Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants appealed a district court judgment in a real property contract action. Based on Appellants’ failure to file their opening brief and appendix by the deadline and failure to comply with court rules and directives, Appellants’ appeals were dismissed. Appellants sought the en banc Court’s reconsideration, arguing that the dismissal of their appeals were based on the missteps of their lead appellate attorney, and therefore, the dismissal was contrary to the Supreme Court’s precedent recognizing public policy favoring dispositions on the merits. The Supreme Court denied en banc reconsideration, holding that precedential uniformity did not provide a basis to reinstate these appeals, as the policy was not absolute and must be balanced against countervailing policy considerations such as the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of appeals and judicial administration concerns. View "Huckabay Props., Inc. v. NC Auto Parts, LLC" on Justia Law

After Appellants purchased condominiums and engaged in related transactions at the Las Vegas Cay Club resort, Appellants filed suit against dozens of defendants, including Cay Clubs, Jeffrey Aeder, and JDI Loans, LLC and JDI Realty, LLC (together, the JDI entities), alleging that Defendants engaged in wrongdoings while abandoning a plan to improve Las Vegas Cay Club and leaving Appellants with “worthless property.” Appellants claimed that they bought the condominiums on the belief that a partnership between Cay Clubs and the JDI entities existed that would provide the expertise and resources to execute the resort’s transformation. Aeder and the JDI entities successfully moved for summary judgment with respect to their liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1), which codifies the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying the meaning and application of section 87.160(1), holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the JDI entities with regard to their liability under the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. View "In re Cay Clubs" on Justia Law

Downing, Thorpe & James Design, Inc. (DTJ) was an architectural firm incorporated in Colorado. Thomas Thrope, one of DTJ’s three founding principals, was allowed to practice individually as a foreign architect in Nevada, but DTJ was not allowed to practice as a foreign corporation in Nevada. In 2004, DTJ contracted with a Nevada developer to provide architectural services for a Las Vegas subdivision owned by Prima Condominiums, LLC (Prima). Prima obtained a loan from First Republic Bank in exchange for a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on one of the subdivision’s units. After Prima defaulted on its payments, DTJ recorded a notice of mechanic’s lien against the property for unpaid services. First Republic then foreclosed and purchased the property. DTJ subsequently brought an action against First Republic for lien priority and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for First Republic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because DTJ had failed to comply with Nevada’s statutory registration and filing provisions, it was barred from maintaining an action in Nevada for compensation for its architectural services; and (2) Thorpe’s individual status had no bearing on whether DTJ could bring or maintain an action for compensation for its services. View "DTJ Design, Inc. v. First Republic Bank" on Justia Law

Frank Sorichetti contracted Respondent to buy his property. Sorichetti reneged so Respondent sued and recorded a lis pendens against the property. Due to misinformation about the lis pendens, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. loaned Sorichetti money secured by deeds of trust against the property. Sorichetti defaulted and Countrywide initiated foreclosure. Respondent sued Countrywide. Countrywide argued that it was entitled to equitable subrogation in amount of the sum that it had paid off in prior loans against the property. Eventually, the case reached the Supreme Court for a second time. In Zhang II, the Court reversed and remanded the case, determining that the district court erred in concluding that Respondent’s lis pendens should not be given priority over Countrywide’s deeds of trust. On remand, Countrywide asked for a decision on its equitable subrogation claim, which the district court declined to give because it was “not given jurisdiction to do so by the Supreme Court.” The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of Respondent and remanded with instructions to decide Countrywide’s equitable subrogation claim, holding that the district court erred in failing to resolve the equitable subrogation issue. View "Recontrust Co., N.A. v. Zhang" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned unpaid homeowners’ association (HOA) dues. The district court concluded that the HOA fees were proper and awarded the HOA the unpaid fees and attorney fees. Appellants appealed. Meanwhile, the HOA successfully sought in the lower court supplemental attorney fees for its counsel’s additional services. The notice of entry of the supplemental attorney fees award was served by mail on August 14, 2012. On January 16, 2013, the district court denied Appellant’s subsequently filed motion to alter or amend the order. On January 30, 2013, Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the supplemental attorney fees award. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Appellants’ motion to alter or amend the post-judgment order awarding supplemental attorney fees tolled the thirty-day period for filing the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court held that the notice of appeal was timely filed because Nev. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) tolling applied to Appellants’ motion to alter or amend that was directed at the post-judgment order awarding supplemental attorney fees. View "Lytle v. Rosemere Estates Prop. Owners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Respondents, the county board of county commissioners and county treasurer, attempted to provide refunds to property owners who paid excessive property taxes due to improper appraisals. To cover the cost of the refunds, Respondents withheld amounts from property tax distributions made to various county taxing units that had previously benefited from the excessive property taxes. Appellant, one of the taxing units from which distribution amounts were withheld, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents to cease withholding portions of the distributions. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying extraordinary relief, holding that Respondents were within their authority to withhold distributions, and because the manner in which they withheld distributions was discretionary, the political question doctrine precluded judicial review. View "N. Lake Tahoe Fire Prot. Dist. v. Washoe County Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Following a dispute over unpaid property assessments, a homeowners association, management company, and an assessment collection company (collectively, the HOA) sold McKnight Family, LLP's properties at a trustee sale. McKnight filed a complaint against the HOA and the purchaser of one of the properties, alleging several claims, including one for quiet title. McKnight also filed a motion to set aside the sale based on improper notice. The district court denied McKnight's motion to set aside the sale, determining that the HOA properly served McKnight. The court then dismissed McKnight's complaint, determining that, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.310, the claims should have been submitted to a form of alternative dispute resolution before McKnight could bring the claims in district court. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that most of McKnight's claims were subject to section 38.310; and (2) erred in dismissing McKnight's claim for quiet title because that claim was not subject to section 38.310. The Court also reversed the district court's order denying the motion to set aside the trustee's sale, concluding that the court should reconsider the motion once it resolves the quiet title claim on remand. View "McKnight Family, LLP v. Adept Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

At a foreclosure mediation, Homeowners and representatives of Lender agreed that foreclosure proceedings would be halted while Homeowners were being considered for a loan modification. Several months later, Homeowners petitioned for judicial review, asserting that Lender breached the parties' agreement. The district court granted the petition, finding Lender had violated the agreement and directing Lender to participate in and pay for further mediation. The Supreme Court dismissed Lender's appeal, holding (1) to preserve and promote the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, an order remanding for further mediation generally is not final and appealable; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal because, given the remand for additional mediation, the district court's order was not final and appealable. View " Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Saxon Special Servicing serviced a promissory note that secured a home loan for Appellants. After Appellants stopped making payments to Saxon, a notice of default was recorded. Appellants elected to mediate in Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP). Saxon provided all of the required documents for the mediation, including an eighty-three-day-old broker's price opinion (BPO). The mediator ultimately determined that Saxon failed to provide "an appraisal within sixty days of mediation" because the BPO was not prepared within sixty days of the mediation. The district court concluded that the parties had negotiated in good faith with valid authority and that there was no reason to withhold the FMP certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the petition for judicial review, holding (1) the mediation rule requiring an appraisal or broker's price opinion that is no more than sixty days old at the time of the mediation requires substantial, rather than strict, compliance; and (2) Saxon substantially complied with the foreclosure mediation rule requiring a current appraisal. View " Markowitz v. Saxon Special Servicing" on Justia Law

Appellants agreed to purchase a restaurant and real property on which the restaurant was located from Respondent. After Appellants failed to make payments on the promissory note, Respondent filed an action against Appellants to recover the principal and unpaid interest. According to Respondent, a third buy-and-sell agreement between the parties was the operative agreement. But during trial, Appellants presented evidence that a fourth written agreement, which was allegedly later destroyed by Respondent or his brother, existed containing the agreed-upon purchase price and terms of the sale. The district court concluded that Appellants' evidence of the destroyed fourth agreement was barred by the statute of frauds because Appellants failed to produce the written agreement. The court then found that Appellants breached the third agreement and entered judgment for Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a writing that is subsequently lost or destroyed, and oral evidence is admissible to prove the existence and terms of the lost or destroyed writing. Remanded. View " Khan v. Bakhsh" on Justia Law