depot. The nail gun, designed and manufactured by other companies, was marketed and sold by Home Depot under a trademark license agreement with Ridge Tool Company. Hernandez filed a complaint against Ridge Tool Company and Home Depot, asserting claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.The respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ridge Tool Company should not be held strictly liable as it only licensed the RIDGID trademark and did not participate in the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of the nail gun. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment on all claims except the strict liability claim, noting the lack of controlling precedent in Nevada on whether a trademark licensor can be held strictly liable under such circumstances. The court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that Nevada does not impose strict products liability on an entity whose only involvement with a defective product is licensing its trademark for marketing purposes. The court adopted the rule set forth in section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which states that a trademark licensor is not subject to strict liability unless it substantially participates in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the product. The court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that a trademark licensor cannot be held strictly liable for damages caused by a defective product if its role is limited to licensing its trademark. View "HERNANDEZ VS. THE HOME DEPOT, INC." on Justia Law

David Bourne was diagnosed with chronic anxiety, major depressive disorder, and chronic low back pain by Dr. Zidrieck Valdes in 2015. Valdes prescribed Klonopin and an opioid. In 2019, Valdes informed Bourne of new CDC guidelines against concurrent use of these medications and switched Bourne to Buspar. Bourne experienced withdrawal symptoms and refused a referral to an in-patient drug treatment facility. Despite reporting stress and receiving a half-dose emergency prescription of Klonopin, Bourne showed no signs of withdrawal or suicidal ideation in subsequent visits. In November 2019, Bourne died by suicide, leaving a note blaming the medication changes.Bourne's wife and child sued Valdes for medical malpractice, alleging negligence in not tapering off Klonopin. Their expert, Dr. Donald A. Misch, supported this claim. Valdes moved for summary judgment, arguing that suicide is a superseding cause that precludes liability. The district court agreed, citing the "suicide rule" and granted summary judgment, stating Valdes had no control over Bourne.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that a patient's suicide does not automatically preclude liability for medical malpractice. The court emphasized that established medical malpractice principles should apply, and whether a medical provider's negligence led to a patient's suicide is a factual question for the jury. The court found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on the "suicide rule" and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bourne v. Valdes" on Justia Law