Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Through the adoption of Nev. Rev. Stat. 630.356(2), the Legislature gave physicians the right to contest and the district courts the power to review final decisions of the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners. In this case, the Board suspended the license of Appellant, a surgeon licensed in Nevada, for rendering services to a patient while under the influence of alcohol and in an impaired condition. The Board also issued a public reprimand and imposed additional sanctions. Appellant petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision and requested a preliminary injunction to stay the sanctions and prevent the Board, while judicial review was pending, from filing a report with the National Practitioner Data Bank. The district court denied Appellant’s injunction request, concluding that section 630.356(2), which prohibits district courts from entering a stay of the Board’s decision pending judicial review, precluded such an action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 630.356(2) impermissibly acts as a legislative encroachment on the district court’s power to do what is reasonably necessary to administer justice, and this is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. View "Tate v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

The litigation privilege immunizes from civil liability communicative acts occurring in the course of judicial proceedings, even if those acts would otherwise be tortious. Nevada had long recognized this common law privilege but until this case had not yet determined whether it applies to preclude claims of legal malpractice or professional negligence based on communicative acts occurring in the course of judicial proceedings. The federal court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether Nevada law recognizes an exception to the common law litigation privilege for legal malpractice and professional negligence actions. The Court answered the district court’s question in the affirmative, concluding that, generally, an attorney cannot assert the litigation privilege as a defense to legal malpractice and professional negligence claims. View "Greenberg Traurig, LLP v. Frias Holding Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.207’s limitations period, which the Supreme Court has stated in the past does not commence for a malpractice action until the conclusion of the litigation in which the malpractice occured. Claimants filed suit against New Albertson’s, Inc. for damages. New Albertson’s hired Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino (BVRC) for legal representation, and BVRC assigned attorney W. Dennis Richardson to the case. New Albertson’s eventually settled the case. Over two years after New Albertson’s settlement with the claimants, New Albertson’s filed an attorney malpractice action against BVRC and Richardson. The suit was removed to the federal district court, which concluded that New Albertson’s action against BVRC was timely. The federal district court then granted BVRC’s motion to certify the question to the Supreme Court of whether 1997 amendments to section 11.207(1) rendered the litigation malpractice tolling rule obsolete. The Supreme Court answered that the two-year statute of limitations in section 11.207, as revised by the Legislature in 1997, is tolled against a cause of action for attorney malpractice pending the outcome of the underlying lawsuit in which the malpractice allegedly occurred. View "Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino v. New Albertson’s, Inc." on Justia Law

Real parties in interest in this case were the owners and developers (collectively, P&R) and the general contractor (PCS) of a construction site in Las Vegas. Petitioner, an architecture firm, designed a housing project at the site. After a fatal automobile accident occurred at the site, Plaintiffs and/or their estates filed complaints against P&R, PCS, and Petitioner. Petitioner and Plaintiffs settled, and the district court determined the settlement was made in good faith. P&R subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Petitioner for breach of contract, professional negligence, and express indemnity, among other claims. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were barred as "de facto" contribution and/or equitable indemnity claims. The district court granted the motion in part and dismissed P&R's claim for professional negligence. Petitioner then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the district court to dismiss P&R's remaining third-party claims against Petitioner, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.245(1)(b) bars all claims that seek contribution and/or equitable indemnity when the settlement is determined to be in good faith; and (2) P&R's remaining third-party claims here were "de facto" contribution claims and were thus barred by section 17.245(1)(b). View "Otak Nev., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Dr. Obteen Nassiri owned and operated a chiropractic practice and employed Dr. Edward Johnson as a chiropractic physician. Both Appellants were licensed chiropractic physicians in Nevada at the time. Responding to allegations of unprofessional conduct, the Chiropractic Physicians’ Board of Nevada filed complaints for disciplinary action against Appellants. After an adjudicative hearing, the Board found Appellants had committed professional misconduct, revoked Nassiri’s license and mandated that Nassiri could not own any interest in a chiropractic practice until his license was restored, and suspended Johnson’s license for one year with conditions. On review, the district court entered judgment against Appellants. On appeal, Appellants argued that the Board improperly used a substantial evidence standard of proof to determine that Appellants committed professional misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the absence of a specific statutory mandate, agencies generally must utilize, at a minimum, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in adjudicative hearings as a standard of proof; and (2) because the Board applied at least the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in this case, the Board did not err in finding that Appellants committed violations warranting professional discipline. View "Nassiri v. Chiropractic Physicians' Bd." on Justia Law

Sierra International purchased a manufacturing facility's operations. Sierra later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants, the facility and its president, hired Respondent (MCW) to represent them in Sierra's bankruptcy action. Sierra's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2006, Appellants filed an action against MCW, alleging professional malpractice arising from its representation of Appellants in the bankruptcy action. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(e)(2). In 2010, Appellants filed a second complaint against MCW, reasserting the claims in their first complaint. MCW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations because the appropriate accrual date was 2006, the date of the filing of the first complaint. Appellants responded by asserting that Hewitt v. Allen, which provides that the statutory limitation period of a claim of legal malpractice involving the representation of a client during litigation does not commence until the underlying litigation is concluded, governed. The district court held that 2006 was the appropriate accrual date and that Hewitt was inapplicable because a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holing that Sierra's bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding under Hewitt. View "Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP" on Justia Law

Appellant sued the trustee of his deceased wife's estate, claiming that the trustee improperly transferred Appellant's assets into the trust. Appellant also sought to disqualify the attorney who prepared the trust documents (Attorney) from representing the trustee based on the district court's conclusion that a prior attorney-client relationship existed between Appellant and Attorney, creating a conflict of interest. After the trust litigation settled, Appellant sued Attorney for legal malpractice due to Attorney's failure to verify Appellant's intentions before preparing he documents for his signature. Before trial, Appellant sought to preclude Attorney from arguing that an attorney-client relationship did not exist because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, Attorney could not deny the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The district court denied Appellant's motion. During trial, the district court ruled that evidence of Appellant's intent in executing the documents was precluded by the parol evidence rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion because the issue of an attorney-client relationship between Appellant and Attorney was not necessarily litigated in the trust action; and (2) the district court did not err in applying the parol evidence rule. View " Frei v. Goodsell" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint for professional negligence against a doctor of podiatric medicine and his employer. Appellant filed the complaint without a supporting Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 affidavit of merit because podiatrists are not considered "physicians" under chapter 41A for medical malpractice claims purposes. While Appellant's case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Fierle v. Perez concluding that an affidavit of merit is required under section 41A.071 for both medical malpractice and professional negligence complaints. Relying on Fierle, the district court dismissed Appellant's complaint without prejudice. Appellant was subsequently unable to file a new complaint because the statute of limitations for her claims had expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in Fierle, the Court expanded the reach of section 41A.071 beyond its precise words, and therefore, Fierle was overruled; (2) professional negligence actions are not subject to the affidavit-of-merit requirement based on the unambiguous language of section 41A.071; and (3) therefore, the district court erred when it dismissed Appellant's professional negligence complaint for lack of a supporting affidavit of merit. View " Egan v. Chambers" on Justia Law