Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ad America owned commercial rental property. When Ad America’s tenants were informed that Ad America’s property would be acquired for Project Neon, a freeway improvement project, Ad America’s net rental income decreased, and Ad America could no longer meet its mortgage requirements. Ad America filed an inverse condemnation action against Nevada’s Department of Transportation (NDOT), the lead agency for Project Neon, seeking precondemnation damages for alleged economic harm and just compensation for the alleged taking of its property. The district court granted summary judgment for Ad America even though NDOT had not physically occupied Ad America’s property or taken any formal steps to commence eminent domain proceedings against Ad America’s property. At issue on appeal was whether a taking occurred where NDOT publicly disclosed its plan to acquire Ad America’s property to comply with federal law, the City of Las Vegas independently acquired property that was previously a part of Project Neon, and the City rendered land-use application decisions conditioned on coordination with NDOT for purposes of Project Neon. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that the undisputed material facts, as a matter of law, did not demonstrate that NDOT committed a taking of Ad America’s property warranting just compensation. View "State Dep’t of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The Kawaharas loaned the Allisons $400,000. The Allisons executed a note to the Kawaharas in that amount secured by a deed of trust on a Reno property. The note was delivered in 2009 but was not recorded until 2011. When the Allisons’ car dealership became delinquent in taxes, the State Department of Taxation recorded certificates of tax lien against the Allisons. The lien was created and recorded in 2010. The Allisons filed for bankruptcy in 2011. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada approved the sale of the Reno property. The bankruptcy court certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court concerning the priority of the competing liens on the Reno property. The Supreme Court concluded (1) a recorded tax lien cannot be recognized as a mortgage lien, and therefore, the Department cannot claim to have recorded a mortgage lien when it filed a tax lien certificate; (2) the deed of trust had priority over a tax lien levied under Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.473; and (3) the Department’s tax lien is considered a judgment lien under section 360.473(2), and Nevada recording statutes do not protect judgment creditors against prior unrecorded conveyances. View "State, Dep't of Taxation v. Kawahara" on Justia Law

Appellants borrowed money from Colonial Bank and granted the bank a security interest in their real property. The FDIC assigned Appellants’ loan to Branch Banking and Trust Company, Inc. (BB&T) after placing Colonial into receivership. After Appellants defaulted on their loan, BB&T instituted an action for a judicial foreclosure of the secured property. Two years later, Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which implements certain limitations on the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by an assignee creditor, became effective. After the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale, BB&T filed a motion seeking a deficiency judgment against Appellants for the remaining balance of the loan. The district court awarded a deficiency judgment to BB&T, finding that section 40.459(1) did not apply to BB&T’s application for a deficiency judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that section 40.459(1)(c) was preempted by the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to the extent that section 40.459(1)(c) limits deficiency judgments that may be obtained from loans transferred by the FDIC, as section 40.459(1)(c) conflicts with FIRREA’s purpose of facilitating the transfer of the assets of failed banks to other institutions. View "Munoz v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Respondent borrowed nearly $17 million from Appellant’s predecessor-in-interest. The loan was secured by real property located in Texas. The Guarantors entered into a guaranty agreement to pay any debt remaining if Respondent defaulted. When Respondent defaulted, the Texas property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under Texas law. Appellant then sought a deficiency judgment against Respondent and the Guarantors under Nevada law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent and the Guarantors, finding that Appellant’s nonjudicial foreclosure in Texas did not comply with the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.080. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1), which permits a creditor or deed-of-trust beneficiary to bring an action for a deficiency judgment after the foreclosure sale or trustee’s sale held pursuant to section 107.080, does not preclude a deficiency judgment in Nevada when the nonjudicial foreclosure sale upon property located in another state is conducted pursuant to that state’s laws instead of section 107.080. Remanded. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Windhaven & Tollway, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were two mining companies. Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court alleging that Defendant owed it royalty payments under an area-of-interest provision in a 1979 commercial mining agreement. Defendant argued that it did not owe royalties because the area-of-interest provision was void under the rule against perpetuities. Plaintiff countered that the rule does not apply to area-of-interest royalty agreements. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant based on the rule against perpetuities. Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Court answered that Nevada’s common-law rule against perpetuities does not extend to area-of-interest royalties created by commercial mining agreements. View "Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc." on Justia Law

Borrower took out a loan from the predecessor-in-interest of Bank. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on certain property and personally guaranteed by Guarantor. After Borrower defaulted and Guarantor failed to fulfill his obligations, Bank instituted an action seeking a receiver to collect rents from and to sell the secured property. The district court approved the request. The receiver (Receiver) subsequently entered into a purchase and sale agreement with a third-party purchaser (Purchaser). The district court approved the sale, and Purchaser paid the agreed-upon price and obtained the deed to the property. Bank then filed a complaint seeking to recover the amount of Guarantor’s indebtedness that the net proceeds that the sale did not satisfy. Borrower and Guarantor (together, Respondents) moved for summary judgment, arguing that the relief sought was in essence an application for a deficiency judgment under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1), which Bank was precluded from seeking because Bank failed to comply with section 40.455(1)’s time frame. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 40.455(1) applied in this case; and (2) Bank’s application for a deficiency judgment was timely. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Palmilla Dev. Co." on Justia Law

In an effort to foreclose on real property that was used to secure a debt by Appellant, Respondent recorded a notice of a trustee’s sale. Respondent orally postponed the sale three times before the property was sold. Thereafter, Respondent initiated a civil action against Appellant. Appellant filed counterclaims against Respondent, claiming that Respondent violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.082(2) when it thrice postponed the sale without effectuating a written notice of the sale’s time and place. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the three oral postponements did not trigger section 107.082(2)’s notice requirement because the sale occurred on the date set by the third oral postponement. The district court subsequently granted Respondent attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment, as Respondent was not required to give notice under section 107.082(2) because the time or place of the trustee’s sale was not changed subsequent to the third oral pronouncement; and (2) awarding attorney fees and costs to Respondent. View "JED Prop. v. Coastline RE Holdings NV Corp." on Justia Law

The City of North Las Vegas publicly announced its intent to condemn a portion of Appellant’s land but delayed condemning the property. Appellant sold the property before it was condemned. Appellant filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation proceedings. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Buzz Stew I, the Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Appellant’s precondemnation damages claim, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding whether the City’s actions were unreasoanble and injurious; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim because Appellant had not stated a takings claim upon which relief could be granted. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for the City, finding that the City’s delay was not unreasonable. On appeal, Appellant contended that newly discovered evidence presented at trial demonstrated that a taking of its property occurred and that a new trial was required due to errors made with regard to the precondemnation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial did not establish that a taking occurred while Appellant maintained an interest in the property; and (2) no error made below warranted a new trial. View "Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Gordon and Carol Lane took out a loan secured by a piece of commercial real estate. John Serpa executed a personal guaranty upon the loan. The Lanes defaulted on their obligation, and Serpa failed to fulfill his guarantor duties. Before the original lender exercised its right to foreclose, the FDIC was appointed its receiver and assigned the interest in the Lanes’ loan to First Financial Bank, N.A. (FFB). FFB foreclosed and sold the property to itself. FFB then brought a deficiency judgment and breach of guaranty action against the Lanes and Serpa (collectively, Respondents). The district court entered judgment in Respondents’ favor under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.451 because the fair market value of the property exceeded the consideration the FFB paid the FDIC to acquire a lien on the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of “indebtedness” found in section 40.451 does not limit the amount a successor lienholder can recover in an action for a deficiency judgment to the amount of consideration such a lienholder paid to obtain its interest in the note and deed of trust. Remanded. View "First Fin. Bank v. Lane" on Justia Law

Elsinore, LLC purchased a property located within the Peccole Ranch planned community that was subject to a lien for unpaid community-association assessments. Elsinore paid the outstanding association dues and then sold the property. Thereafter, Elsionre filed a complaint against Peccole Ranch with the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED) on behalf of itself and a class of property owners. Peccole Ranch then filed a district court action against Elsinore. Elsinore counterclaimed for declaratory relief and damages on bhealf of itself and the identified class. Peccole Ranch filed a third-party complaint against Nevada Association Services (NAS), one of its agents, seeking indemnification and contribution for any damages that Elsinore and the class recovered from Peccole Ranch. NAS and Peccole Ranch moved for summary judgment against Elsinore's counterclaims for damages on the basis that the voluntary payment doctrine barred Elsinore’s and the class members’ claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that the voluntary payment doctrine was a complete defense to Elsinore’s claims, and therefore, the district court erred by denying NAS and Peccole Ranch’s motion for summary judgment. View "Nev. Ass'n Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law