Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC supplied Pavestone, LLC with aggregate used to manufacture pavers. After customers complained about efflorescence on the pavers, Pavestone determined that sodium carbonate in Hi-Tech’s aggregate caused the issue. Pavestone sued Hi-Tech for negligence, products liability, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court ruled in favor of Pavestone on the breach of warranty and products liability claims.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and found that Hi-Tech breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and was liable under products liability. Hi-Tech appealed the decision, arguing that it did not know of Pavestone’s specific need for sodium-free aggregate and that the economic loss doctrine barred Pavestone’s tort claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that Hi-Tech’s sale of aggregate carried an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because Hi-Tech had reason to know Pavestone’s intended use. The court adopted the reasoning of UCC § 2-315, which does not require proof of a seller’s actual knowledge if the seller had reason to know the product’s intended purpose. The court also held that Pavestone was excused from testing the aggregate for sodium carbonate because the defect was latent and not detectable through a simple examination.However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on the products liability claim, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Pavestone’s noncontractual claims. The doctrine applies when the damage is to the product itself and not to other property. Pavestone did not provide sufficient evidence of damage to property other than the pavers. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s judgment on the warranty claim but reversed its judgment on the products liability claims. View "Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC v. Pavestone, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court imposing case-termination sanctions on MDB Trucking, LLC for spoliation of evidence, holding that the record did not support the imposition of case-terminating sanctions in this case.Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against MDB, a commercial trucking company, and Versa Products Company, which manufactured the dump gate valves, after an MDB driver experienced an uncommanded activation of the dump gate in his rig's trailer, causing it to open and unexpectedly dump its loads. The incident caused several collisions. MBD cross-claimed against Versa for contribution, alleging an unreasonably dangerous and defective design of the Versa valve. MDB reached a settlement with Plaintiffs, who assigned their claims against Versa to MDB. Versa then filed the motion for sanctions underlying this appeal, asking the district court to dismiss MDB's claim with prejudice for having spoliated evidence, namely by discarding plug, sockets, and cords in the tractor/trailer rig. The district court dismissed MDB's claims with prejudice, holding that MDB's failure to preserve the replaced parts caused Versa prejudice that lesser sanctions could not cure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that MDB acted negligently, not willfully, when it discarded the replaced parts and that, on remand, the district court should consider whether Versa can meet its burden of proving prejudice. View "MDB Trucking, LLC v. Versa Products Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that a large MGM Grand sign located on top of a 150-foot tall steel pylon was not a product within the contemplation of the doctrine of strict products liability, holding that the MGM sign was a product for purposes of strict liability.Plaintiff was seriously injured while servicing the MGM sign. Plaintiff brought this suit alleging that Defendant designed, manufactured, and sold the allegedly defective sign to MGM, and therefore, Defendant should be strictly liable for his injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that the sign was not a product that was subject to the doctrine of strict liability. The Supreme Court reversed after applying the principles set forth in section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts and relevant jurisprudence, holding that the MGM pylon sign was a product within the meaning of strict products liability. View "Schueler v. Ad Art, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant brought a products liability claim against Respondent, the manufacturer of various models of swimming pool filters for both commercial and residential swimming pools, after he was injured when a filter canister exploded. Appellant alleged that the design of the filter was legally defective and that Respondent failed to give him proper warnings regarding the risk of explosion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent on all claims. Appellant filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that, during closing argument, Respondent’s counsel made various impermissible statements that were not based in evidence or that reflected the personal opinion of counsel. Appellant’s counsel did not timely object to any of the disputed statements. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for new trial, holding that attorney misconduct could be deemed to have occurred in this case and that the evidence supporting the products liability verdict was weak. Remanded to the district court for additional findings and with direction for the district court to reconsider its conclusion. View "Michaels v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa" on Justia Law

Petitioners were two German limited liability corporations who were sued by a homeowners association for alleged construction defects in plumbing parts. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they had no direct connection to Nevada, did not manufacture or distribute the allegedly faulty plumbing parts, and had no responsibility or control over their American subsidiaries such that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. The district court asserted jurisdiction over Petitioners, determining that the companies’ American subsidiaries acted as Petitioners’ agents and concluding that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging the validity of the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. The district court granted the petition, holding that no agency relationship was shown in this case, and accordingly, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in imputing the subsidiaries’ contacts to Petitioners. View "Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal because the district court had not issued a final ruling on the change of venue motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court order deferring a final ruling on a change of venue motion based on adverse pretrial publicity until after jury selection begins does not finally decide the motion; and (2) because the court did not finally rule on the motion in this case, the matter was not ripe for appeal. View "Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. After the jury was empaneled, Appellants renewed their motion for a change of venue, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court must apply a multifactor test to determine whether there is a reason to believe that the party seeking a change of venue will not receive a fair trial in the community where the case originated; and (2) because Appellants did not demonstrate that the circumstances in this case presented a reasonable belief that a fair trial could not be had in Clark County, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' motion for a change of venue. View "Sicor, Inc. v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

This case involved consolidated petitions for writs of mandamus challenging district court rulings regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. The petitions arose out of two separate actions resulting from an outbreak of heptitis C at an endoscopy clinic. Plaintiffs sued defendants, pharmaceutical companies, for strict products liability. The Supreme Court held that (1) a nurse can testify regarding matters within his or her specialized area of practice but not as to medical causation unless he or she has obtained the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, or training to identify cause; and (2) the standard for defense expert testimony regarding medical causation differs depending on how the defendant utilizes the expert's testimony. When a defense expert traverses the causation theory offered by the plaintiff and purports an independent causation theory, the testimony must be stated to a reasonable degree of medical probability pursuant to Morsicato v. Sav-On Drug Stores. However, when a defense expert's testimony of alternative causation theories controverts an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the testimony must only be relevant and supported by competent medical research. View "Williams v. U.S. Dist. Court" on Justia Law