Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant leased commercial real property from Respondent. Appellant vacated the property and ceased paying rent after a significant water intrusion event. Respondent filed a complaint alleging that Appellant breached the lease. Appellant counterclaimed that Respondent constructively evicted Appellant by failing to maintain the roof. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding (1) severe water intrusion justified Appellant’s vacating the property; but (2) the lease obligated Appellant to provide Respondent written notice of and thirty days to cure the water intrusion before exercising any other potential remedies, and Appellant did comply with the notice and cure provision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s factual findings did not support Appellant’s argument that it was constructively evicted, and therefore, the Court did not need to address whether Appellant was required to comply with the lease’s notice and cure provision in order to successfully assert constructive eviction. View "Mason-McDuffie Real Estate, Inc. v. Villa Fiore Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

A common interest community subject to covenants, conditions, and restrictions was encumbered by a note and deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank, N.A. The former homeowners fell delinquent on their association dues and defaulted on their obligations to U.S. Bank. The community homeowners’ association (SHHOA) and U.S. Bank separately initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC purchased the property at the SHHOA’s trustee's sale and filed an action to quiet title and enjoin the trustee’s sale on U.S. Bank’s deed of trust, alleging that the SHHOA trustee’s deed extinguished U.S. Bank’s deed of trust. The district court granted judgment for U.S. Bank, holding that a homeowners’ association (HOA) must proceed judicially to validly foreclose its superpriority lien, and since the SHHOA foreclosed nonjudicially, U.S. Bank’s first deed of trust survived the SHHOA trustee’s sale and was senior to the trustee’s deed received by SFR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2) gives an HOA a true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first deed of trust; and (2) chapter 116 permits nonjudicial foreclosure of HOA liens. View "SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Appellant obtained a home loan from IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (IndyMac F.S.B.) secured by a promissory note and deed of trust. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was the legal beneficiary of the deed of trust. Appellant’s loan was later sold to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. IndyMac F.S.B.’s and Deutsche Bank’s obligations were listed in a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA). In 2012, Appellant elected to participate in Nevada’s foreclosure medication program (FMP) with IndyMac Mortgage Services (IndyMac), Deutsche Bank’s loan servicer. The mediation concluded unsuccessfully. Appellant sought judicial review, arguing that IndyMac had failed to establish that Deutsche Bank owned his loan because the MERS assignment violated the PSA’s terms and was therefore void. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a loan assignment made in violation of a PSA is not void, but merely voidable; (2) because Appellant was neither a party to nor an intended beneficiary of the PSA, Appellant lacked standing to contest the assignment’s validity; and (3) although Respondents produced an assignment at the mediation that was executed after the PSA’s closing date, the assignment was nevertheless effective to transfer ownership of Appellant’s loan to Deutsche Bank. View "Wood v. Germann" on Justia Law

Respondent supplied steel for projects on six properties. Respondent was not fully paid for the steel delivered to the properties, and consequently, Respondent perfected mechanics’ liens on the six properties. Respondent then filed a complaint for foreclosure against each property. Thereafter, surety bonds were posted and recorded for four properties. Respondent then amended its complaint to dismiss its lien foreclosure claims against those four properties, replacing them with claims against the sureties and principles on the surety bonds. The district court concluded that Respondent established liens on the six properties. The district court ordered the sale of all six properties without demonstrating that each surety bond was insufficient to pay the sum due on its respective property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a materialman has a lien upon a property and any improvements thereon for which he supplied materials in the amount of the unpaid balance due for those materials; (2) in this case, Respondent established a materialman’s lien on each of the six properties for the unpaid balance due on the steel delivered; and (3) the district court erred by ordering the sale of all six properties. View "Simmons Self-Storage Partners v. Rib Roof, Inc." on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint against the City of North Las Vegas for inverse condemnation and precondemnation damages. The district court awarded Landowners precondemnation damages and attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders with the exception of the prejudgment interest award, which the Court reversed, concluding that the district court erred in failing to calculate prejudgment interest from the date on which the resulting injury arose. The City sought rehearing of that order on the prejudgment issue and on issues concerning the statute of limitations and standing. Although rehearing was not warranted, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevant law, holding (1) the Court’s dispositional order properly concluded that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of taking, which was the first date of compensable injury; (2) the City could not raise its statute of limitations argument for the first time on rehearing, and even if it could, that defense was inapplicable to the facts of this case; and (3) rehearing was not warranted to clarify whether the City can assert a standing defense on remand. View "City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada certified three questions of law to the Supreme Court regarding the mechanic’s lien priority law, specifically, the visible-commencement-of-construction aspect of the law, which states that a mechanic’s lien takes priority over other encumbrances on a property that are recorded after construction of a work of improvement visibly commences. The Supreme Court answered (1) the Court’s holding in J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc. v. Corus Construction Venture, LLC does not preclude a trier of fact from finding that grading property for a work of improvement constitutes visible commencement of construction; (2) the contract dates and permit issuance dates are irrelevant to the visible-commencement-of-construction test, even in this case where dirt material was placed on a future project site before building permits were issued and the general contractor was hired; and (3) the Court declined to answer the third certified question because it asked the Court to make findings of fact that should be left to the bankruptcy court. View "Byrd Underground, LLC v. Angaur, LLC" on Justia Law

Corporation obtained a loan from Lenders to help pay for real property that was secured by a deed of trust on the property. Appellant, the principal and sole owner of Corporation, signed a personal guaranty of the loan, which included a waiver of his right to receive notice of any default on the loan. Corporation defaulted on the loan, and Lender purchased the property at a trustee’s sale. Lender then filed a complaint seeking a deficiency judgment from Appellant as guarantor. The district court awarded a deficiency judgment in favor of Lender, concluding (1) Appellant’s waiver of his right to receive a notice of default was invalid pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.453; but (2) Lender substantially complied with Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.095’s notice requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Legislature intended for section 40.453 to invalidate a guarantor’s purported waiver of the right to be mailed a notice of default; and (2) substantial compliance can satisfy section 107.095’s notice requirements. View "Schleining v. Cap One, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner personally guaranteed a commercial real estate loan that Bank purchased. The borrowers defaulted on the loan, and Bank sought recovery of the loan’s balance from Petitioner. While the case against Petitioner was pending, Bank foreclosed and took ownership of the property securing the underlying loan at a trustee’s sale. Bank subsequently moved for summary judgment regarding Petitioner’s liability for his breach of the loan guaranty. Petitioner also moved for summary judgment, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455 precluded Bank from obtaining a judgment for the deficiency on the loan balance after the trustee’s sale. The district court granted summary judgment for Bank. The Supreme Court subsequently issued a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to dismiss the guaranty action against Petitioner, concluding that Bank was barred from recovery under the guaranty because it failed to apply for a deficiency judgment under section 40.455 within six months after the property’s sale. The Supreme Court denied Bank's petition for rehearing because it considered and resolved Bank’s arguments in its order granting mandamus relief and did not misread or misapply the pertinent law. View "Lavi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In this dispute over a real estate transaction, the real party in interest (KB Home) took the deposition of one of Defendants’ principals. During the deposition, the principal testified that he had refreshed his recollection and prepared for the deposition by reviewing two memoranda prepared by his attorneys and his own handwritten notes. When KB Home requested that the principal divulge the contents of the memoranda and notes, however, the principal refused on the grounds that they were privileged. KB Home filed a motion to compel production of the documents. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.125 mandates disclosure of any documents used before a deposition to refresh one’s recollection. Defendants sought writ relief from the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, holding (1) reviewing a document for the purpose of refreshing one’s memory prior to giving testimony serves as a waiver to the attorney-client privilege under section 50.125; and (2) section 50.125 applies to depositions as well as to in-court hearings. View "Las Vegas Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The developer (“Developer”) of a residential community hired a general contractor (“Contractor”) to construct homes in the community, and Contractor subcontracted with Subcontractor for construction services. Subcontractor performed services on several homes, including Appellant’s. Because Subcontractor was not fully paid, it recorded liens on properties within the community, including Appellant’s. Subcontractor filed a civil action against Developer, Contractor, Appellant, and other homeowners, seeking to foreclose on its liens. Appellant filed a cross-claim against Developer and Contractor for breach of contract and seeking to recover attorney fees as damages. The district court denied Appellant’s request to recover attorney fees, concluding that, under the standard set forth in Horgan v. Felton regarding the recovery of attorney fees in cloud-on-title cases, because the breach of contract in this case related to title of real property, and because Appellant failed to allege and prove slander of title, she could not recover the attorney fees that she sought as special damages. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment to the extent that it denied Appellant’s request for special damages, holding that Horgan did not apply to preclude such recovery in this case. View "Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC" on Justia Law