Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court concluding that a residual beneficiary's objection to the second and third amendments to the Ella E. Horst Revocable Trust was time-barred under Nev. Rev. Stat. 164.021(4), holding that the objection was timely.Following the settlor's death, Respondent, the trustee, sent notice of irrevocability to the Trust's beneficiaries pursuant to section 164.021. The notice included copies of the original Trust and the Trust's first three amendments. Sixteen months later, Respondent petitioned to confirm a purported fourth amendment to the Trust. Appellant, a residual beneficiary, filed an objection, alleging that the second through fourth amendments were the product of undue influence. The district court confirmed the original Trust and its first three amendments, concluding that Appellant's objection to the amendments was time-barred under section 164.021(4), which provides a window of 120 days from service of the notice of irrevocability for bringing an action to challenge a trust's validity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to trigger the 120-day limitation period under section 164.021(4), the trustee's notice must include all trust provisions pertaining to the beneficiary; (2) because Respondent's initial notice to beneficiaries did not include the purported fourth amendment, the notice did not trigger the 120-day limitation period; and (3) therefore, Appellant's objection was timely. View "In re Estate of Horst Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a creditor of a settlor may bring a claim against a settlor of a trust so long as the settlor's interest in the trust is not solely discretionary and there is not a spendthrift provision precluding payment of the claim and that where a trust provides broad discretion to its trustees, the trustees may approve a creditor's claim against the trust.At issue was whether a creditor may satisfy its claim against the settlor's trust where the trust does not specifically provide for payment of the claim but the trustees approve the payment. The district court ordered frozen trust funds be released to pay the creditor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) both parties had standing to maintain this action, and the appeal is not moot; (2) the trust allowed for payment of the creditor's fees; (3) the creditor satisfied the procedural requirements to file a creditor's claim; and (4) the trustees had broad discretion to approve the creditor's claim. View "In re Christian Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the district court confirming Third Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to a Survivor's Trust and denying a challenge to the settlor's capacity, holding that the district court failed to comply with the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 164.015.Here, the settlor's daughter, Amy Wilson, challenged the settlor's capacity to execute amendments to the Trust in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 164.015. Under the statute, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing, make factual findings, and issue an order binding in rem on the trust and appealable to the Supreme Court. The district court entered an order denying the objections and confirming the amendments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it did not hold an evidentiary hearing or provide factual finding regarding the settlor's mental capacity prior to approving the amendments to the trusts. View "In re Frasier Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioners challenging a district court order compelling the production of allegedly privileged documents in a trust dispute with a beneficiary, holding that the documents were undiscoverable and that this Court expressly declines to recognize the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in Nevada.Petitioners, former trustees, challenged a district court order compelling a group of documents containing a former trustee's notes related to a phone call with counsel and a second group of documents containing the former trustee's notes taken during a meeting with other trustees, counsel, the opposing party, and an independent appraiser. The Supreme Court held that the district court acted in excess of jurisdiction in compelling the partial production of the disputed documents because (1) the first group of documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) the second group of documents were protected by the work-product doctrine. View "Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this dispute between a trust's trustee and beneficiary the Supreme Court granted the trustee's original writ petition seeking a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, mandamus on the grounds that a discovery order was improper as a matter of law, holding that neither the trust instrument nor Nevada trust law required the trustee to consider the beneficiary's other assets before making distributions from the trust.This case concerned three trusts - the Raggio Trust and its two subtrusts, the Marital Trust and the Credit Shelter Trust. The Raggio Trust named Trustee as the trustee and life beneficiary of the subtrusts. Respondents were named as remainder beneficiaries of the Marital Trust. Respondents sued Trustee alleging that Trustee improperly distributed funds from the Marital Trust and paid herself distributions in amounts that were more than necessary for her proper support, care and maintenance. To prove their claim, Respondents sought discovery of Trustee's accounting and distributions of the Credit Shelter Trust. The district court granted the motion to compel discovery. The Supreme Court granted Trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 163.4176 nor the Raggio Trust required Trustee to consider her other assets in making distributions from the Marital Trust, and therefore, information about those assets was irrelevant. View "Raggio v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that a secondary beneficiary was entitled to property in a trust created by Paul and decedent Chari Colman, Paul's ex-wife, holding that the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.781(1) automatically revokes any revocable disposition from one spouse to another upon divorce.While they were married, Paul and Chari lived in a home Chari owned as her separate property. Later, Chari transferred the property to the family trust but did not change its status as her separate property. The trust named Paul and Chari as the trust's primary beneficiaries and provided that, after their deaths, Tonya Collier was the beneficiary of the property. One month after Paul and Chari divorced, Chari died. Based on section 111.781(1), Collier filed a petition seeking to confirm her status as beneficiary to the property. The district court ordered the property transferred to Collier. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by applying section 111.781 and concluding that it required revocation of Paul's interest in the property; and (2) substantial evidence supported the finding that the property remained Chari's separate property throughout the marriage. View "In re Colman Family Revocable Living Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Barto v. Weishaar, 692 P.2d 498 (Nev. 1985), and its conclusion that a suggestion of death emanating from the deceased party must identify the deceased party's successor or representative to trigger the deadline set forth in Nev. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) to file a motion to substitute, holding that Barto expanded rule 25(a)(1) beyond its plain language.James McNamee was sued for damages. During the litigation, McNamee died. Counsel for McNamee filed a suggestion of death without naming a successor or representative. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Susan Clokey as special administrator to defend the negligence suit. McNamee's attorney later filed a motion to substitute Clokey as the party defendant in the negligence suit. The district court denied the motion and named Fred Waid as general administrator of McNamee's estate. McNamee's attorney moved to dismiss the personal injury case because his motion to substitute had been denied. The district court denied the motion and substituted Waid as the defendant in place of McNamee. The Supreme Court held (1) a suggestion of death that is properly served triggers the deadline for filing a motion to substitute regardless of whether it identifies the deceased party's successor or representative; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner's motion to substitute. View "McNamee v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting Respondent's motion to decant half of a wholly charitable trust's property, holding that the district court erred in ordering a course of action that the trust instrument did not permit and the settlors did not intend.The district court's order decanted half the trust's property into a newly created wholly charitable trust with the same purpose as the original charitable trust, to be administered solely by one trustee of the original trust. This action was taken against the objection of co-trustees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by ordering the wholly charitable trust decanted under Nev. Rev. Stat. 163.556 because the terms of the trust instrument required the unanimous consent of all trustees to make a distribution of half of the trust's assets. View "Phung v. Doan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that where an individual has been appointed special administrator of an estate that includes residential real property, the special administrator resides in the property as his or her primary residence, and the special administrator retains an ownership interest via intestate succession laws, the special administrator is entitled to participate in a foreclosure mediation program (FMP) regarding the decedent’s residential real property, despite the fact that the property was purchased in the decedent’s name only.Appellant was the decedent’s spouse and the special administrator of the decedent’s estate. When Respondent commenced foreclosure proceedings on the home the decedent purchased in her name only, Appellant requested foreclosure mediation through Nevada’s FMP. The mediator concluded that the property was not eligible for the FMP because Appellant was not an owner or grantor of the property and because the order appointing him as special administrator did not specifically authorize him to participate in the FMP. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant obtained an ownership interest in the property upon the decedent’s death, the property served as his primary residence, and his status as special administrator authorized him to take action to preserve the decedent’s estate, Appellant was entitled to participate in the FMP. View "Pascua v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court declining to enforce a no-contest clause of a 1972 Trust against Respondent, a trustee-beneficiary, holding that a trust beneficiary does not forfeit interest in the trust’s assets pursuant to a no-contest clause penalty by breaching her fiduciary duties while acting in her dual capacity as trustee.The district court found that Respondent violated her fiduciary duties as trustee of the 1972 Trust but determined that her acts as trustee did not warrant imposition of the Trust’s no-contest clause to revoke her beneficiary status. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no-contest clauses do not apply to foreclosure beneficiary interests when the beneficiary, acting in a trustee capacity, breaches her fiduciary duty. View "Montoya v. Ahern" on Justia Law