Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of a crime and given a suspended prison sentence and placed on probation. When Defendant completed his probationary period, he was subject to a special sentence of lifetime supervision. After commencing lifetime supervision, Defendant filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, requesting that the district court release him from lifetime supervision or strike the lifetime supervision requirement. The district court denied Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person who is subject only to lifetime supervision may not file a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence because that person is no longer under “sentence of death or imprisonment” as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.724(1). View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Delaware corporation registered to do business in Nevada, purchased four aircraft to transport its employees and guests to and from its worldwide establishments. Each of the aircraft consistently flew to and from Nevada while in service and were continuously used in interstate commerce. Appellant paid Nevada use tax on each of the aircraft but later requested refunds for the taxes paid, claiming that the aircraft were not purchased for use in Nevada within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 372. The Nevada Department of Taxation denied the requested refunds. The Nevada Tax Commission and the district court upheld the denial. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether, by purchasing the aircraft out of state and later bringing them to Nevada, Appellant became subject to the use tax imposed by section 372.185. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department erred in its interpretation of chapter 372, and Appellant’s aircraft were not subject to Nevada’s use tax. View "Harrah's Operating Co. v. State Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

After Appellants purchased condominiums and engaged in related transactions at the Las Vegas Cay Club resort, Appellants filed suit against dozens of defendants, including Cay Clubs, Jeffrey Aeder, and JDI Loans, LLC and JDI Realty, LLC (together, the JDI entities), alleging that Defendants engaged in wrongdoings while abandoning a plan to improve Las Vegas Cay Club and leaving Appellants with “worthless property.” Appellants claimed that they bought the condominiums on the belief that a partnership between Cay Clubs and the JDI entities existed that would provide the expertise and resources to execute the resort’s transformation. Aeder and the JDI entities successfully moved for summary judgment with respect to their liability under Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.160(1), which codifies the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying the meaning and application of section 87.160(1), holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the JDI entities with regard to their liability under the partnership-by-estoppel doctrine. View "In re Cay Clubs" on Justia Law

Appellant-homeowners filed a complaint against Respondent-contractor for negligence and breach of warranty arising from construction defects in their homes. After a trial, the jury awarded verdicts for each homeowner. Appellants and Respondent subsequently filed motions for costs and attorney fees, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s order denying Appellants’ motion for a new trial for attorney misconduct, and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of costs or attorney fees to Appellants, but reversed the court’s order as it related to Respondent’s motion for costs and attorney fees because the court failed to apply the full, applicable legal analysis in this instance. Remanded. View "Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with murder and other crimes, charging the murder count as willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and, alternatively, as felony murder in the perpetration of burglary. During the jury trial, Appellant’s theory of defense was that the felony-murder rule did not apply because the underlying felony, burglary, was complete before the killing happened, and thus, the death did not occur “during the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of a felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(1)(b). Appellant was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, aggravated stalking, and burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction even though the killing in this case occurred after the offense of burglary was complete because section 200.030(1)(b) holds felons strictly responsible for killings that result from their felonious actions. View "Sanchez-Dominguez v. State" on Justia Law

Steven Jacobs filed an action against Las Vegas Sands Corp. and related entities (collectively, “Sands”). During a hearing to consider sanctions as a result of Sands’s conduct in the discovery process, Sands attorney Justin Jones admitted that, prior to testifying, he had reviewed his billing records and e-mails from Jacobs that refreshed his memory as to the timing of events. Jacobs argued that the billing records and e-mails were openly discoverable because Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.125 requires a party to disclose any documents used to refresh a witness’s recollection. Sands objected based on the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. Without deciding the discovery issue, the district court imposed sanctions on Sands. Two months later, Jacobs filed a motion to compel production of the disputed documents, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court granted Sands’s request for a writ of prohibition to halt the production of the purportedly privileged documents, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, where Jacobs failed to demand production, inspection, and admission of the documents at or near the sanctions hearing and waited until well after the district court had entered its order, Jacobs’s demand was untimely under section 50.125(1). View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline issued a verified statement of complaint against the Honorable Steven E. Jones, a family court judge, alleging that he may have violated the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct by his alleged involvement in two particular incidents of domestic battery and a resulting temporary protective order violation. An investigation was subsequently conducted into Judge Jones’s conduct. Judge Jones filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to halt and dismiss the disciplinary proceedings against him, asserting that the investigation upon which the proposed charges were based resulted from a defective complaint, was conducted by a biased party in an untimely manner, and included an improper scope. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that the issues Judge Jones raised were not yet ripe for review. View "Jones v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315, which provides that the declaration of a person who collects a criminal defendant’s blood for evidentiary testing may be admitted at trial. The City of Reno charged Respondent with misdemeanor driving under the influence. At a bench trial, the City sought to introduce into evidence the declaration of a phlebotomist who collected Respondent’s blood for evidentiary testing after Respondent’s arrest. Respondent objected, and the municipal court excluded the declaration on Confrontation Clause grounds. The district court denied the City’s subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus, determining that admitting the phlebotomist’s declaration into evidence over Respondent’s objection would have violated Respondent’s right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts requires the Court to overrule its prior decision in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, where it held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315(6) adequately protects the rights provided by the Confrontation Clause; and (2) section 50.315(6)’s requirement that a defendant establish a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding the facts in a declaration made and offered as evidence pursuant to section 50.315(4) impermissibly burdens the right to confrontation. View "City of Reno v. Howard" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Reno who intended to run for mayor, filed a writ petition seeking extraordinary relief preventing the city clerk and chief elections officer from taking the steps necessary include either Jessica Sferrazza or Dwight Dortch on the 2014 ballot for the mayoral race, asserting that Sferrazza and Dortch were ineligible to run for mayor under Nev. Const. art. XV, 3(2) by virtue of their twelve years of service as Reno City Council members. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Article 15, Section 3(2) prevents an individual who has served for twelve years in one position on a local governing body from then serving additional terms in a different position on the same body. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that because the Reno City Charter makes the mayor a member of the city’s “local governing body” for all purposes, Article 15, Section 3(2) bars a term-limited council member from thereafter being elected mayor of Reno. View "Lorton v. Jones" on Justia Law

Downing, Thorpe & James Design, Inc. (DTJ) was an architectural firm incorporated in Colorado. Thomas Thrope, one of DTJ’s three founding principals, was allowed to practice individually as a foreign architect in Nevada, but DTJ was not allowed to practice as a foreign corporation in Nevada. In 2004, DTJ contracted with a Nevada developer to provide architectural services for a Las Vegas subdivision owned by Prima Condominiums, LLC (Prima). Prima obtained a loan from First Republic Bank in exchange for a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on one of the subdivision’s units. After Prima defaulted on its payments, DTJ recorded a notice of mechanic’s lien against the property for unpaid services. First Republic then foreclosed and purchased the property. DTJ subsequently brought an action against First Republic for lien priority and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for First Republic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because DTJ had failed to comply with Nevada’s statutory registration and filing provisions, it was barred from maintaining an action in Nevada for compensation for its architectural services; and (2) Thorpe’s individual status had no bearing on whether DTJ could bring or maintain an action for compensation for its services. View "DTJ Design, Inc. v. First Republic Bank" on Justia Law