Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Lance and Eva Posner purchased a property with an outstanding loan secured by a deed of trust, which they assumed responsibility for. The deed of trust was later assigned to U.S. Bank. In 2012, U.S. Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action against the Posners, alleging that the amount owing under the note had become accelerated. However, U.S. Bank did not pursue the judicial foreclosure and voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit without prejudice in 2013. The Posners remained in default on the loan through 2019.U.S. Bank's dismissal of its judicial foreclosure action led to a dispute in 2022. The Posners filed a state-court action asserting a claim for quiet title, alleging that the 10-year period in NRS 106.240 was triggered in 2012 when U.S. Bank filed its judicial foreclosure action, such that by 2022, the deed of trust had been extinguished as a matter of law. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent U.S. Bank's scheduled nonjudicial foreclosure sale.The district court denied the request for an injunction, finding the Posners' claims had no likelihood of success. The Posners appealed, arguing that the district court erred in relying on NRS 107.550, which only applies to judicial foreclosure actions commenced on or after October 1, 2013.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that instituting judicial foreclosure proceedings does not trigger the 10-year time frame in NRS 106.240. The court concluded that the Posners' quiet title claim had no likelihood of success on the merits because the judicial foreclosure action did not trigger the 10-year time frame in NRS 106.240. Therefore, the lien on the subject property was not discharged as a matter of law in 2022. View "Posner v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was tasked with determining whether a government entity, in this case Clark County, qualifies as a "person" under Nevada's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. This arose from a dispute where a property owner, 6635 W Oquendo LLC, claimed Clark County lacked the authority to impose civil penalties and to record liens against its property. Clark County, in response, filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing that the actions forming the basis of Oquendo's claims were protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. The district court ruled in favor of Oquendo, stating that Clark County was not a "person" for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed this decision, concluding that a government entity is not a "person" under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court rejected Clark County's arguments, stating that the statutory definition of "person" in Nevada law does not include a government, governmental agency or political subdivision of a government. The court also clarified that an earlier decision, John v. Douglas County School District, did not establish that a governmental entity is a "person" for the purpose of anti-SLAPP protections. The court concluded that Clark County was not entitled to file an anti-SLAPP motion, affirming the lower court's decision. View "Clark County v. 6635 W Oquenda LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment by substituting other remedies in place of an equitable lien placed by the bankruptcy court on real property located at 10512 Loma Portal Avenue, holding that, based on the preclusive effect of prior court orders, an equitable lien was the only available remedy to satisfy Respondent's interest concerning the property.At issue before the Supreme Court was the preclusive effect of the multiple court orders in this case and the equitable remedies available under those orders. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) an equitable lien placed on property to satisfy a debt permits the lien holder to enforce the value of the equitable lien against the debtor's property even where that property has been subsequently transferred to a nondebtor spouse during divorce proceedings; (2) the district court erred by substituting other remedies in place of the equitable lien; and (3) genuine issues of material fact remained as to the value of the equitable lien placed on the property, as well as the value of the property itself. View "Holland v. Barney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint brought by a first deed of trust holder against its title insurance company for breach of contract and related claims, holding that there was no error.The insurer in this case denied coverage to a first deed of trust holder for its loss of interest in property following a foreclosed upon a "superpriority piece." At issue was whether the first deed of trust holder could recover for its loss of interest in the subject property by making a claim on its title insurance policy. The district court granted the title insurance company's motion to dismiss as to all claims, concluding that no coverage existed under the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were properly dismissed; and (2) the first deed of trust holder was not entitled to relief on its remaining allegations of error. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Administrator of the Division of State Lands of the State Department of Conservation and Natural Resources and dismissing Appellants' petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.110 for a declaratory judgment that a fee-setting regulation was invalid, holding that there was no error.At issue was NAC 322.190, a regulation that sets permit fees for the residential use of piers and buoys on navigable waters in Nevada. Appellants petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the fee-setting regulation was invalid. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Division. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Division did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating NAC 322.195, and Appellants failed to overcome the presumption that the regulation is valid. View "Killebrew v. Donohue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a deed of trust on real property continued to encumber the property, holding that there was no error.LV Debt Collect, which acquired title to the subject property in 2013, filed this quiet title action in 2016 seeking a declaration that a home homeowners' association's foreclosure sale extinguished Bank of New York Mellon's (BNYM) deed of trust and that LV Debt Collect held an unencumbered ownership interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for BNYM, determining that the deed of trust continued to encumber the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a loan secured by real property does not become "wholly due" for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 when a notice of default is recorded as to the secured loan. View "LV Debt Collect, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Buyer in this dispute arising from an ordinary course covenant in an asset purchase agreement, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Buyer.In April 2019, Seller entered into an agreement to sell a casino and hotel to Buyer. The agreement contained an ordinary course covenant requiring Seller to operate its business in the usual manner between the time the agreement was signed and closing. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Seller complied with the Governor's emergency directive mandating closure of all nonessential businesses. The pandemic also affected Buyer's duties under the agreement. Buyer subsequently terminated the agreement and sued Seller for return of the deposit, alleging various contract claims. Seller counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Buyer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Seller did not violate the agreement's ordinary course covenant by closing the casino and hotel as mandated by the Governor's emergency directive and was entitled to retain the earnest money deposit. View "Lucky Lucy D LLC v. LGS Casino LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissal in favor of a loan servicer and trustee in this case involving a home equity line of credit agreement (HELOC) with a defined maturity date and closed draw period, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Court was whether a loan servicer and trustee were entitled to foreclose upon Borrowers' residence due to Borrowers' failure to repay the funds provided to them under the terms of their HELOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Borrowers' HELOC was both a negotiable instrument under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(1) and a promissory note under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(5), entitling the loan servicer and trustee to enforce the document under Nev. Rev. Code chapter 104 due to Borrowers' default; and (2) erred in finding that Borrowers' property was not owner-occupied and thus not subject to statutory requirements pertaining to foreclosures affecting owner-occupied housing, but the error was harmless. View "Wishengrad v. Carrington Mortgage Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Tahican LLC's petition seeking a writ of mandamus affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Tahican LLC's second motion seeking to expunge a lis pendens, holding that the district court did not err in denying Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens.Max Joly and Bydoo, LLC formed a partnership. Joly later transferred his shares in the partnership to Bydoo but Bydoo did not make the payments required under the parties' agreement. Joly sued Bydoo and Jean Francois Rigollet, alleging breach of contract. Bydoo later transferred real property to Tahican by quitclaim deed. When Joly recorded a notice of lis pendens against the property Rigollet sought to expunge the lis pendens. Joly amended his complaint to add Tahican as a defendant and allege fraudulent transfer. The district court denied the motion to expunge and granted summary judgment in favor of Joly on the majority of his claims. Tahican brought this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was no error in the denial of Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens because a fraudulent transfer claim seeking avoidance of the transfer of real property is an "action...affecting the title or possession of real property" within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 14.010(1). View "Tahican, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.At issue was whether the revocable living trust agreement was effective to establish the decedent's house, his only real property, as an asset of the trust under Nevada law and to the satisfaction of the relevant statute of frauds. The district court confirmed the trustee and the house as trust property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trust agreement effectively funded the decedent's house to the trust; (2) the agreement satisfied the common law statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.205(1); and (3) the decedent's living trust agreement funded the trust with his house. View "In re Trust Agreement of Davies" on Justia Law