Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was trust property that was transferred from the trust to a limited partnership by consent of the trust beneficiaries. The partnership subsequently transferred the property to a third-party business. The district court (1) imposed a constructive trust on the previous trust property based on the alleged improper transfer made by the partnership to the third party, and (2) entered a personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and the third party holding the former trust assets. At issue on appeal and cross-appeal was whether the in rem jurisdiction over the trust assets conferred upon the district court by Nev. Rev. Stat. 164.010(1) and 164.015(6) permitted the district court to impose the constructive trust and to enter the personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and third-party company. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 164.010(1) and 164.015(6) did not confer jurisdiction upon the district court to enter a constructive trust on the disputed assets and a personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and third-party company because in rem jurisdiction only extends to property, and the disputed assets were no longer trust property after they were transferred to the limited partnership. Remanded.View "In re Aboud Inter Vivos Trust" on Justia Law

Appellants, two taxicab drivers, brought an action against Respondents, taxicab companies, claiming damages for unpaid wages pursuant to the Minimum Wage Amendment, a constitutional amendment that revised Nevada’s then-statutory minimum wage scheme. The district court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the Minimum Wage Amendment did not repeal Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.250, which excepts taxicab drivers from Nevada’s minimum wage provisions, and that the statutory exceptions could be harmonized with the constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Minimum Wage Amendment, by clearly setting out some exceptions to the minimum wage law and not others, supersedes and supplants the taxicab driver exception set out in section 608.250(2). View "Thomas v. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp." on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced in Nevada pursuant to a decree that granted Mother custody of the parents’ two children and ordered Father to pay Mother child support. Father later relocated to Hawaii and ceased making child support payments. Thereafter, the Hawaii court issued an administrative order that continued the Nevada child support order. The Hawaii court later entered an order reducing Father’s child support obligation. After the children reached the age of majority, Mother filed a motion requesting the Nevada district court to determine that the Nevada child support order was controlling and for a judgment of arrears. The Nevada court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act applies retroactively; and (2) Nevada had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over this child support matter under the Act because Mother and the children continuously resided in Nevada and the parents did not consent to the assumption of jurisdiction over and modification of the order by the Hawaii court. View "Holdaway-Foster v. Brunell" on Justia Law

Catherine Doan and Craig Doan divorced in 2003. The divorce decree did not include Craig’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) retirement benefit despite the fact that the retirement benefit was disclosed and discussed during the divorce proceedings. In 2009, Catherine filed a motion for division of an omitted asset after her attorney discovered that she was not receiving Craig’s FAA retirement benefits. The district court modified the final decree of divorce, concluding that Craig’s retirement benefits were omitted from the divorce decree because of a mutual mistake. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an ex-spouse who does not file a motion for relief from a divorce decree within the six month period under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is not entitled to partition absent exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief; and (2) under the facts of this case, Catherine was not entitled to equitable relief because the retirement benefit was adjudicated in the divorce proceedings. View "Doan v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were unmarried parents of one child. Father established himself as the child’s father with to a written acknowledgment of paternity. After Mother relocated with the child to California without Father’s consent or knowledge, Father filed a motion for the child’s return and for an award of primary custody. The district court awarded Mother primary physical custody of the child and allowed the child to remain with her in California. In making its determination, the court concluded that because the couple did not have a judicial child custody order, Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.200, the statute governing relocation by an established custodial parent, was inapplicable in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) unmarried parents have equal custody rights regarding their child absent a judicial custody order to the contrary; (2) the district court did not err in finding section 125C.200 was inapplicable in this case; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mother primary physical custody and approving her relocation with the child to California based on its determination that Mother had a “good faith” reason for the move and that living with Mother in California was in the child’s best interest. View "Druckman v. Ruscitti" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of one count of first-degree murder, based on both premeditated and felony murder, and two counts of sexual assault. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court committed clear error by overruling his Batson objection and allowing the State to exercise peremptory challenges against several minority prospective jurors because the State’s explanations for striking the venirepersons were pretext for racial discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court clearly erred by allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge to dismiss an African-American prospective juror, as it was more likely than not that the State struck the prospective juror because of race. View "Conner v. State" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Nevada Tax Commission (NTC) promulgated Nev. Admin. Code 361.61038, which set forth an apportionment formula for calculating remainder-parcel property values for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.4722. Respondent owned a parcel that was divided from a larger piece of land before the regulation's enactment and was properly characterized as a "remainder parcel" under section 361.4722(6). Appellant, the county assessor, valued the land under the approach he used before section 361.61038 was enacted. Respondent appealed, seeking application of the new regulation's apportionment formula. The NTC upheld the assessor's valuation and declined to apply its new regulation retroactively. The district court reversed the judgment of the NTC and directed it to apply section 361.61038 to Respondent's remainder parcel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in this case, (1) application of the regulation would be impermissibly retroactive; and (2) the methods the assessor used did not violate the Constitution.View "County of Clark v. LB Props., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners were sued by Investors who alleged that Petitioners had breached various statutory, contractual, and fiduciary duties. Petitioners filed numerous counterclaims alleging (1) Dana Gentry, a local television reporter, helped Investors investigate and prepare their lawsuit in order to manufacture news stories intended to embarrass Petitioners; and (2) Gentry received personal favors from Investors in connection with the news stories. During discovery, Petitioners served a subpoena on Gentry requesting information relating to Gentry's relationship with Investors. Gentry filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that the information sought was protected by Nevada's news shield statute, which protects journalists from being required to reveal information gathered in their professional capacities in the course of developing news stories. The district court granted the motion to quash. The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' petition for extraordinary relief, concluding that Gentry's motion to quash the subpoena properly asserted the news shield privilege and that Petitioners failed to overcome this privilege.View "Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In Carrigan I, the Nevada Supreme Court held that city councilman Michael Carrigan's vote on the Lazy 8 hotel/casino project constituted protected speech under the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Carrigan's vote on the Lazy 8 project did not constitute protected speech, thus reversing the Nevada Supreme Court decision that the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine invalidated the conflict-of-interest recusal provision in Nevada's Ethics in Government Law. On remand, Carrigan challenged the constitutional validity of the core conflict-of-interest recusal provisions in Nevada's Ethics in Government Law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the conflict-of-interest recusal provision in Nevada's Ethics in Government Law is not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) the conflict-of-interest recusal provision does not unconstitutionally burden the First Amendment freedom-of-association rights shared by Nevada's elected officials and their supporters.View "Carrigan v. Nev. Comm'n on Ethics" on Justia Law

The State charged Petitioner with two counts of first-degree murder and associated offenses. The State filed a motion in the juvenile court seeking to unseal and release Petitioner's juvenile records to assist in the prosecution. The juvenile court issued an order broadly unsealing and releasing the records for "use in the prosecution." The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief, holding (1) a district attorney is not statutorily authorized to inspect a defendant's sealed juvenile records to obtain information that will be used against him or her in a subsequent proceeding; and (2) therefore, the juvenile court manifestly abused its discretion by granting the State's motion to inspect Petitioner's sealed juvenile records.View "Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law