Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court returning a $5.9 million verdict in favor of Plaintiff on his negligence action, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.An employee of Defendant collided the forklift he was driving with Plaintiff's vehicle, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action, alleging negligence. The case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff, and the district court awarded Plaintiff $2.3 million in attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) imposed sanctions within its discretion; (2) did not err in instructing the jury; and (3) did not err by concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to recover the entirety of his contingency fee from the verdict under Nev. R. Civ. P. 68. View "Capriati Construction Corp. v. Yahyavi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights claims and state law tort claims, holding that the district court erred by requiring Appellant to administratively exhaust all potential remedies.Appellant brought this complaint alleging that Georgina Stuart, who was employed by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS), and two police officers forced him to sign a temporary guardianship over his two minor children to the children's maternal aunt. DFS subsequently made a findings of maltreatment against Appellant, which he administratively appealed. The district court dismissed Appellant's request for punitive damages as not available and dismissed Appellant's section 1983 and state law tort claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant was not required to administratively exhaust all potential remedies in his DFS case before bringing his section 1983 and tort claims; and (2) the district court erred by finding that Appellant's section 1983 claim was solely a procedural due process claim subject to the exhaustion doctrine. View "Eggleston v. Stuart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss this defamation action, holding that Defendant's statements met the requirements for anti-SLAPP privilege and that the absolute litigation privilege applied.Plaintiff threatened to sue Defendant over a text message that he perceived as defamatory. Defendant subsequently filed a complaint with the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED) alleging that Defendant, in a certain real estate matter, had acted unethically. Plaintiff brought this tort complaint based on Defendant's NRED complaint. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the anti-SLAPP statute and absolute litigation privilege applied to protect her from liability. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant met the good faith standard under the anti-SLAPP framework; and (2) the absolute litigation privilege applied such that Plaintiff could not prevail on his claims. View "Williams v. Lazer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, to alter or amend the judgment to offset the settlement proceeds paid by other defendants, and to retax costs, holding that Appellant was entitled to an offset of the settlement proceeds.Dr. Kayvan Khiabani was fatally injured when he collided with a passing bus while riding his bicycle. Khiabani's estate and surviving family members (collectively, Respondents), sued several defendants, including Appellant. Each defendant except Appellant settled with Respondents. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Respondents on their failure-to-warn theory. The district court denied each of Appellant's post-judgment motions, after which Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly denied MCI's motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to relax costs; and (2) erred in denying MCI's motion to alter or amend the judgment because Appellants was entitled to an offset of the settlement proceeds where Appellant and the settling defendants were liable for the same injury. View "Motor Coach Industries, Inc. v. Khiabani" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part a writ of mandamus filed by Petitioners arguing that Dillon's Rule barred the underlying lawsuit, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 268.0035's limitations apply to a city's ability to litigate such that the city's power to maintain a lawsuit must be derived from an express grant of power or fall within a matter of local concern as defined by section 268.003(1).Section 268.0035(1), Nevada's modified version of Dillon's Rule, limits a city's powers to those expressly granted to it, those necessarily implied from an express grant of power, or those necessary to address matters of local concern. The City of Reno brought the underlying action against Petitioners, manufacturers and distributors of prescription opioid medications, to recover damages as a result of the opioid epidemic. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred under Dillon's Rule. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners then filed this writ petition arguing that Dillon's Rule barred the underlying lawsuit. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that the modified Dillon's Rule applies to a city's ability to bring a lawsuit, and the district court misapplied the definition of a "matter of local concern." View "Endo Health Solutions, Inc. v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding that an exclusion in a personal umbrella liability insurance policy expressly excluding coverage for damages that are "payable to any insured" was valid and precluded coverage, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff sought coverage for injuries he incurred as the passenger on a motorcycle that crashed. At the time of the crash, Plaintiff's wife was the named insured on a personal umbrella policy directly underwritten by Farmers Insurance Exchange. Farmers denied coverage under the umbrella policy under the exclusion at issue. Because Plaintiff was an insured under the umbrella policy, argued Farmers, he was not entitled to payment under the policy. The district court granted summary judgment for Farmers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.147 does not apply to umbrella policies; (2) an insured who alleges that an exclusion was not disclosed must make that allegation in an affidavit rather than rely solely on the arguments of counsel; and (3) there was no other error on the part of the district court. View "Sciarratta v. Foremost Insurance Co. Grand Rapids Michigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the two-year limitations period of Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(e) for commencing actions to recover for personal injuries or wrongful death is subject to equitable tolling and that Appellant failed to demonstrate that her circumstances warranted equitable tolling of section 11.190(4)(e).Plaintiff filed a civil torts complaint two and a half years after an alleged sexual assault occurred, alleging that Defendant sexually assaulted her. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(e), which imposes a two-year limitations period for wrongful death and personal injury claims. In response, Plaintiff argued that the limitations period should be tolled. The district court granted Defendant's motion, finding that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 11.190(4)(e) is subject to equitable tolling; but (2) Plaintiff failed to meet the relevant tolling factors in this case. View "Fausto v. Sanchez-Flores" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a petition for a writ of mandamus stemming from lawsuits brought against generic drug manufacturers for selling vials of propofol to ambulatory surgical centers despite an allegedly foreseeable risk that they would be used on multiple patients, holding that some of the claims were preempted.Plaintiffs alleged that Petitioners knew or should have known that selling 50 mL vials of propofol, as opposed to 20 mL vials, to ambulatory surgical centers with high patient turnover was unsafe due to the risk of contamination from multi-dosing. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff's claims conflicted with federal law. The district courts summarily denied the motions to dismiss. Petitioners then filed the instant writ petition. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' negligence cause of action and request for punitive damages survived; but (2) the remainder of Plaintiffs' causes of action were preempted. View "Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court properly determined that the allegedly defamatory statements made by Respondents Kay Zilverberg and Victoria Eagan fell within the protections of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes and that Appellant Jason Smith did not demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claims.Appellant was a professional thrifter, and Respondents were thrifters. When Respondents criticized Appellant for bullying behavior Appellant filed a complaint alleging that Respondents' statements were false and defamatory. Respondents filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and awarded Respondents attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly granted the anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss; and (2) Appellant failed to show with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claims. View "Smith v. Zilverberg" on Justia Law

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's special motion to dismiss under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, holding that each of Defendant's statements was "made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum." See Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.637(4).The statements at issue were Defendant's criticisms of the homeowners' association and developers/managers of Southern Highlands in Clark County. Plaintiffs - Olympia Companies, LLC and its president - sued Defendant for defamation and defamation per se. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under section 41.660. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant met his prima facie burden to demonstrate that his statements were all made in public forums on a matter of public interest. The Court remanded the case with direction to consider whether Defendant made his communications in good faith. View "Kosor v. Olympia Companies, LLC" on Justia Law