Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a civil complaint against The Power Company, Inc. (“TPCI”) and TPCI’s president, Rick Rizzolo. Less than five years after Plaintiffs filed their action, they entered into a settlement agreement with TPCI and Rizzolo providing that Plaintiffs would receive $9 million upon the sale of Crazy Horse Too, which TPCI owned. More than five years after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, TPCI and Rizzolo filed two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) for want of prosecution. The district court denied the motions. After the Crazy Horse Too sold at a foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs filed a third motion to reduce the settlement agreement to judgment. The district court granted the motion. TPCI and Rizzolo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 41(e)’s provision requiring dismissal for want of prosecution does not apply to an action in which the parties enter into a binding settlement agreement before Rule 41(e)’s five-year deadline has expires, and therefore, the district court properly denied TPCI and Rizzolo’s motions to dismiss for want of prosecution; and (2) the district court did not err in reducing the parties’ settlement agreement to judgment. View "The Power Co., Inc. v. Henry" on Justia Law

Appellants were injured in automobile accidents, but Geico, which insured both Appellants, denied coverage of their medical expenses. Appellants subsequently instituted a class action of behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alleging that Geico violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.145(3), which provides that a motor vehicle insurer must offer its insured the option of purchasing medical payment coverage, because, while Geico may have offered its insureds medical payment coverage, it did not obtain written rejections from them of the offered coverage. The district court granted Geico’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 687B.145(3) does not require a written rejection of medpay coverage, and therefore, Appellants’ claims failed. View "Wingco v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The State charged real party in interest Jihad Zogheib with several crimes. Steven Wolfson, who was a criminal defense attorney before being appointed to the elective office he currently held, was appointed district attorney. Zogheib moved to disqualify the district attorney’s office based on a conflict of interest because an attorney in Wolfson’s former law firm represented Zogheib in the instant case. The district court disqualified the district attorney’s office, concluding that there was a conflict of interest between Wolfson and Zogheib and that the conflict should be imputed to the office because the appearance of impropriety warranted vicarious disqualification even though Wolfson had been screened from participating in the case. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) the appearance-of-impropriety was the incorrect standard to apply, and the more appropriate standard was whether Wolfson’s conflict of interest would render it unlikely that Defendant would receive a fair trial unless the conflict was imputed to the prosecutor’s office; and (2) regardless of which standard is applied, the district court acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting Zogheib’s motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his proposed instructions regarding self-defense. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to self-defense instructions because there was competent evidence of self-defense; (2) Defendant’s proposed jury instructions did not misstate Nevada law; (3) Defendant’s justifiable battery theory was not substantially covered by other instructions; and (4) the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s proposed jury instructions was not harmless and constituted reversible error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of a crime and given a suspended prison sentence and placed on probation. When Defendant completed his probationary period, he was subject to a special sentence of lifetime supervision. After commencing lifetime supervision, Defendant filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, requesting that the district court release him from lifetime supervision or strike the lifetime supervision requirement. The district court denied Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person who is subject only to lifetime supervision may not file a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence because that person is no longer under “sentence of death or imprisonment” as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.724(1). View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Delaware corporation registered to do business in Nevada, purchased four aircraft to transport its employees and guests to and from its worldwide establishments. Each of the aircraft consistently flew to and from Nevada while in service and were continuously used in interstate commerce. Appellant paid Nevada use tax on each of the aircraft but later requested refunds for the taxes paid, claiming that the aircraft were not purchased for use in Nevada within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 372. The Nevada Department of Taxation denied the requested refunds. The Nevada Tax Commission and the district court upheld the denial. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether, by purchasing the aircraft out of state and later bringing them to Nevada, Appellant became subject to the use tax imposed by section 372.185. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department erred in its interpretation of chapter 372, and Appellant’s aircraft were not subject to Nevada’s use tax. View "Harrah's Operating Co. v. State Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

After Appellants purchased condominiums and engaged in related transactions at the Las Vegas Cay Club resort, Appellants filed suit against dozens of defendants, including Cay Clubs, Jeffrey Aeder, and JDI Loans, LLC and JDI Realty, LLC (together, the JDI entities), alleging that Defendants engaged in wrongdoings while abandoning a plan to improve Las Vegas Cay Club and leaving Appellants with “worthless property.” Appellants claimed that they bought the condominiums on the belief that a partnership between Cay Clubs and the JDI entities existed that would provide the expertise and resources to execute the resort’s transformation. Aeder and the JDI entities successfully moved for summary judgment with respect to their liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1), which codifies the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying the meaning and application of section 87.160(1), holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the JDI entities with regard to their liability under the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. View "In re Cay Clubs" on Justia Law

Appellant-homeowners filed a complaint against Respondent-contractor for negligence and breach of warranty arising from construction defects in their homes. After a trial, the jury awarded verdicts for each homeowner. Appellants and Respondent subsequently filed motions for costs and attorney fees, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s order denying Appellants’ motion for a new trial for attorney misconduct, and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of costs or attorney fees to Appellants, but reversed the court’s order as it related to Respondent’s motion for costs and attorney fees because the court failed to apply the full, applicable legal analysis in this instance. Remanded. View "Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with murder and other crimes, charging the murder count as willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and, alternatively, as felony murder in the perpetration of burglary. During the jury trial, Appellant’s theory of defense was that the felony-murder rule did not apply because the underlying felony, burglary, was complete before the killing happened, and thus, the death did not occur “during the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of a felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(1)(b). Appellant was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, aggravated stalking, and burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction even though the killing in this case occurred after the offense of burglary was complete because section 200.030(1)(b) holds felons strictly responsible for killings that result from their felonious actions. View "Sanchez-Dominguez v. State" on Justia Law

Steven Jacobs filed an action against Las Vegas Sands Corp. and related entities (collectively, “Sands”). During a hearing to consider sanctions as a result of Sands’s conduct in the discovery process, Sands attorney Justin Jones admitted that, prior to testifying, he had reviewed his billing records and e-mails from Jacobs that refreshed his memory as to the timing of events. Jacobs argued that the billing records and e-mails were openly discoverable because Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.125 requires a party to disclose any documents used to refresh a witness’s recollection. Sands objected based on the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. Without deciding the discovery issue, the district court imposed sanctions on Sands. Two months later, Jacobs filed a motion to compel production of the disputed documents, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court granted Sands’s request for a writ of prohibition to halt the production of the purportedly privileged documents, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, where Jacobs failed to demand production, inspection, and admission of the documents at or near the sanctions hearing and waited until well after the district court had entered its order, Jacobs’s demand was untimely under section 50.125(1). View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law