Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Borrower took out a loan from the predecessor-in-interest of Bank. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on certain property and personally guaranteed by Guarantor. After Borrower defaulted and Guarantor failed to fulfill his obligations, Bank instituted an action seeking a receiver to collect rents from and to sell the secured property. The district court approved the request. The receiver (Receiver) subsequently entered into a purchase and sale agreement with a third-party purchaser (Purchaser). The district court approved the sale, and Purchaser paid the agreed-upon price and obtained the deed to the property. Bank then filed a complaint seeking to recover the amount of Guarantor’s indebtedness that the net proceeds that the sale did not satisfy. Borrower and Guarantor (together, Respondents) moved for summary judgment, arguing that the relief sought was in essence an application for a deficiency judgment under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1), which Bank was precluded from seeking because Bank failed to comply with section 40.455(1)’s time frame. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 40.455(1) applied in this case; and (2) Bank’s application for a deficiency judgment was timely. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Palmilla Dev. Co." on Justia Law

In an effort to foreclose on real property that was used to secure a debt by Appellant, Respondent recorded a notice of a trustee’s sale. Respondent orally postponed the sale three times before the property was sold. Thereafter, Respondent initiated a civil action against Appellant. Appellant filed counterclaims against Respondent, claiming that Respondent violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.082(2) when it thrice postponed the sale without effectuating a written notice of the sale’s time and place. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the three oral postponements did not trigger section 107.082(2)’s notice requirement because the sale occurred on the date set by the third oral postponement. The district court subsequently granted Respondent attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment, as Respondent was not required to give notice under section 107.082(2) because the time or place of the trustee’s sale was not changed subsequent to the third oral pronouncement; and (2) awarding attorney fees and costs to Respondent. View "JED Prop. v. Coastline RE Holdings NV Corp." on Justia Law

The City of North Las Vegas publicly announced its intent to condemn a portion of Appellant’s land but delayed condemning the property. Appellant sold the property before it was condemned. Appellant filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation proceedings. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Buzz Stew I, the Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Appellant’s precondemnation damages claim, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding whether the City’s actions were unreasoanble and injurious; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim because Appellant had not stated a takings claim upon which relief could be granted. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for the City, finding that the City’s delay was not unreasonable. On appeal, Appellant contended that newly discovered evidence presented at trial demonstrated that a taking of its property occurred and that a new trial was required due to errors made with regard to the precondemnation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial did not establish that a taking occurred while Appellant maintained an interest in the property; and (2) no error made below warranted a new trial. View "Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Gordon and Carol Lane took out a loan secured by a piece of commercial real estate. John Serpa executed a personal guaranty upon the loan. The Lanes defaulted on their obligation, and Serpa failed to fulfill his guarantor duties. Before the original lender exercised its right to foreclose, the FDIC was appointed its receiver and assigned the interest in the Lanes’ loan to First Financial Bank, N.A. (FFB). FFB foreclosed and sold the property to itself. FFB then brought a deficiency judgment and breach of guaranty action against the Lanes and Serpa (collectively, Respondents). The district court entered judgment in Respondents’ favor under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.451 because the fair market value of the property exceeded the consideration the FFB paid the FDIC to acquire a lien on the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of “indebtedness” found in section 40.451 does not limit the amount a successor lienholder can recover in an action for a deficiency judgment to the amount of consideration such a lienholder paid to obtain its interest in the note and deed of trust. Remanded. View "First Fin. Bank v. Lane" on Justia Law

Elsinore, LLC purchased a property located within the Peccole Ranch planned community that was subject to a lien for unpaid community-association assessments. Elsinore paid the outstanding association dues and then sold the property. Thereafter, Elsionre filed a complaint against Peccole Ranch with the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED) on behalf of itself and a class of property owners. Peccole Ranch then filed a district court action against Elsinore. Elsinore counterclaimed for declaratory relief and damages on bhealf of itself and the identified class. Peccole Ranch filed a third-party complaint against Nevada Association Services (NAS), one of its agents, seeking indemnification and contribution for any damages that Elsinore and the class recovered from Peccole Ranch. NAS and Peccole Ranch moved for summary judgment against Elsinore's counterclaims for damages on the basis that the voluntary payment doctrine barred Elsinore’s and the class members’ claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that the voluntary payment doctrine was a complete defense to Elsinore’s claims, and therefore, the district court erred by denying NAS and Peccole Ranch’s motion for summary judgment. View "Nev. Ass'n Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

The purchasers of condominiums at a Las Vegas resort filed suit against approximately forty defendants, including JDI Loans, LLC and JDI Realty, LLC (collectively, the JDI entities), alleging that the resort’s marketing material represented that it was in a partnership with the JDI entities, that several defendants engaged in actionable wrongdoings, and that the JDI entities were liable for these actionable wrongdoings under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1), which codifies the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment for the JDI entities as to their liability under section 87.160(1), concluding that a “reference to a ‘strategic partner’” in the marketing materials was insufficient to establish partnership by estoppel. The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment to the JDI entities with regard to their liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1). View "In re Cay Clubs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for fraud and deceptive trade practices in connection with a real estate purchase and loan arrangement. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages consisting of actual damages and emotional distress damages, as well as punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to consequential damages and remanded for a redetermination of punitive damages. On remand, the district court instructed the jury that it was to decide “what amount, if any, [Plaintiff] was entitled to for punitive damages.” After punitive damages were awarded, Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s punitive damages award and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.005(3) requires a second jury on remand to reassess whether punitive damages are warranted before that jury may determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded; and (2) because the jury instruction did not require the jury to make the threshold determination of whether punitive damages could be awarded, the case must be remanded for a new trial on punitive damages. View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Betsinger" on Justia Law

Appellant leased commercial real property from Respondent. Appellant vacated the property and ceased paying rent after a significant water intrusion event. Respondent filed a complaint alleging that Appellant breached the lease. Appellant counterclaimed that Respondent constructively evicted Appellant by failing to maintain the roof. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding (1) severe water intrusion justified Appellant’s vacating the property; but (2) the lease obligated Appellant to provide Respondent written notice of and thirty days to cure the water intrusion before exercising any other potential remedies, and Appellant did comply with the notice and cure provision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s factual findings did not support Appellant’s argument that it was constructively evicted, and therefore, the Court did not need to address whether Appellant was required to comply with the lease’s notice and cure provision in order to successfully assert constructive eviction. View "Mason-McDuffie Real Estate, Inc. v. Villa Fiore Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

A common interest community subject to covenants, conditions, and restrictions was encumbered by a note and deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank, N.A. The former homeowners fell delinquent on their association dues and defaulted on their obligations to U.S. Bank. The community homeowners’ association (SHHOA) and U.S. Bank separately initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC purchased the property at the SHHOA’s trustee's sale and filed an action to quiet title and enjoin the trustee’s sale on U.S. Bank’s deed of trust, alleging that the SHHOA trustee’s deed extinguished U.S. Bank’s deed of trust. The district court granted judgment for U.S. Bank, holding that a homeowners’ association (HOA) must proceed judicially to validly foreclose its superpriority lien, and since the SHHOA foreclosed nonjudicially, U.S. Bank’s first deed of trust survived the SHHOA trustee’s sale and was senior to the trustee’s deed received by SFR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2) gives an HOA a true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first deed of trust; and (2) chapter 116 permits nonjudicial foreclosure of HOA liens. View "SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Appellant obtained a home loan from IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (IndyMac F.S.B.) secured by a promissory note and deed of trust. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was the legal beneficiary of the deed of trust. Appellant’s loan was later sold to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. IndyMac F.S.B.’s and Deutsche Bank’s obligations were listed in a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA). In 2012, Appellant elected to participate in Nevada’s foreclosure medication program (FMP) with IndyMac Mortgage Services (IndyMac), Deutsche Bank’s loan servicer. The mediation concluded unsuccessfully. Appellant sought judicial review, arguing that IndyMac had failed to establish that Deutsche Bank owned his loan because the MERS assignment violated the PSA’s terms and was therefore void. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a loan assignment made in violation of a PSA is not void, but merely voidable; (2) because Appellant was neither a party to nor an intended beneficiary of the PSA, Appellant lacked standing to contest the assignment’s validity; and (3) although Respondents produced an assignment at the mediation that was executed after the PSA’s closing date, the assignment was nevertheless effective to transfer ownership of Appellant’s loan to Deutsche Bank. View "Wood v. Germann" on Justia Law