Articles Posted in Real Estate Law

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David and Kelli Nilsson, who were divorced, held a half interest in certain property in Reno as tenants in common. After the divorce, Kelli and the parties’ children lived on the property, and David lived elsewhere. Several years later, David filed for bankruptcy. On his schedule of real property assets, David claimed an interest in the Reno property as half-owner with Kelli. David then claimed the property as exempt from inclusion in his bankruptcy estate based in part on the homestead exemption. The bankruptcy trustee (Trustee) objected to the claimed exemption because David did not reside on the Reno property, David did not record a declaration of homestead, and David could not now record a valid declaration of homestead on the property. David responded that he could claim the exemption because his children still lived on the property. The bankruptcy court certified a question to the Nevada Supreme Court without ruling on the Trustee’s objection. The Court answered that a debtor must actually reside on real property in order to claim properly a homestead exemption for that property. View "In re Nilsson" on Justia Law

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In 2007, the Nevada Tax Commission (NTC) promulgated Nev. Admin. Code 361.61038, which set forth an apportionment formula for calculating remainder-parcel property values for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.4722. Respondent owned a parcel that was divided from a larger piece of land before the regulation's enactment and was properly characterized as a "remainder parcel" under section 361.4722(6). Appellant, the county assessor, valued the land under the approach he used before section 361.61038 was enacted. Respondent appealed, seeking application of the new regulation's apportionment formula. The NTC upheld the assessor's valuation and declined to apply its new regulation retroactively. The district court reversed the judgment of the NTC and directed it to apply section 361.61038 to Respondent's remainder parcel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in this case, (1) application of the regulation would be impermissibly retroactive; and (2) the methods the assessor used did not violate the Constitution.View "County of Clark v. LB Props., Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2007, Sandpointe Apartments obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to real property. Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan. After Sandpointe defaulted on the loan, the interest in the loan and guarantee was transferred to CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC. In 2011, CML-NV pursued its rights under the deed of trust's power of sale provision and purchased the property securing the loan at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which limits the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who acquired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who held that right. Subsequently, CML-NV filed a complaint against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation contained in section 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV's action. The district court concluded that the statute applies only to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the statute may not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute's limitations did not apply in this case.View "Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

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In post-judgment proceedings, a judgment creditor garnished the funds in bank accounts held by the judgment debtor jointly with the debtor's nondebtor children. The children petitioned for relief, claiming that the garnished funds belonged to them alone. The district court summarily denied the children's petition and claims, concluding that the claims were not properly made and were untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a judgment creditor may garnish only a debtor's funds that are held in a joint bank account, not the funds in the account owned solely by the nondebtor; and (2) because the children's claims to the funds were timely and properly made, the district court erred in dismissing their petition without a hearing. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the garnished funds actually belonged, and thus must be returned, to the nondebtor children.View "Brooksby v. Nev. State Bank" on Justia Law