Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gordon and Carol Lane took out a loan secured by a piece of commercial real estate. John Serpa executed a personal guaranty upon the loan. The Lanes defaulted on their obligation, and Serpa failed to fulfill his guarantor duties. Before the original lender exercised its right to foreclose, the FDIC was appointed its receiver and assigned the interest in the Lanes’ loan to First Financial Bank, N.A. (FFB). FFB foreclosed and sold the property to itself. FFB then brought a deficiency judgment and breach of guaranty action against the Lanes and Serpa (collectively, Respondents). The district court entered judgment in Respondents’ favor under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.451 because the fair market value of the property exceeded the consideration the FFB paid the FDIC to acquire a lien on the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of “indebtedness” found in section 40.451 does not limit the amount a successor lienholder can recover in an action for a deficiency judgment to the amount of consideration such a lienholder paid to obtain its interest in the note and deed of trust. Remanded. View "First Fin. Bank v. Lane" on Justia Law

Elsinore, LLC purchased a property located within the Peccole Ranch planned community that was subject to a lien for unpaid community-association assessments. Elsinore paid the outstanding association dues and then sold the property. Thereafter, Elsionre filed a complaint against Peccole Ranch with the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED) on behalf of itself and a class of property owners. Peccole Ranch then filed a district court action against Elsinore. Elsinore counterclaimed for declaratory relief and damages on bhealf of itself and the identified class. Peccole Ranch filed a third-party complaint against Nevada Association Services (NAS), one of its agents, seeking indemnification and contribution for any damages that Elsinore and the class recovered from Peccole Ranch. NAS and Peccole Ranch moved for summary judgment against Elsinore's counterclaims for damages on the basis that the voluntary payment doctrine barred Elsinore’s and the class members’ claims. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that the voluntary payment doctrine was a complete defense to Elsinore’s claims, and therefore, the district court erred by denying NAS and Peccole Ranch’s motion for summary judgment. View "Nev. Ass'n Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

The purchasers of condominiums at a Las Vegas resort filed suit against approximately forty defendants, including JDI Loans, LLC and JDI Realty, LLC (collectively, the JDI entities), alleging that the resort’s marketing material represented that it was in a partnership with the JDI entities, that several defendants engaged in actionable wrongdoings, and that the JDI entities were liable for these actionable wrongdoings under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1), which codifies the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment for the JDI entities as to their liability under section 87.160(1), concluding that a “reference to a ‘strategic partner’” in the marketing materials was insufficient to establish partnership by estoppel. The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment to the JDI entities with regard to their liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1). View "In re Cay Clubs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for fraud and deceptive trade practices in connection with a real estate purchase and loan arrangement. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages consisting of actual damages and emotional distress damages, as well as punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to consequential damages and remanded for a redetermination of punitive damages. On remand, the district court instructed the jury that it was to decide “what amount, if any, [Plaintiff] was entitled to for punitive damages.” After punitive damages were awarded, Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s punitive damages award and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.005(3) requires a second jury on remand to reassess whether punitive damages are warranted before that jury may determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded; and (2) because the jury instruction did not require the jury to make the threshold determination of whether punitive damages could be awarded, the case must be remanded for a new trial on punitive damages. View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Betsinger" on Justia Law

Appellant leased commercial real property from Respondent. Appellant vacated the property and ceased paying rent after a significant water intrusion event. Respondent filed a complaint alleging that Appellant breached the lease. Appellant counterclaimed that Respondent constructively evicted Appellant by failing to maintain the roof. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding (1) severe water intrusion justified Appellant’s vacating the property; but (2) the lease obligated Appellant to provide Respondent written notice of and thirty days to cure the water intrusion before exercising any other potential remedies, and Appellant did comply with the notice and cure provision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s factual findings did not support Appellant’s argument that it was constructively evicted, and therefore, the Court did not need to address whether Appellant was required to comply with the lease’s notice and cure provision in order to successfully assert constructive eviction. View "Mason-McDuffie Real Estate, Inc. v. Villa Fiore Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

A common interest community subject to covenants, conditions, and restrictions was encumbered by a note and deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank, N.A. The former homeowners fell delinquent on their association dues and defaulted on their obligations to U.S. Bank. The community homeowners’ association (SHHOA) and U.S. Bank separately initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC purchased the property at the SHHOA’s trustee's sale and filed an action to quiet title and enjoin the trustee’s sale on U.S. Bank’s deed of trust, alleging that the SHHOA trustee’s deed extinguished U.S. Bank’s deed of trust. The district court granted judgment for U.S. Bank, holding that a homeowners’ association (HOA) must proceed judicially to validly foreclose its superpriority lien, and since the SHHOA foreclosed nonjudicially, U.S. Bank’s first deed of trust survived the SHHOA trustee’s sale and was senior to the trustee’s deed received by SFR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2) gives an HOA a true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first deed of trust; and (2) chapter 116 permits nonjudicial foreclosure of HOA liens. View "SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Appellant obtained a home loan from IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (IndyMac F.S.B.) secured by a promissory note and deed of trust. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was the legal beneficiary of the deed of trust. Appellant’s loan was later sold to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. IndyMac F.S.B.’s and Deutsche Bank’s obligations were listed in a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA). In 2012, Appellant elected to participate in Nevada’s foreclosure medication program (FMP) with IndyMac Mortgage Services (IndyMac), Deutsche Bank’s loan servicer. The mediation concluded unsuccessfully. Appellant sought judicial review, arguing that IndyMac had failed to establish that Deutsche Bank owned his loan because the MERS assignment violated the PSA’s terms and was therefore void. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a loan assignment made in violation of a PSA is not void, but merely voidable; (2) because Appellant was neither a party to nor an intended beneficiary of the PSA, Appellant lacked standing to contest the assignment’s validity; and (3) although Respondents produced an assignment at the mediation that was executed after the PSA’s closing date, the assignment was nevertheless effective to transfer ownership of Appellant’s loan to Deutsche Bank. View "Wood v. Germann" on Justia Law

Respondent supplied steel for projects on six properties. Respondent was not fully paid for the steel delivered to the properties, and consequently, Respondent perfected mechanics’ liens on the six properties. Respondent then filed a complaint for foreclosure against each property. Thereafter, surety bonds were posted and recorded for four properties. Respondent then amended its complaint to dismiss its lien foreclosure claims against those four properties, replacing them with claims against the sureties and principles on the surety bonds. The district court concluded that Respondent established liens on the six properties. The district court ordered the sale of all six properties without demonstrating that each surety bond was insufficient to pay the sum due on its respective property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a materialman has a lien upon a property and any improvements thereon for which he supplied materials in the amount of the unpaid balance due for those materials; (2) in this case, Respondent established a materialman’s lien on each of the six properties for the unpaid balance due on the steel delivered; and (3) the district court erred by ordering the sale of all six properties. View "Simmons Self-Storage Partners v. Rib Roof, Inc." on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint against the City of North Las Vegas for inverse condemnation and precondemnation damages. The district court awarded Landowners precondemnation damages and attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders with the exception of the prejudgment interest award, which the Court reversed, concluding that the district court erred in failing to calculate prejudgment interest from the date on which the resulting injury arose. The City sought rehearing of that order on the prejudgment issue and on issues concerning the statute of limitations and standing. Although rehearing was not warranted, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevant law, holding (1) the Court’s dispositional order properly concluded that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of taking, which was the first date of compensable injury; (2) the City could not raise its statute of limitations argument for the first time on rehearing, and even if it could, that defense was inapplicable to the facts of this case; and (3) rehearing was not warranted to clarify whether the City can assert a standing defense on remand. View "City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada certified three questions of law to the Supreme Court regarding the mechanic’s lien priority law, specifically, the visible-commencement-of-construction aspect of the law, which states that a mechanic’s lien takes priority over other encumbrances on a property that are recorded after construction of a work of improvement visibly commences. The Supreme Court answered (1) the Court’s holding in J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc. v. Corus Construction Venture, LLC does not preclude a trier of fact from finding that grading property for a work of improvement constitutes visible commencement of construction; (2) the contract dates and permit issuance dates are irrelevant to the visible-commencement-of-construction test, even in this case where dirt material was placed on a future project site before building permits were issued and the general contractor was hired; and (3) the Court declined to answer the third certified question because it asked the Court to make findings of fact that should be left to the bankruptcy court. View "Byrd Underground, LLC v. Angaur, LLC" on Justia Law