Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law

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In the wake of Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n v. New York Community Bankcorp, Inc., 355 P.3d 1105 (Nev. 2016), the Supreme Court took the opportunity in this case to provide further clarification as to whether a homeowners’ association (HOA) foreclosure sale can be set aside based on commercial unreasonableness or solely on low sales price. Saticoy Bay instituted a quiet title action after buying property located in a neighborhood governed by an HOA at a foreclosure sale held by the HOA. Saticoy Bay named Nationstar Mortgage as a defendant and sought a declaration that the sale extinguished Nationstar’s deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Saticoy Bay. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commercial reasonableness standard, derived from Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, has no applicability in the context of an HOA foreclosure involving the sale of real property; (2) Shadow Wood did not overturn the court’s longstanding rule that inadequacy of price is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee’s sale absent fraud, unfairness or oppression that brings about the price inadequacy; and (3) because Nationstar’s identified irregularities did not establish that fraud, unfairness or oppression affected the sale, summary judgment was properly granted for Saticoy Bay. View "Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted the Nevada Department of Transportation’s (NDOT) petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court erred in denying NDOT’s motions for summary judgment on Landowner’s contract claims concerning a settlement agreement in a condemnation action. The court held that the district court erred in declining to grant summary judgment by interpreting the parties’ agreement to include a duty imposed outside the express terms of the agreement and allowing a claim for unilateral mistake to proceed even though Landowner’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "State Department of Transportation v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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Homeowners’ associations (HOAs) have representational standing to represent unit owners who purchase their units after litigation commences on claims alleging construction defects, but HOAs do not have standing under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d) to bring, or continue to pursue, claims for unit owners who sell their units after the litigation commences. In this case, an HOA filed a complaint against the real party in interest on its own behalf and on behalf of all of the HOA unit owners, alleging, inter alia, breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality and habitability and breach of contract. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the real party in interest, concluding that the HOA could only maintain an action for those owners who had owned their units continuously since the HOA first filed its complaint. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus requested by the HOA, holding (1) the HOA had standing in the construction defect action to represent unit owners who purchased units after the initiation of the underlying litigation; but (2) the HOA did not have standing to represent unit owners who sold their units after the litigation commenced. View "High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Ass’n v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court properly granted Respondents’ petition for judicial review and properly vacated permits granted to Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC (KVR) to appropriate water. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the State Engineer failed to rely upon substantial evidence in approving KVR’s applications to appropriate water. The court reversed the district court’s previous order denying judicial review and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. After the district court granted judicial review, KVR and the State Engineer appealed, arguing that the district court violated the Supreme Court’s mandate by not further remanding to the State Engineer for additional fact-finding. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s actions were proper because (1) the Supreme Court did not direct the district court to remand to the State Engineer; and (2) KVR was not entitled to a do-over after previously failing to provide sufficient evidence of mitigation. View "State Engineer v. Eureka County" on Justia Law

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Here the Supreme Court declined to apply Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(1)(b)’s statute of limitations for contract actions to nonjudicial foreclosures because statutes of limitations only apply to judicial actions, and a nonjudicial foreclosure by its nature is not a judicial action. After HSBC Bank USA, which was the beneficiary of a promissory note and deed of trust on Appellant’s home, recorded a notice of default and election to sell Appellant’s property “without any court action,” Appellant commenced this action to quiet title and extinguish HSBC’s interest in the property. The district court dismissed Appellant’s claim, thus rejecting Appellant’s argument that HSBC was barred from foreclosing on the mortgage property because the six-year limitation period began running with the initial notice of default and had therefore expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations set forth in section 11.190(1)(b) did not extinguish HSBC’s right to pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure because statutes of limitations apply only to judicial actions. View "Facklam v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law

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A homeowners association (HOA) is not limited to only one superpriority lien under the HOA lien statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116, per parcel of property forever. In this case arising from conflicting claimed interests in real property located in Las Vegas, Appellant challenged the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding (1) when an HOA rescinds a superpriority lien on property, the HOA may assert a separate superpriority lien on the same property based on monthly assessments, and any maintenance and nuisance abatement charges, accruing after the rescission of the previous superpriority lien; and (2) an HOA lien survives bankruptcy even though the homeowner’s personal obligation is extinguished upon a Chapter 7 discharge. View "Property Plus Investments, LLC v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

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Certain real property was sold in violation of an automatic stay from the homeowners’ bankruptcy proceedings. Because the property was situated in Nevada, and the bankruptcy proceedings commenced in Texas, the Supreme Court was presented with a purported conflict of laws issue. Appellant sought to quiet title in the district court. Respondent disputed the validity of the sale by filing a complaint in intervention. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied, Respondent had standing as a creditor enforce the automatic stay in the homeowners’ bankruptcy, and the foreclosure sale was void due to the violation of the automatic stay. On appeal, Appellant argued that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit law applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper because, under both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, a sale conducted during an automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings is invalid. View "LN Management LLC Series 5105 Portraits Place v. Green Tree Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

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The provisions of Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116, which provides homeowners’ associations (HOAs) a superpriority lien on up to nine months of unpaid HOA dues, are not preempted by federal law when the first deed of trust on the property is insured through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Homeowners bought a home using a mortgage insured through the FHA insurance program, and the promissory note and deed of trust were eventually assigned to Respondent. Homeowners’ HOA eventually initiated foreclosure proceedings pursuant to section 116.3116. Appellant purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and then filed suit to quiet title to the property. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the chapter 116 foreclosure sale of federal insured property was void under the federal constitution’s Supremacy Clause. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the provisions of section 116.3116 were preempted when a homeowner’s first mortgage was insured through the FHA insurance program. View "Renfroe v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court’s holding in SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014) that foreclosures under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 extinguish first security interests applies to all foreclosures conducted since section 116.3116’s inception. Respondent in this case employed the three-factor test established by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) and argued that SFR could not apply retroactively because this court established a new principle of law, a retroactive application would not further the purposes of section 116.3116, and a retroactive application would product inequitable results. The Supreme Court held (1) the Chevron Oil factors do not apply, but rather, that the court’s analysis in Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 383 P.3d 246 (Nev. 2016), governs the present matter; and (2) SFR did not create new law or overrule existing precent, and therefore, that decision applies retroactively. View "K&P Homes v. Christiana Trust" on Justia Law

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The one-action rule, which generally requires a creditor seeking to recover debt secured by real property to proceed against the security prior to seeking recovery from the debtor personally, must be timely interposed as an affirmative defense in a party’s responsive pleadings or it is waived. Plaintiff contributed more than $2 million toward funding a loan that was secured by the personal residence of Defendant. When the borrower defaulted on the loan and Defendant refused to repay the loan under a personal guaranty agreement, Plaintiff filed a complaint to recover damages against Defendant. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court granted based on Defendant’s failure to oppose the motion on the merits. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, raising the one-action rule defense for the first time. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the one-action rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant failed to raise the one-action rule defense until prior to the commencement of the second trial in this case, Defendant failed timely to interpose the one-action rule defense. View "Hefetz v. Beavor" on Justia Law