Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent issued an eminent domain action against Appellants. The district court awarded Respondent possession of the property, and the jury found Respondent owned Appellants $4.4 million in just compensation. Appellants appealed and Respondent cross-appealed. While the appeals were pending, Respondent filed a notice of its intent to abandon the condemnation proceedings and a motion to vacate the judgment of condemnation. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order vacating the judgment while an appeal was pending but certified its inclination to grant the motion to vacate based on its conclusion that Respondent was entitled to abandon the proceedings. The Supreme Court held (1) a public agency may abandon an eminent domain action after it has paid just compensation and the district court has entered a final order of condemnation, but before the resolution of issues pending on appeal; (2) the district court retains jurisdiction to address a notice of abandonment and motion to dismiss, even while an appeal of the matter is pending in the Supreme Court; and (3) thus, the motion to remand was denied as moot because a remand was unnecessary for the district court to decide the motion to dismiss. View "Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pac. Power Co." on Justia Law

In this appeal, which arose out of Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP), the Supreme Court examined the note-holder and beneficial-interest status of a party seeking to foreclose. The Court concluded (1) to participate in the FMP and ultimately obtain an FMP certificate to proceed with the nonjudicial foreclosure of an owner-occupied residence, the party seeking to foreclose must demonstrate that it is both the beneficiary of the deed of trust and the current holder of the promissory note; (2) when the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS) is the named beneficiary of the deed of trust and a different entity holds the promissory note, the note and deed of trust are split, making nonjudicial foreclosure by either improper, but any split is cured when the promissory note and deed of trust are reunified; and (3) because the foreclosing bank in this case became both the holder of the promissory note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust, it had standing to proceed through the FMP. View "Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

In the second of two lawsuits brought by appellant Francie Bonnell against her daughter and son-in-law, respondents Sabrina and Steven Lawrence, Appellant appealed the grant of summary judgment from the first suit, along with its associated fee award. The underlying case arose from a $135,000 payment that Bonnell made to retire the mortgage debt on her daughter’s home ("Lindell premises"). Bonnell saw the payment as an advance on what her daughter would eventually inherit anyway, but with a catch: She expected, in return, a life estate in the premises, allowing her to live in the home, rent-free, for the rest of her life. The daughter acknowledged the $135,000 payment. However, she viewed it as a loan (which she and her husband repaid when they deeded Bonnell a different home with equity of $135,000). No writing memorialized the latter agreement, and the facts of the case questioned whether there was one. In her first suit, Bonnell asserted a variety of legal and equitable claims, all premised on her claimed life estate in the Lindell premises. Bonnell's attorney had withdrawn, and she continued in proper person. She received the motion for summary judgment, but she did not file a written opposition to it, and it was granted by written order. More than a year later, Bonnell obtained new counsel, who filed this second suit on her behalf. Although filed in the same judicial district and repeating the claims in the first suit, the second suit went to a new district court judge. The Lawrences moved to dismiss the second suit for failure to state a claim under NRCP 12(b)(5). They argued that res judicata barred relitigation of Bonnell’s claims and that, to the extent Bonnell identified grounds for avoiding the prior summary judgment, she could and should have asserted them by motion under NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3) within the six-month deadline specified in the rule. The district court credited the Lawrences’ arguments, rejected Bonnell’s, and dismissed the second suit with prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bonnell v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Respondent/cross-appellant Precision Construction, Inc. solicited bids from subcontractors for the design and installation of an early suppression, fast response sprinkler system. Certified Fire Protection, Inc. submitted a bid. Precision notified Certified that it won the bid, and Precision entered into a contract with the owner to complete the project. Certified obtained a copy of the subcontract along with a set of construction plans and sprinkler system specifications. The subcontract’s provisions required Certified to complete the preliminary design drawings of the sprinkler system within two weeks and to obtain a certificate naming Precision as an additional insured. Over the next few weeks, Precision asked Certified several times to sign the subcontract and provide the additional-insured certificate. Certified objected to the subcontract as imposing terms that differed from the bid specifications. It complained that the unanticipated terms changed the scope of work and that it would have to amend its bid accordingly. Certified also took exception to some of the generic contractual provisions, including the additional-insured requirement. Nonetheless, Certified hired specialists to work on the Precision contract, and began work. Precision and Certified communicated several more times about getting the subcontract signed. Eventually Precision terminated its relationship with Certified for refusing to sign the subcontract, for not providing the additional-insured endorsement, and for incorrect designs. At Precision’s request, Certified submitted an itemized billing for the work it had performed; its bill reported costs of $25,185.04, which included design work and permit fees for the project. Precision deemed the costs too high and never paid. Certified placed a mechanic’s lien on the property and sued to recover for its design-related work. Certified’s complaint sought to foreclose the mechanic’s lien and damages for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and breach of contract. On appeal, Certified argued that the district court failed to determine whether a contract for the design-only work existed but conceded that the parties never reached agreement on the full design and installation contract. Certified also asserted that the district court erred in concluding that Precision was neither unjustly enriched nor liable to Certified in quantum meruit because Precision did not benefit from the work performed. On cross-appeal, Precision argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying Precision’s motion for attorney fees. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Certified did not provide sufficient evidence to establish either an implied-in-fact contract or unjust enrichment, the Court affirmed. Additionally, the Court affirmed on cross-appeal the district court’s order denying attorney fees. View "Certified Fire Prot. v. Precision Constr." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court addressed whether a claim for fraud in the inducement was available when the basis for the claim contradicts the very language of the contract at issue in the parties’ dispute. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Court concluded that when a fraudulent inducement claim contradicts the express terms of the parties’ integrated contract, it fails as a matter of law. Additionally, the Court addressed the propriety of the damages awarded by the jury under a separate claim for breach of contract. The Court affirmed the compensatory damages award in this case, but reversed the punitive damages award, as the Court reversed the finding of fraud on which the punitive damages were based. View "Road & Highway Builders v. N. Nev. Rebar" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court addressed several issues arising from a dispute over a series of property transactions. Plaintiffs sued Defendants under various theories of liability, including breach of contract and fraud. Defendants countersued for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and fraud by concealment. Defendants also brought a claim against Plaintiffs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.257, which provides a statutory cause of action for the victim of a real estate licensee's breach of the various duties imposed by Nev. Rev. Stat 645.252-.254. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court, holding (1) compromise offers are not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a failure to mitigate damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.105; (2) although Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.251 does not, in all instances, shield real estate licensees from common law forms of liability, it precludes such liability when the type of conduct complained of is covered by sections 645.252-.254; and (3) punitive damages may not be recovered under section 645.257, but compensatory damages are recoverable under the statute in accordance with the measure of damages that appropriately compensates the injured party for the losses sustained as a result of the real estate licensee's violations. Remanded. View "Davis v. Beling" on Justia Law

Petitioners Club Vista Financial Services and others (Club Vista) entered into a real estate development project with real parties in interest Scott Financial Corporation and others (Scott Financial). When a loan guaranteed by some of the Petitioners went into default, Club Vista filed an action against Scott Financial. During discovery, Scott Financial obtained a deposition subpoena for Club Vista's attorney, K. Layne Morrill. An Arizona court granted Morrill's motion to quash the subpoena. The Nevada district court, however, denied Morrill's motion for a protective order and permitted Scott Financial to depose Morrill as to the factual matters supporting the allegations in the complaint. The Supreme Court granted Morrill's petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition in part after adopting the framework espoused by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shelton v. American Motors Corp., which states that the party seeking to depose opposing counsel must demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by other means, is relevant and nonprivileged, and is crucial to the preparation of the case. Because the district court did not analyze the Shelton factors, the Court directed the district court to evaluate whether, applying the Shelton factors, Scott Financial may depose Morrill. View "Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellants Michael and Analisa Jones purchased a home with a loan from a mortgage company, which assigned the note and deed of trust to SunTrust Mortgage. After the Joneses defaulted on their mortgage, the Joneses elected to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086. SunTrust and the Joneses resolved the pending foreclosure by agreeing to a short sale of the Joneses' home. The Joneses, however, never returned the short-sale documents and instead filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, requesting that the court impose sanctions against SunTrust because SunTrust violated section 107.086 and foreclosure mediation rules (FMRs) by failing to provide required documents and mediating in bad faith. The district court (1) denied the petition, finding that the Joneses entered into an enforceable short-sale agreement and therefore waived any claims under section 107.086 and the FMRs; and (2) allowed SunTrust to seek a certificate from the FMP to proceed with the foreclosure based on the terms of the short-sale agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the short-sale agreement was an enforceable settlement agreement, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to impose sanctions against SunTrust. View "Jones v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

This was an appeal and cross-appeal from a district court judgment awarding appellant homebuyer treble damages against respondent seller, a limited liability company, but refusing to find that the individual respondent, a former manager of the limited liability company, was liable for the judgment as the company's alter ego. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's award of treble damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 113.150(4), which awards treble damages for a seller's delayed disclosure or nondisclosure of property defects, despite the court's failure to make a finding that the seller acted willfully, as the legislature did not intend to imply a heightened level of mental culpability to the statute; and (2) vacated the portion of the court's judgment concerning the alter ego issue, as the court failed to explain its reasoning for denying alter ego status. Remanded. View "Webb v. Shull" on Justia Law

Appellants signed a note secured by a deed of trust on their home. Respondents, Regional Trustee Services Corporation (RTSC) and One West Bank, were the trustee and beneficiary of the deed of trust. After Appellants stopped making payments, RTSC initiated judicial foreclosure. Appellants elected mediation under the foreclosure mediation program (FMP), which provides proof of compliance with the state's law requiring mediation upon homeowner request before a nonjudicial foreclosure sale can proceed on an owner-occupied residence. When RTSC failed to attend the mediation, the district court declared RTSC in bad faith and directed that RTSC be denied the FMP certificate needed to conduct a valid foreclosure sale. RTSC later reinitiated nonjudicial foreclosure. Appellants sought to enjoin Respondents from pursuing foreclosure, arguing that the order denying the FMP certificate permanently prevented foreclosure. The district court denied Appellants' request and directed the parties to return to FMP mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, a lender who has been denied an FMP certificate for failing to mediate in good faith can reinitiate foreclosure by means of a new notice of default and election to sell and rescission of the original, thereby restarting the FMP process. View "Holt v. Reg'l Tr. Servs. Corp." on Justia Law