Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a dispute over unpaid property assessments, a homeowners association, management company, and an assessment collection company (collectively, the HOA) sold McKnight Family, LLP's properties at a trustee sale. McKnight filed a complaint against the HOA and the purchaser of one of the properties, alleging several claims, including one for quiet title. McKnight also filed a motion to set aside the sale based on improper notice. The district court denied McKnight's motion to set aside the sale, determining that the HOA properly served McKnight. The court then dismissed McKnight's complaint, determining that, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.310, the claims should have been submitted to a form of alternative dispute resolution before McKnight could bring the claims in district court. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that most of McKnight's claims were subject to section 38.310; and (2) erred in dismissing McKnight's claim for quiet title because that claim was not subject to section 38.310. The Court also reversed the district court's order denying the motion to set aside the trustee's sale, concluding that the court should reconsider the motion once it resolves the quiet title claim on remand. View "McKnight Family, LLP v. Adept Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

At a foreclosure mediation, Homeowners and representatives of Lender agreed that foreclosure proceedings would be halted while Homeowners were being considered for a loan modification. Several months later, Homeowners petitioned for judicial review, asserting that Lender breached the parties' agreement. The district court granted the petition, finding Lender had violated the agreement and directing Lender to participate in and pay for further mediation. The Supreme Court dismissed Lender's appeal, holding (1) to preserve and promote the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, an order remanding for further mediation generally is not final and appealable; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal because, given the remand for additional mediation, the district court's order was not final and appealable. View " Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Saxon Special Servicing serviced a promissory note that secured a home loan for Appellants. After Appellants stopped making payments to Saxon, a notice of default was recorded. Appellants elected to mediate in Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP). Saxon provided all of the required documents for the mediation, including an eighty-three-day-old broker's price opinion (BPO). The mediator ultimately determined that Saxon failed to provide "an appraisal within sixty days of mediation" because the BPO was not prepared within sixty days of the mediation. The district court concluded that the parties had negotiated in good faith with valid authority and that there was no reason to withhold the FMP certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the petition for judicial review, holding (1) the mediation rule requiring an appraisal or broker's price opinion that is no more than sixty days old at the time of the mediation requires substantial, rather than strict, compliance; and (2) Saxon substantially complied with the foreclosure mediation rule requiring a current appraisal. View " Markowitz v. Saxon Special Servicing" on Justia Law

Appellants agreed to purchase a restaurant and real property on which the restaurant was located from Respondent. After Appellants failed to make payments on the promissory note, Respondent filed an action against Appellants to recover the principal and unpaid interest. According to Respondent, a third buy-and-sell agreement between the parties was the operative agreement. But during trial, Appellants presented evidence that a fourth written agreement, which was allegedly later destroyed by Respondent or his brother, existed containing the agreed-upon purchase price and terms of the sale. The district court concluded that Appellants' evidence of the destroyed fourth agreement was barred by the statute of frauds because Appellants failed to produce the written agreement. The court then found that Appellants breached the third agreement and entered judgment for Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a writing that is subsequently lost or destroyed, and oral evidence is admissible to prove the existence and terms of the lost or destroyed writing. Remanded. View " Khan v. Bakhsh" on Justia Law

Respondent owned a three-acre parcel, the northernmost twenty feet of which was in a county setback within which Power Company had an existing ten-foot-wide utility easement. Power Company later sought to exercise two easements on the property for installation of high-voltage transmission lines. Respondent rejected Power Company's offer for the easements, and the issue of just compensation went to trial. During the reading of the jury instructions, Power Company objected a jury instruction telling the jury to disregard the setback in its valuation of the property on the grounds that Respondent's use of the area was limited to parking and landscaping. The district court included the instruction. The jury ultimately awarded Respondent $1.7 million in just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instruction at issue provided an overbroad reading of the Court's decision in City of North Las Vegas v. Robinson, but Power Company did not suffer prejudice because a separate jury instruction remedied the error; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Respondent's expert to testify regarding her paired sales analysis. View "Nev. Power Co. v. 3 Kids, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent owned four parcels of real property in Clark County. Respondent challenged the Clark County Assessor's assessment for the tax year 2011-2012 with the County Board of Equalization, which lowered the valuation. Clark County in turn appealed the revised assessment to the State Board of Equalization, which increased the valuation. Respondent ultimately petitioned the district court in Carson City for judicial review. Clark County and the Assessor filed a motion for change of venue, contending that the action should be maintained in the district court in Clark County because Respondent's property was located outside of Carson City. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute provides that a property owner with property located in any county in the State may file a property tax valuation action in any district court in the state; and (2) the Carson City district court was an appropriate venue for filing the property tax valuation challenge because it was a court of competent jurisdiction as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.420(2). View " County of Clark v. Howard Hughes Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant obtained a home loan from Countywide Home Loans. The promissory note was secured by a deed of trust naming Countrywide as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as beneficiary of the deed of trust. MERS assigned its interest in the deed of trust to HSBC Bank. Bank of America later acquired Countrywide and its assets, including Appellant's promissory note. After Appellant defaulted on the loan, Appellant participated in Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP). BAC Home Loans Servicing, as a representative of Bank of America, appeared at the mediation. After the mediation, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review, which the district court denied. Appellant appealed, arguing that Bank of America lacked authority to negotiate a loan modification at the mediation because the note and deed of trust were assigned to two separate entities. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for judicial review and refusal to impose sanctions, holding that because Bank of America was not the deed of trust beneficiary at the time of the FMP mediation, Bank of America failed to satisfy Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086(4)'s attendance and participation requirement. Remanded. View " Bergenfield v. Bank of Am." on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding that Respondent bank initiated against a home owned by Appellants. Respondent purchased the home at the trustee's sale. When Appellants did not vacate, Respondent filed an unlawful detainer action. Appellants responded by filing a complaint seeking to quiet title to the property, alleging that Respondent did not own the promissory note or deed of trust and had foreclosed without proper notice under Nev. Rev. Sat. 107.080, invalidating the trustee's sale. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss Appellants' complaint, which the federal district court granted. Appellants appealed, arguing that the district court should not have ruled on the motion dismiss because the prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine required the federal court to abstain in favor of the earlier-filed unlawful detainer action. The federal court agreed that if both the quiet title action and the unlawful detainer action were characterized as in rem or quasi in rem, then the court was required to vacate the district court's dismissal of the quiet title action. The Nevada Supreme Court accepted certification to answer the characterization of the parties' actions and held that quiet title and unlawful detainer proceedings are in rem or quasi in rem in nature. View "Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co." on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a written option contract under which Respondent had the right to purchase real property from Appellants for $8 million. The property was subject to a deed of trust securing approximately $1.3 million in debt. At issue was whether the Respondent or Appellants were required to pay off the $1.3 million debt. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the option contract required Appellants to deliver clear title, meaning Appellants were required to remove the $1.3 encumbrance for a net $6.7 option price. Appellants appealed, arguing that the option contract contemplated that Respondent take title subject to preexisting encumbrances, so that Appellants received the full $8 million option price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly interpreted the option contract and that the contract placed responsibility for the $1.3 million debt on Appellants' side of the ledger. View " Galardi v. Naples Polaris, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, Regents Bank issued two loans to Appellant. After Appellant failed to repay either loan, Regents filed a complaint in district court for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure. The district court stayed the proceedings and compelled arbitration as provided in the loan documents. The arbitrator ultimately ruled in Regents' favor. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and later entered an amended judgment and order of sale. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) Regents employed undue means in procuring the award, and (2) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in refusing to void one of the loans. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitration award, holding (1) Appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the award was procured through intentionally misleading conduct; and (2) the arbitrator's refusal to void one of the loans was not a manifest disregard of the law. View "Sylver v. Regents Bank, N.A." on Justia Law