Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline issued a verified statement of complaint against the Honorable Steven E. Jones, a family court judge, alleging that he may have violated the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct by his alleged involvement in two particular incidents of domestic battery and a resulting temporary protective order violation. An investigation was subsequently conducted into Judge Jones’s conduct. Judge Jones filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to halt and dismiss the disciplinary proceedings against him, asserting that the investigation upon which the proposed charges were based resulted from a defective complaint, was conducted by a biased party in an untimely manner, and included an improper scope. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that the issues Judge Jones raised were not yet ripe for review. View "Jones v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315, which provides that the declaration of a person who collects a criminal defendant’s blood for evidentiary testing may be admitted at trial. The City of Reno charged Respondent with misdemeanor driving under the influence. At a bench trial, the City sought to introduce into evidence the declaration of a phlebotomist who collected Respondent’s blood for evidentiary testing after Respondent’s arrest. Respondent objected, and the municipal court excluded the declaration on Confrontation Clause grounds. The district court denied the City’s subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus, determining that admitting the phlebotomist’s declaration into evidence over Respondent’s objection would have violated Respondent’s right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts requires the Court to overrule its prior decision in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, where it held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315(6) adequately protects the rights provided by the Confrontation Clause; and (2) section 50.315(6)’s requirement that a defendant establish a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding the facts in a declaration made and offered as evidence pursuant to section 50.315(4) impermissibly burdens the right to confrontation. View "City of Reno v. Howard" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Reno who intended to run for mayor, filed a writ petition seeking extraordinary relief preventing the city clerk and chief elections officer from taking the steps necessary include either Jessica Sferrazza or Dwight Dortch on the 2014 ballot for the mayoral race, asserting that Sferrazza and Dortch were ineligible to run for mayor under Nev. Const. art. XV, 3(2) by virtue of their twelve years of service as Reno City Council members. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Article 15, Section 3(2) prevents an individual who has served for twelve years in one position on a local governing body from then serving additional terms in a different position on the same body. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that because the Reno City Charter makes the mayor a member of the city’s “local governing body” for all purposes, Article 15, Section 3(2) bars a term-limited council member from thereafter being elected mayor of Reno. View "Lorton v. Jones" on Justia Law

Downing, Thorpe & James Design, Inc. (DTJ) was an architectural firm incorporated in Colorado. Thomas Thrope, one of DTJ’s three founding principals, was allowed to practice individually as a foreign architect in Nevada, but DTJ was not allowed to practice as a foreign corporation in Nevada. In 2004, DTJ contracted with a Nevada developer to provide architectural services for a Las Vegas subdivision owned by Prima Condominiums, LLC (Prima). Prima obtained a loan from First Republic Bank in exchange for a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on one of the subdivision’s units. After Prima defaulted on its payments, DTJ recorded a notice of mechanic’s lien against the property for unpaid services. First Republic then foreclosed and purchased the property. DTJ subsequently brought an action against First Republic for lien priority and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for First Republic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because DTJ had failed to comply with Nevada’s statutory registration and filing provisions, it was barred from maintaining an action in Nevada for compensation for its architectural services; and (2) Thorpe’s individual status had no bearing on whether DTJ could bring or maintain an action for compensation for its services. View "DTJ Design, Inc. v. First Republic Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor. Defendant filed a notice for a jury trial, which the justice court denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the charged offense. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief, claiming that the offense of domestic battery was serious enough to warrant a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the misdemeanor charge of domestic battery because he did not demonstrate that first-offense domestic battery is a serious offense for which he was entitled to a jury trial. View "Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant appealed, raising several issues for the Supreme Court’s review. After consideration of the issues, the Supreme Court determined that only two had merit and held (1) the district court erred in failing to record numerous bench and in-chambers conferences; (2) the district court erred in failing to excuse for cause a prospective juror who was equivocal about her impartiality; but (3) the errors in this case did not prejudice Defendant and were therefore harmless. View "Preciado v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a workers’ compensation claim for an injury he received when slipping down a flight of stairs. Liberty Mutual, Respondent’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, denied the claim. A hearing officer with the Department of Administration affirmed, but an appeals officer reversed the claim denial. Liberty Mutual subsequently filed a petition for judicial review in the Second Judicial District Court. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition because Liberty Mutual was not a resident of Washoe County, and therefore the petition did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(b)’s residency requirement. The Second Judicial District Court transferred venue. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order transferring venue and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition for judicial review, holding that section 233.130(2)(b) is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement and because Liberty Mutual was not a resident of Washoe County, the Second Judicial District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Liberty Mutual’s petition. View "Liberty Mut. v. Thomasson" on Justia Law

Frank Sorichetti contracted Respondent to buy his property. Sorichetti reneged so Respondent sued and recorded a lis pendens against the property. Due to misinformation about the lis pendens, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. loaned Sorichetti money secured by deeds of trust against the property. Sorichetti defaulted and Countrywide initiated foreclosure. Respondent sued Countrywide. Countrywide argued that it was entitled to equitable subrogation in amount of the sum that it had paid off in prior loans against the property. Eventually, the case reached the Supreme Court for a second time. In Zhang II, the Court reversed and remanded the case, determining that the district court erred in concluding that Respondent’s lis pendens should not be given priority over Countrywide’s deeds of trust. On remand, Countrywide asked for a decision on its equitable subrogation claim, which the district court declined to give because it was “not given jurisdiction to do so by the Supreme Court.” The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of Respondent and remanded with instructions to decide Countrywide’s equitable subrogation claim, holding that the district court erred in failing to resolve the equitable subrogation issue. View "Recontrust Co., N.A. v. Zhang" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned unpaid homeowners’ association (HOA) dues. The district court concluded that the HOA fees were proper and awarded the HOA the unpaid fees and attorney fees. Appellants appealed. Meanwhile, the HOA successfully sought in the lower court supplemental attorney fees for its counsel’s additional services. The notice of entry of the supplemental attorney fees award was served by mail on August 14, 2012. On January 16, 2013, the district court denied Appellant’s subsequently filed motion to alter or amend the order. On January 30, 2013, Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the supplemental attorney fees award. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Appellants’ motion to alter or amend the post-judgment order awarding supplemental attorney fees tolled the thirty-day period for filing the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court held that the notice of appeal was timely filed because Nev. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) tolling applied to Appellants’ motion to alter or amend that was directed at the post-judgment order awarding supplemental attorney fees. View "Lytle v. Rosemere Estates Prop. Owners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Appellant was terminated from his position as a group supervisor at a youth center after an incident involving Appellant and one of the youths. Appellant, who was a classified employee with the State Department of Health and Human Services in the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), administratively appealed his dismissal. A State Personnel Commission hearing officer set aside Appellant’s dismissal and remanded to DCFS to determine the appropriate level of discipline for Appellant’s infraction. Appellant subsequently sought judicial review to have a district court decide the issue of whether the hearing officer, as opposed to the employer, should determine the appropriate level of discipline for Appellant’s situation. The district court denied Appellant’s petition, concluding that hearing officers, after finding that dismissal was unreasonable, are not required to determine the appropriate level of discipline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that only appointing authorities, and not hearing officers, have the power to prescribe the actual discipline imposed on permanent classified state employees. View "Taylor v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law